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Daily Report
East Europe

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Albania: Socialists Protest Delay in Posting Electoral Rolls

AU0705153396 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 7 May 96 p 3

[Article by Rezear Xhaxhiu: "Alarm Over the Electoral Rolls"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—There is alarm in the opposition camp. The electoral rolls have still not been published, and the concern of the opposition reached the oval table of the Central Electoral Commission yesterday. The members of the opposition on the arbitrating commission argued that the delays in posting the lists are intentional, in order to allow time for their manipulation. On the basis of the law, electoral rolls are to be posted no less than 30 days before the election day, and their absence has led to the first argument breaking out in the body masterminding the election campaign. Arjan Madhi, the commission's lawyer, admits the contradiction between the law and the current state of affairs, but claims: "There is no need for alarm because the elections will not in the end miscarry." The Central Electoral Commission explains that "nothing can be announced before the polling stations are created." The legal deadline has expired for them, too, but Madhi explains that "secondary reasons led to delays here."

Admitting a defect in the law that was hastily passed by parliament, the members of the commission excuse the delays in publishing the electoral rolls by claiming that the failure to keep to the law will not have any consequence. This position appears not to convince the Albanian Socialists. Sabit Brokaj said that "this delay is an attempt to rig the elections and will oblige the Socialists to start to exert pressure on the local authorities and on President Berisha himself, who guaranteed free elections." A protest to President Berisha to be issued by Socialist Party [PS] headquarters today will reconfirm this tough stand.

More reassuring reports have reached the central headquarters of the Secretariat for Local Government today. A considerable number of municipalities throughout the country have displayed the lists in the places appointed by the law. Njazi Kosovrasti confirmed for GAZETA SHQIPTARE yesterday evening that the municipalities of Berat, Fier, Durres, Elbasan, Lushnje, Vlore, Tepelene, and many other districts had published the disputed lists. For the local government chief, there was no question of any intentional neglect among the municipalities and prefectures, but only a contradiction in the law.

There has also been dispute within the commission about the deadline for deciding the polling stations, especially over siting them in schools and kindergartens. Members of the commission used the provision in the law against siting polling stations in apolitical state institutions as an argument against putting them in schools. However, it appears that Albanian reality has obliged even these determined critics to retreat, and the commission has decided to use schools for the elections. They are the most suitable buildings for the normal conduct of the elections because it is hard to find specially constructed buildings in Albania, Madhi explained.

PS: The Dead on the Lists, Too

Even the dead have been registered on the list in Puke District. The most recent news from PS headquarters was accompanied by the most bitter charges against the state and Berisha over attempts to rig the elections. The political camp of the largest opposition party has cast a great shadow of suspicion over the Democratic Party and Berisha. The main concern of the Socialists, who are among the main contestants for electoral victory, is the possible theft of the free votes of the people.

Albania: Firearms Reportedly Used on Socialist Campaigners

AU0705194296

[FBIS Report] Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian on 7 May carries on page 3 two 400-word reports, one by "B.A." in Lac and the other by Gezim Ashimi in Korce, on incidents that occurred on 5 and 6 May during the Socialist Party's (PS) election campaign, under the joint headline "Bullets Against the Socialists."

B.A.'s report from Lac on 6 May states: "Assembled to meet Ali Dervishi, their candidate for the town of Lac, the Socialists of Kurbin witnessed shocking incidents that almost went as far as bloodshed. After a meeting in Lezhe and Zejmen, Socialist Deputy Chairman Hajdaraga and candidate Paloka were escorted along the road by many cars with national flags. The cars of the PS supporters were subjected to a detailed search by the police at Milot and then allowed to go free. When the Socialists cars arrived in front of the Palace of Culture in Lac, a small group of people shouted 'Down with communism,' while the PS supporters retorted 'Down with communism, long live Fatos Nano.' This led to the PS supporters being struck with rubber truncheons. Police forces then prevented them from entering the hall. Meanwhile, Albert Xhuti, PS district secretary, was kicked by people prepared for incidents. P. Pepa was seized by the police and beaten horribly in a van. Ilir Laci, one of those mistreated yesterday, reported that Gjin Buraku, the driver of the chairman of the district, drew his pistol, loaded it, and pointed it at Albert Xhuti. Many policemen and other people then rushed forward to prevent Buraku from firing. A bullet struck the ground during efforts to render the gun harmless. Ilir Laci was then subjected to a hail of blows from rubber truncheons, and only the intervention of a policeman and Democratic Alliance candidate Fatos Gjoni enabled him to take refuge with Xhuti in a nearby apartment. Several other Socialist supporters such as Petraq Kumaraku were later detained by the police. Bearing in mind the deterioration of the situation, the Socialist leaders saw fit to talk only briefly to their hundreds of supporters, while KOHA JONE's reporter was not allowed to follow the meeting. After the end of the rally, a group of 10 people surged forward in the direction of the Socialists cars, throwing stones at them."

Gezim Asimi reports an incident in Korce during the early hours of 5 May involving bullets aimed at a writer of Socialist slogans. The report states that Julian Kodra, deputy chairman of the Eurosocialist Youth Forum in Korce, was fired on by a man in plain clothes who got out of a car with official number plates. The report states: "Perhaps only the darkness helped Kodra save himself from the bullets. What is known for certain is that he fell into the hands of the secret police. Kodra and Bilal Hysollari, another member of the Eurosocialist Youth Forum, ended up in the police station." The report states that the two Korce Eurosocialists were released after 18 hours of mistreatment in detention.

Albania: Press Warns of State Violence Against Opposition

AU0805120096 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 8 May 96 p 9

[Commentary by Gavrosh Levonja: "Bullets Warn of Murder"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Stones, slander, and blackmail against the opposition are now the main weapons being used by certain groups of "supporters" who are "fighting against the return of communism" in their own way.

The events of last week, with the removal of pictures of Nano in Devoll, the forcible removal of the Socialist Party [PS] flag from the party's Tepelene headquarters, and the detention of Socialist activists who had cheered for the PS and its leaders have marked the start of state violence against the opposition.

The tendency to obstruct opposition rallies at all costs is reminiscent of the position taken by the communist regime in the days after 12 December 1990 and before the elections of 31 March 1991, just as the banditry at Burrel is reminiscent of the counterrallies of communist fanatics in small towns such as Tropoje and Tepelene in the first months of 1991. It is interesting that excesses against the opposition are again a feature of small-town life. Acts of violence against the opposition party are appearing alongside clamorous propaganda by the progovernment media, accusing the opposition of using or at least trying to use force to coerce voters. However, everybody knows that the opposition is much poorer in resources in this area than the state, which moreover has the law on its side. The propaganda in the state media is an attempt to blame the opposition for the violence being used by the state itself. There is also a commotion about the opposition exerting pressure on businessmen to finance the PS campaign. However, this is against common sense. Nobody who knows how many beans make five can swallow this story cooked up in the propaganda kitchens of the state. The very opposite is more credible. The state, which has the tools of violence in its hands, has not only approved laws in the interests of the clans that are at the state's apex, but also has twisted them to assist them to retain power. The opposition is also accused of setting in motion the former Sigurimi. However, to admit that the Sigurimi remains active after five years and still possesses the strength and the means to subject people to blackmail is a sign of the incompetence of the present government, which has supposedly not been able to dismantle its organization.

Even in those constituencies that progovernment propaganda in one way or another admits are bastions of the Socialists, no act of provocation against the ruling party has been committed. This is another argument that belies the claims of the dilettantes in charge of the progovernment propaganda, especially those of the disinformation department. The simplest logic leads to the conclusion that the state is behind these incidents, as it was five years ago.

If we add to this merry-go-round of illegal acts the bullets fired at Socialist activists over the past few days, there is no difference at all from the bloody events of five years ago, over which the present regime has initiated criminal investigations, not to mention the heavy propaganda on this subject that is put out by the progovernment media.

The establishment at that time, considering the privileges they enjoyed and the enormous difference between their living standards and those of the remainder of the people, could not conceivably surrender power, which they claimed to have won with blood, without bloodshed. However, the most obvious parallel with the present government's determination to cling to power at all costs suggests that power, despite its much-publicized difficulties, has become "sweet" to them too. Their blind insistence on not surrendering power is another reason in favor of the oft-mentioned existence of corruption among the members of the present government, which treats the state as their fiefdom instead of behaving as its servants. The Albanian media carried some truly spine-chilling news yesterday. The electoral campaign was "enriched" by the only ingredient it needed to make it resemble the campaigns of Latin America or some African country dogged by political murders that generally culminate in a coup d'etat. The bullets in Korce and Lac are a warning that citizens must prepare themselves to find even political murders an ingredient of political life.

Bulgaria: Solana Visit, NATO Membership Considered

AU0605133496 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 4 May 96 p 8

[Commentary by Lyubomir Denov: "We Pretend To Be More Pro-NATO Than Solana"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is ridiculous for us to pretend to be more pro-NATO than Solana.

During his few hours in Sofia, the chief of the North Atlantic Pact saw how much we are worth; the only thing he could not understand was why we are promoting a hysteria over the differences in our views.

Throughout his visit, the Spaniard tried to tell us that he had come not as an arbiter, but as a partner. He doggedly evaded both direct appeals to admit us into the pact immediately and humiliating attempts to sit on the fence, by saying we are not for NATO, but are not against it either.

"I read the memorandum carefully"—this was Solana's diplomatic reply to a request to comment on the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] memorandum in which the opposition sought parallel negotiations with NATO alongside the government. What can one say to them? That they are doing this at the wrong time? In the same way, he evaded satisfying the Socialists' dreams of extracting high praises for the government's document on an enhanced dialogue with NATO. "Good, very good," the secretary general repeated, without making it clear what exactly he was referring to.

We Bulgarians are strange people. Injured by decades of one-man power, we seemed to be ashamed to admit to the Spaniard that we have no united view. We praise to the skies the "determination" of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Albania, without realizing that there it is simply impossible to hold an opinion different from that held by the government.

What, then, is better? To make at least a few strides toward the values of democracy, or to be complacent that someone is doing the thinking on your behalf? For, in the final analysis, entry into NATO will not be determined by who wanted it and how strongly they wanted it, nor by who was the first to apply for full membership.

The West thinks pragmatically. First, it has no intention of burdening itself with unnecessary expenditures on stabilizing insecure states like our own. It will be much cheaper for it to allow stable states like the Czech Republic and Hungary to snuggle under its wing. Second, [words illegible] from Yalta and Malta, they send us mercilessly into Russia's sphere of influence. NATO will continue to be a mirage for every Bulgarian until the moment that Moscow and Washington reach a consensus.

Furthermore, in this fast-moving world nothing stands still. This is no wonder that, just as Solana himself traveled the road from a convinced pacifist and an opponent of Spain joining NATO to become NATO's chief, so our own Socialists are changing their spots too, except in cases where people are genetically in their views, as is the case with Vladimir Spasov's men. [Spasov is leader of the revived Bulgarian Communist Party] Again, why do the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] members not evolve in a smoother transition, in the name of national consensus? Nevertheless, at the present period of cruel transition, the main priorities for every Bulgarian are bread and a roof over his head. Security is a different category, it may stand above everything, but at least it is not so seriously threatened by attack.

Solana did not want to deceive us with empty promises. Nevertheless, he is a former physics professor, and the politician in him cannot take the upper hand completely. Why, however, are we trying to deceive him ourselves?

Bulgaria: Commentator Views 'Price' of Joining NATO

AU0305102596 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 3 May 96 p 7

[Commentary by Petur Bochukov: "Yes, but at What Price"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Javier Solana is an experienced diplomat. He knows what to say and when. He also knows how to say it. In addition, he knows to whom and why is he saying what he says. Finally, he knows what goals is he pursuing. Yesterday, NATO's secretary general arrived in our country, the last stop of his second East European tour. He met our most senior politicians, and repeated what he said in a DUMA interview, namely, that expanding NATO is a complex process, which includes giving the new members serious and reliable guarantees of their security. This is something Bulgaria wants very much after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, and even more so, as the guarantees are offered by the most powerful military organization in the world. What else can we do but accept with gratitude the historic chance of acquiring reliable protection. Let us recall that already in 1990 the Bulgarian Government accepted the invitation to establish diplomatic relations with NATO, in 1993 Bulgaria began its participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in 1994 we joined the Partnership for Peace program, and now we express our readiness to intensify the dialogue with NATO.

So far so good, except for a few details. Only three days ago, Solana said in Prague that NATO's potential future members in Eastern Europe must accept the principle of deploying nuclear weapons on their territory. He is an experienced diplomat, and he knows what he is saying and to whom. Therefore, the doubts regarding Bulgaria's future membership in NATO are well founded, despite his calming statement yesterday to the effect that the Euromissiles were eliminated a long time ago. This is because, first of all, even during the period when Moscow used to command us, there were no nuclear weapons on Bulgarian territory, and second, because if we agree to such a condition, it would mean that our country will become a permanent target of the future enemies of the alliance to which we will belong. NATO has nuclear weapons.

Another important detail is the fact that at least for the time being it is unclear whether Bulgaria could select the variant of membership, or whether it will be imposed by Brussels. According to the famous study on NATO's eastward expansion, there are three variants of joining the alliance: full membership—political and military; the Spanish variant—political and military membership, but without nuclear weapons on the country's territory; and third—the already perishing French variant, according to which the country participates only in the Alliance's political structures. Will Bulgaria be able to chose?

If those details are not clarified, our politicians will not be able to coordinate their positions. The dispute as to what is or is not a matter of our national security will continue. This is so despite the fact that Solana brought the invitation on beginning the intensified dialogue with NATO in the Alliance's headquarters. The dialogue is expected to continue until December.

The NATO secretary general's talks in Sofia did not create any problems. This was so not only because the hosts' attention was focused on the dangerous caprices of the unstoppable dollar and the threat of a hyperinflation, but also because the specific issues were clarified at the expert level. Solana liked the Bulgarian document on the so-called intensified individual dialogue. Therefore, there was no place for issues such as relations between NATO and Russia, and the reform in NATO, which still have not been clarified. The mutual compliments expressed by Solana and the most senior Bulgarian politicians are a sign of the good diplomatic atmosphere. No unclarified factors must remain behind those words. We must not find ourselves in a situation in which we are a NATO member, but we do not know what happens in this organization. We do not mean any fundamental suspicions because NATO is an organization of democratic states. We are talking about the degree to which our sovereignty will be limited and the price that we will have to pay. If it includes the deployment of nuclear weapons on Bulgarian territory, then the price is unacceptable for us. The question is not whether this or that Bulgarian Government could bargain better, but in asserting greater clarity in Europe's future security architecture, whose political and military structures we will gradually enter. It must be remembered that Solana, who knows very well what is he saying and where, said one thing in Prague, and another—in Sofia.

Bulgaria: Prospects for Dobrev as Interior Minister

AU0805093296 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 8 May 96 p 9

[Commentary by Todor Tokin: "Dobrev Should Take Care Not To Become a Second Dimitur Stoyanov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nikolay Dobrev is taking the helm of the Interior Ministry at a moment that is very complex on the one hand, but extremely favorable for him personally on the other. Society would applaud any action to combat organized crime, whose back the future minister promised to break in the promises he made before his upcoming appointment. Judging from the public mood, this moment has come. An April public opinion poll conducted by BBSS Gallup International showed that 86.3 percent of Bulgarian want strong government, while only 7 percent are against. The percentage in favor has certainly risen by a point or two following the murder of the three police officers in the Lyulin residential district. The poll showed that 31 percent believe that crime is the most important problem facing Bulgaria at the present, while 51.7 percent of Bulgarian support applying the death penalty and only 5.6 percent want it to be abolished.

At the same time, however, the future minister will have to try very hard to improve the good image of the police, which has dived to 8.9 percent, while 57.2 percent see the police image as poor.

Nevertheless, a danger of a quite different kind is emerging. Dobrev will be the first interior minister since 10 November 1989 who is directly linked with the leading BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] structures. He is a member of the BSP Executive Bureau and chief of its key Organizational Department. The probability of a remerging of the party apparatus with the police cannot be overlooked. If the police permit themselves to yield to disastrous emotions, they may again become the party's iron fist, in which event Dobrev may find himself referred to as the new Dimitur Stoyanov, who served for almost 15 years as a Politburo member and interior minister in the time of mature socialism. At the start of the great changes in 1989-90, the depoliticization of the militia was one of the first points on which the national roundtable reached a consensus. The merging of the militia with the party lay at the basis of the totalitarian system that everyone vowed that they wanted dismantled once and for all. From that point to this very day, the interior ministers have been either nonparty members or members of the ruling party or coalition, like Yordan Sokolov and Lyubomir Nachev, who both, however, stood far away from the top of their party leaderships. The diplomat Lyuben Gotsev was interior minister in Andrey Lukanov's first socialist administration, while the judge Pencho Penev held the post in the second socialist government. Khristo Danov, who served under Dimitur Popov, was a nonparty man, as was Viktor Mikhaylov, who served in Professor Lyuben Berov's cabinet. Chavdar Chervenkov left military counterintelligence when he was called to take charge of the Interior Ministry under Reneta Indzhova's administration.

Memories of the endless party bargaining for the post of top policeman under previous administrations are still fresh in our minds.

One of the theories put forward on why the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] government fell from power was that Filip Dimitrov refused to appoint Emil Buchkov, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms man, as a deputy prime minister to oversee the key power ministries (including the Interior Ministry).

There were times when nonparty professionalism was a quality looked for in the person to hold the stressful post of chief of the Interior Ministry. Dobrev has amassed a certain amount of experience in this respect as deputy chairman and then chairman of the National Security Commission in the last two parliaments. However, we will very soon see which aspect of his past experience will take the upper hand: the good professional or the classic party apparatchik.

Bulgaria: Vuchev on Collapse of Sudanese Arms Deal

AU0605133096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 6 May 96 p 1

[Article by KONTINENT correspondent Nedyalka Filipova: "Arms Export Deal Worth $120 Million Falls Through"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Stara Zagora—A deal to supply weapons worth $120 million to Sudan, which was concluded on 26 April, has fallen through after an arms embargo was imposed on Sudan a few days later, Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev announced in an interview given to a local newspaper here.

According to Vuchev, this was no accident. He says that there is a certain lady who represents the United States in Bulgaria, and she made accusations to the Bulgarian diplomatic representatives that Bulgaria was exporting weapons to Iran. Vuchev said that the allegation was that Iran for its part was passing on the weapons to the Hizballah group in Lebanon. This is not true, but the lady's statements were no accident, because negotiations on the contract were in progress precisely at that time, Vuchev alleged. Competition is extremely fierce in foreign markets, accordingly all the foreign trade activities of our statesmen are aimed at solving the problems of the military-industrial complex (MIC), Vuchev said.

The Americans have established themselves in most of Bulgaria's previous markets, Vuchev declared, but no one will permit the MIC to collapse. During the summer, a start will probably be made on privatizing the sector and on removing certain ancillary production activities from the MIC, the minister announced.

No one knows why our arms exports were stalled during the first quarter of the year, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov told journalists in Plovdiv on 4 May. He suggested as one possible reason the introduction of the new Arms Trading Act and the formation of new structures to control the arms trade. In Videnov's view, however, this will be no hindrance to a sharp increase in arms exports during the second quarter.

Bulgaria: Finance Minister Questioned on Budget Updating

AU0805110596 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 8 May 96 p 11

[Interview with Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov by an unnamed 24 CHASA representative; place and date not given: "We May Adjust the Budget, but Only After Making Savings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [24 CHASA] With the dollar at its present rate, will you want to update the budget?

[Kostov] I will want greater frugality in budget expenditure.

[24 CHASA] What does that mean?

[Kostov] Spending money more sparingly.

[24 CHASA] Where will you make the savings?

[Kostov] Savings can always be made everywhere.

[24 CHASA] Mention a specific area.

[Kostov] Some other time.

[24 CHASA] Will you want to cut the base interest rate?

[Kostov] No, I want to create conditions so that the BNB [Bulgarian National Bank] can reach this decision by itself.

[24 CHASA] What are these conditions?

[Kostov] Acceleration of structural reform, especially the closure of loss-making firms.

[24 CHASA] Do you regard the current dollar rate as normal?

[Kostov] I do not know what you have in mind.

[24 CHASA] Was the leap in the rate caused by speculation?

[Kostov] A speculative element was present, but there were some things that lay at the foundation, because last year the losses made by companies were greater than the budget deficit.

[24 CHASA] At what dollar level can one still talk about making economies stay within the budget framework?

[Kostov] As in the family household budget, one can always raise the question of more frugal expenditure, and the same is true of the state.

[24 CHASA] Even at a level of 150 leva to the dollar?

[Kostov] Yes, of course.

[24 CHASA] When will you decide to ask for a budget update?

[Kostov] When the job is finished.... I say yet again, the issue does not only relate to the state's debt, but also to the companies' bad debts. When all this is made ready in a package, then I will be able to say categorically how and where the budget can be adjusted. However, I would not want to leave you with the impression that the expenditure side of the budget will merely be multiplied by some coefficient. Quite to the contrary, we must work in the direction of identifying all possible savings.

Bulgaria: Tomov Warns of Danger of Financial Crisis

AU0605140496 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 4 May 96 p 4

[Article by Aleksandur Tomov, leader of the Civic Alliance for the Republic: "In the Coming Months, We May Get a Government of National Salvation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The country faces the danger of high and possibly uncontrollable inflation. The government either does not understand the complexity of the overall situation or pretends not to. Every day, its leaders attend BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] party conferences, while at the same time the lev sinks, and with it the state.

Clear differences are apparent between the government and the Bulgarian National Bank [BNB], and these particularly influenced the devaluation of the lev during the last week. The BNB raised the interest rate, while the prime minister declared that he will "pressure" the bank to lower the interest rates. This made any action by the BNB senseless or at the least futile.

Everyone is clearly aware that the BNB's foreign currency reserves have been severely depleted, while its actual operating reserves, which can be used to support the market, have declined below the minimum required for good financial health. This is no secret either to the Bulgarian or to the foreign financial institutions, or to the handful of players in the so-called interbank market. It is being kept a secret only from the Bulgarian people.

We are witnessing a decline in confidence, unprecedented in recent years, in the statements of the official government institutions that manage the economy. All the promises of large sums coming from abroad and of agreements with the IMF have remained unfulfilled. A direct link exists between the decline of confidence in the government and the decline of confidence in the lev.

With the dizzy increases in the interest rates and the rise in the dollar, the budget adopted for 1996 already looks unrealistic. Its macroeconomic framework has been upset, which places a question mark over the entire state policy for the forthcoming period and the confidence in this policy.

The lev is losing ground at a furious rate, before we have even made a start on paying our principal debts this year to the international financial institutions, and at a moment when we are still harboring faint hopes of reaching some kind of agreement with the world financial organizations.

The tunnel from which we can emerge without incurring hyperinflation (or at least making it more bearable) and without ending in dictatorship (which will halt our development for many years to come) is a very tight fit, and it becomes tighter every day. The present Bulgarian Government has no more than 10-20 days available to tell the people whether it sees the way out and whether it can guide the state through it.

The way out from this situation is a major cabinet reshuffle, a broadening of the social base on which the government stands, and a radical turnabout in its policies. If this does not happen or if it is delayed, within the coming months it may become necessary to form a government of national salvation, with the participation of representatives of the parliamentary majority and publicly acknowledged experts.

A whole series of measures have to be taken within two to three days—days that are sufficient to deal with the general critical state of the financial system and the entire economy. It would be a gross mistake to think that the closure of a group of enterprises or the restructuring of part of our internal debt will by themselves produce a speedy and wide-acting effect. What is needed is the following: updating of the budget, a sharp reduction in budget expenditure, a broadening of the scope of the proposed structural reform, a bold but professional rethinking of the restructuring of the banking sector, and reaching an agreement with the trade unions on the social cost of these measures.

Since it is increasingly unlikely that the government as presently constituted will manage to implement these measures and, in particular, to restore the confidence of the world financial organizations, it is clear that it will have to accept into its team people who are capable of creating trust and of reaching an agreement with the IMF and the London Club under the difficult conditions that have been created.

Finally, what is needed is complete transparency and glasnost regarding the actions taken, honest dialogue and frankness with the people, and a new media policy. In the final analysis, we need less partisanship, coupled with more professionalism and appreciation of the realities.

Bulgaria: Petkov Advocates National Salvation Government

AU0705133796 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 7 May 96 p 3

[Article by Georgi Landzhov: "Professor Petkov Proposes Government of National Salvation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—Bulgaria has fallen into the most terrible economic, financial, and social disaster since 1989, Professor Krustyu Petkov, president of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB], declared yesterday. This is now not merely something that has been established by the opposition and the trade unions. In an article in yesterday's issue of DUMA, the prime minister's economic adviser Ivan Angelov acknowledges this. What is more, in the article quoted by Prof. Petkov, it is admitted for the first time that the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government was not prepared to cope with governing and implementing the reform.

The only way to rescue the country, the trade union leader claimed, is for everyone to adopt urgent and nonstandard measures. In his view, three scenarios are possible in Bulgaria. It is likely that Videnov will intensify the war with the opposition, the president, the unions, and the financial institutions, and the outcome of this will be fatal. Another possibility, Petkov said, is for Videnov to soften his policies by taking political responsibility and broadening his coalition partners, although the last step is impossible.

In Petkov's view, the only winning move is to obtain a working consensus, most of all in parliament. The political formula for this is a government of national salvation. However, this government should not be like the one in 1991, and the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] would not agree to this. According to Prof. Petkov, the SDS position of allowing the cabinet to collapse is a political winner. However, if the SDS wins any eventual early elections, it will be placed in an exceptionally serious situation of having to govern with a ruined economy. The SDS coalition should not participate in government, so as not to confuse the issue and assume the responsibility, but it should make a number of concessions to ensure a degree of parliamentary consensus in the event of a switch in policy and a starting of the reforms. If the political situation changes, the KNSB will assume its portion of the responsibility, the trade union leader declared.

Czech Republic: Poll Shows ODS Almost 10% Ahead of CSSD

AU0705141596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 6 May 96 p 2

[Article by "(jik)": "According to STEM, the Strongest Party's Lead Has Again Increased"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—According to the most recent poll conducted at the end of last week by the Center for Empirical Research [STEM], the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] stands a chance of winning the coming elections with an almost 10-percent lead over the social democrats.

In an extensive survey conducted last Friday and Saturday [3 and 4 May], in which STEM attempted to evoke the atmosphere of the real elections as they will also be held on these days in just under four weeks, 29.1 percent of the several thousand respondents supported the ODS, while only 20.4 percent supported the social democrats.

"This time, we wanted to take the poll as if it were the real elections, so we spoke to people on Friday and Saturday and at exactly the times when the elections will really be held in just under a month," said Vera Haberlova of STEM yesterday.

The difference between the electoral preferences for these parties was less than it is now in the poll conducted at the beginning of April. While 20.5 percent supported the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] at that time, support for the ODS was lower—26.7 percent.

During the past month, the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] has lost some of its voters; it is now supported by 7.0 percent, whereas 8.5 percent supported it in April. On the other hand, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] has improved from 8.2 to 9.7 percent, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] from 7.8 to 10.6 percent, and Sladek's Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC] from 6.6 to 8.8 percent.

If the votes won are converted to the number of seats the individual parties could hold in the 200-member chamber after the elections, STEM has ascertained that the current coalition parties—that is, the ODS, ODA, and the KDU-CSL—should have a total of 107 seats, while they have 112 at the moment. According to the new poll, the ODS is guaranteed 68 deputies' mandates (72 now), the ODA 16 (the same as now), and the KDU-CSL 23 (24 now). This would mean that the coalition, as long as its composition is the same after the elections, would require the support of more opposition deputies than it does at the moment to promote constitutional laws. That is, at least 120 deputies have to vote for a constitutional law to be approved.

According to the poll, the Social Democrats' Club would comprise 48 deputies, the KSCM Club would have 25 deputies, and the SPR-RSC Club would have 20 deputies.

The other political parties remain stable in the polls at under 3.0 percent, so their hopes of getting into parliament, for which they need at least 5.0 percent, are negligible.

Czech Republic: Ruml Ridicules CSSD, Supports Police

AU0705181196 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 7 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Czech Interior Minister Jan Ruml by Bohumil Pecinka; place and date not given: "BIS Needs a Political Protector"]

[FBIS Translated Text] LIDOVE NOVINY questioned Jan Ruml, interior minister and election leader of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] in Western Bohemia, about security issues.

[Pecinka] How do you foresee the future of the local police forces?

[Ruml] The municipal police emerged, among other things, as an expression of the sovereignty of local administrations. Its tasks in enforcing local bylaws are beyond dispute. In addition, the law requires municipal police to operate in the spheres of public order and transport. I consider the local police forces an extension of the state police where they are well managed and where cooperative links work. It is not the case everywhere, but I do not expect any radical changes in the system. It is more a matter of specifying powers and good local cooperation.

[Pecinka] Are you content with the status of BIS [Security Information Service]?

[Ruml] I believe BIS should be under the auspices of a specific constitutional official, who would bear political responsibility for the operation of the service before the government, parliament, and public. The government as a collective body cannot efficiently manage and control the secret service. Of course, to implement this point of view would require a change in the law on intelligence services.

[Pecinka] Do you intend to advocate the institution of the so-called controlled provocation?

[Ruml] The contemplation of controlled provocation must be preceded by a discussion of the character of democracy in our country. Namely, it is an aggressive intervention in human rights, an intervention that can have unfathomed consequences. I consider casual toying with this institution to be inappropriate preelection campaigning.

[Pecinka] How would you assess the proposal by the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] to separate the police from the Interior Ministry?

[Ruml] The logic of the matter would imply that the CSSD also wants to separate the Army from the Defense Ministry, customs officers from the Finance Ministry, and the prison service from the Justice Ministry. It certainly is the same nonsense as everything the CSSD, with its "experts," has proposed in the security sphere. The Interior Ministry is the central body of the state administration for internal order and security; its role with respect to the police is legislative and norm-setting, conceptual, methodical, and controlling. The ministry is also the manager of the budget chapter for security. The Interior Ministry neither supervises police work nor has any personnel powers in the police. Organizational changes are implemented by the minister through recommendation by the police president, and the police budget is also prepared through the police president. The political responsibility for the security situation must be borne, however, by a constitutional official—a minister controlled by the Security Committee of the Chamber. In effect, it is a matter of the extent of the powers of the Interior Ministry with respect to the police. The model used in the Czech Republic is balanced and does not require fundamental change.

Czech Republic: ODS Likens Party Financing to Time Bomb

AU0705153096 Prague PRAVO in Czech 6 May 96 p 1

[Article by Robert Dengler: "ODS: The Financing of Parties in the Czech Republic Is a Bomb Ticking in the Foundations of the State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "A time bomb that could explode in eight to 10 years has been placed in the foundations of the Czech state. It consists of the lack of transparency in the financing of the political parties," said a key Civic Democratic Party [ODS] politician who did not wish to be named to PRAVO in Ostrava on Saturday [4 May]. According to him, a fundamental discussion has to be initiated immediately after the elections to ensure that this dangerous matter is kept in check and, in particular, is regulated by means of legislation.

The ODS source referred to the example of the destabilization of Belgium, when a corruption affair came to light. Some $1.6 million made their way into the coffers of the Belgian socialists in return for a tender worth $225 million. The obscure financing of the parties in Italy and their links to lucrative state tenders have had a significant influence on the collapse of the traditional political spectrum there.

The ODS Executive Council severely criticized Deputy Chairman Libor Novak on Friday for not inquiring into the source of the 7.5-million-koruna [Kc] donation the ODS received under the false names of two sponsors from abroad. One of the members of the Executive Council, in an interview for PRAVO, even made no secret of the suspicion that this may involve an expression of gratitude from a firm that successfully privatized property in the Czech Republic and does not want to attract attention to itself.

In reply to a question from PRAVO on whether it is true that the ODS Executive Council has, so to speak, told off Novak for his mistakes, the executive deputy chairman said: "You know that no one has praised me for this. It was said that the details simply have to be checked when the donations are made and not ex post."

In reply to a question on whether the ODS could find out in the bank who the donor was, Novak said that this is not always possible if someone deposits an amount and does not want to be known as a donor. If there were no details, the sponsor would be identified as an anonymous donor. This is possible according to the law even now, but only for amounts up to Kc100,000.

Another member of the Executive Council, who also did not wish to be named, thinks that the ODS congress in the fall will take Novak's mistakes into consideration. It is not clear, however, whether this would be as a consequence of his activity concerning the sponsors, which could damage this party in the run-up to the elections, or whether Novak's party rivals are merely using this situation to undermine him politically.

As we have already reported, the ODS Executive Council on Friday committed the party leadership to dealing with issues associated with the transparency of financing political parties. However, not one word was said about this matter at the ODS's subsequent preelection conference held in Ostrava on Saturday.

Czech Republic: Sound Economy Deemed Necessary for Defense

AU0705140196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 May 96 p 2

["Analysis" by Jan Gazdik: "A Functioning Economy Is Most Important for the Country's Defense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—When Defense Minister Vilem Holan informed the members of the Chamber of Deputies' Defense and Security Committee this week that the Army is woefully short of money, alarm held sway among the deputies.

The candid nature of the minister's analysis also surprised the committee's chairman, Vladimir Suman (Civic Democratic Alliance), who said that his information does not attest to such great penury in the Army. "We did not expect that the Army would be in such a bad way," admitted Miroslav Capek (Left Bloc), too.

The difficulties that have brought the Army to the edge of an abyss do not, on the other hand, surprise diplomats, security analysts, the military, or even arms industry experts. Namely, they maintain that the several years of strangling the Army's budget inevitably had to bring it to its knees. The experts, therefore, compare the Army to a shiny car whose engine may suddenly break down due to several years of postponed maintenance. Even the extraordinarily successful UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and IFOR [Implementation Force] missions in the Balkans or the standard of the elite paratroop brigade or rapid deployment brigade has no affect on this. The experts compare them to exclusive body work, under which the Army's intensifying economic difficulties are concealed.

Despite this, it is impossible to state unequivocally that the dramatic cuts in the military budget after 1989 were a mistake. Some economists support Chief of General Staff Jiri Nekvasil, who maintains that this course of action was necessary to rid the sector of costly units that were unnecessary for the country's defense. The opponents of this strategy are, on the other hand, convinced that the lack of funds for the Army's modernization and, consequently, for its orders to domestic industry has pushed the majority of the country's important arms plants into a crisis.

Obviously, then, the only sure thing is that, regardless of the antagonistic points of view on effective defense, it is hard to cast doubt on the arguments of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, who insists that Army development must be subordinate to the country's economic potential. Therefore, the prime minister has rightly refused to increase the Army's budget until its economic performance becomes more transparent. Even multibillion sums would disappear into it as if into a black hole.

The Army has been able to state since February how much money it is spending and on what; despite this, it is unlikely that it will get a more significant raise in the years to come. This is also recognized by the senior officers, for whom Suman's endeavor to increase the Army's budget by 10 million korunas is an unrealistic dream. That is, they concede that the collapse of health care or education is today more of a threat to citizens than the meager existence of the combat units.

Despite this, the Defense Ministry and the General Staff should focus on the Army's transformation into a modern corps, which is just beginning. This will not proceed without declaring war on the dogmatic notions that the country's defense depends on the size of the Army. The most recent armed conflicts prove, on the other hand, that an army is incapable of conducting an effective longer term operation without a flourishing economy. Therefore, the majority of the experts are inclined toward the government's current, although provisional, security strategy, which considers a sound economy and political system to be a more reliable defensive shield for the country.

The politicians and diplomats also describe this as the optimum path toward the most reliable defensive rampart—the country's admission to NATO. After all, according to the Western generals, it is not the caliber of its cannons but its economic performance and advanced democracy that will decide upon the Republic's incorporation into the alliance.

Slovakia: Duma Official Views NATO Expansion, Relations

AU0705165796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
7 May 96 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Russian State Duma Foreign Relations Committee, by Ivan Drabek in Bratislava on 6 May: "European Dimensions of the Slovak Choice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Drabek] During your meeting with Jan Luptak, deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], you also touched on the issue of NATO's enlargement. How satisfied were you with the position of the NRSR deputy chairman on this issue?

[Lukin] Our esteemed host inquired about our negotiations with the Americans on this issue. We voiced the view that these negotiations are far from over. Although they are now trying to convince us that this matter has been solved, it has not been solved, in reality. The financial questions have not been solved. The question of how the other eastern European countries will feel when some of them are admitted and some not has not been solved. The talks with Mr. Luptak were constructive. My impression of our host is that he is someone who understands the new problems that will arise should this, in my opinion profoundly erroneous, concept be realized. Whether a concept is correct is usually determined by the following method: When it creates fewer problems than it solves, it is a good concept. When it creates more problems than it solves, it is bad. I have the strong suspicion that the idea of NATO enlargement creates more problems than it solves.

[Drabek] Jan Luptak is known in Slovakia as an advocate of neutrality. When talking with him, did you mention any guarantees that Russia would extend to Slovakia if it opted for the neutrality status?

[Lukin] Mr. Luptak told us that this was the policy of his party. Naturally, we have not come here to meddle in the internal affairs of your country. We have simply accepted with interest this angle of vision. As for our guarantees, we are prepared for any conceivable guarantees for which Slovakia will ask, should it opt for this path. I repeat, however, that this is a matter of your choice.

[Drabek] Your ambassador in Bratislava, Yastrzhembskiy, has indicated several times that Moscow's relations with Bratislava were much better than its relations with the other capitals of the Visegrad group. What do you think about this?

[Lukin] I think that this angle of vision has the right to exist. I would say that our relations are almost unimpaired by past complexes. In some other Visegrad countries, strong psychoses linger from the past and people do not speak about the real problems of today—for example, how to combat narcotics and organized crime, including Russian mafias—but they dwell on the past: how bad Russia was, how bad Poland was in certain periods, and so forth. Practically nothing of that sort exists in our relations, which, naturally, also has a psychological impact on practical issues. This is very good.

[Drabek] So you have not registered any manifestations of Russophobia here?

[Lukin] I have been here for only a few hours. But I was here during the recent visit by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, and it is true that I did not notice anything of that sort. Everything I read, study, and hear convinces me that Russophobia is not very popular in Slovakia, which only testifies to the wisdom of this country.

[Drabek] What is Slovakia's geopolitical position, from the Russian perspective?

[Lukin] Slovakia is a key European country. It is located in the center of Europe, on the line where things will or will not happen that will influence the future shape of European security. This is why very much depends on Slovakia's decision, although it is not a large country in terms of size and population. The questions that now seemingly concern Slovakia's internal choice have, in reality, European dimensions-It is characteristic that various distinguished Western representatives are coming here, including NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and my old friend Dick Holbrooke. It seems that they understand very well that Slovakia's choice can have European repercussions regarding NATO's enlargement and the selection of a European security structure that will be the most suitable for Europe. Extraordinary responsibility therefore rests with you, although I repeat that your choice is your own internal affair.

Slovakia: Coalition Leader Advocates Neutrality for Country

AU0705134296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
7 May 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "ik": "According to Luptak, the Idea of Neutrality Has Not Become Dusty in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Jan Luptak yesterday told Russian deputies that the idea of neutrality, born in 1968, has not become dusty in Slovakia.

The National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] deputy chairman is the highest parliamentary representative with whom the delegation of the Russian Federation State Duma Foreign Relations Committee, which is headed by Vladimir Lukin, the committee's chairman, will meet during its three-day official visit to the Slovak Republic.

The representatives of the lower house of the Russian parliament were received yesterday also by Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Today, on the second day of their visit, they will meet with members of the NRSR Foreign Affairs Committee.

The NRSR deputy chairman described the more than 45-minute talk with Russian deputies as very useful. "I said that the idea of neutrality, which appeared in 1968, has not become dusty in our country," Jan Luptak told PRAVDA about the contents of his talk with Vladimir Lukin. "I stressed that we would be glad if our country became neutral," he added. At the same time, he reminded the Russian deputies that it was precisely the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] [of which Luptak is chairman] that was the first to start dusting off the idea of neutrality in Slovakia. He also emphasized that, regarding entry into NATO, his party would insist on a referendum being held. "Of course, this decision will not be made by Slovakia alone. There are great powers and other countries that must give their consent. My view, which I expressed, is, however, that if the great powers wanted to come to an agreement on this issue, they would be able to," he said.

According to Jan Luptak, the Russian deputies told him unequivocally that "the closer NATO moves to the borders of Russia, the worse the situation will be, because they, too, will be forced to take effective countermeasures." "And so I think that neutrality would be acceptable also for them," he said.

Asked by PRAVDA whether he spoke with the Russian deputies about neutrality as NRSR deputy chairman or as ZRS chairman, Jan Luptak stressed that he was speaking as ZRS chairman. When asked whether he received the delegation as ZRS chairman, he answered in the negative, however.

Slovakia: Daily Criticizes Visit by Austria's Schuessel

AU0705171596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 4 May 96 p 5

[Commentary by Roman Hofbauer: "Dirty Game of Minister Schuessel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A visit to the Slovak Republic by a foreign minister of any European country is always a noteworthy event, not only for us but also for the neighboring states. If the foreign minister in question comes from a neighboring state, it doubles the strength of this observation.

The visit by Wolfgang Schuessel, minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Austria, in April 1996 was worthy of special attention, as it indicated more than is usual in this sphere of international diplomacy.

A superficial observer may believe that Minister Schuessel came to Slovakia for talks with his counterpart, Minister Schenk, on topics within a range of joint Slovak-Austrian interests. The press release regarding the meeting does not, however, mention anything like that, if, of course, we do not include in this the assurance that the Austrian minister will continually inform Slovakia about the difficulties of joining the European Union. It is a very peculiar reason for a visit, if that is the true one.

The true objective of the visit was, however, undoubtedly something else, and one should pay attention to that. The Austrian foreign minister met and talked with Jan Carnogursky, chairman of an opposition party [Christian Democratic Movement] that openly threatens the legitimate prime minister that it will teach him how to fear and threatens the legitimate government that it will topple it and imprison its members. Minister Schuessel met and talked with Slovak President Michal Kovac, who openly assumed the leadership of the antigovernment opposition, who instigates and makes official from his supreme level both domestic and foreign attacks and accusations, even some absolute lies, who has refused to sign bills approved by the parliament in a manner reminiscent of an assembly line, and who even refused to appoint the Slovak ambassador to the United Nations in New York!

Other facts of this foreign visit are also noteworthy. Minister Schuessel is concurrently a deputy chancellor of his country. Nevertheless, as a high-ranking government official, he could not be bothered with meeting a similarly ranking Slovak official, i.e. a deputy prime minister. He did not even meet with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

I cannot but point out some neighborly relations between Austria and Slovakia that add the finishing touches to the background of this unusual foreign visit.

Austria is the seat of the environmental political organization [Global 2000] that, under the banner of environment protection, has been the most militant fighter against the completion of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric project, whereby it has substituted lies and falsified facts for arguments.

A high Austrian official, who wishes to remain anonymous, paid the bail of 1 million Austrian schillings for Engineer Michal K. Jr., so that he did not have to remain in police custody but enjoyed his freedom until the decision of the Austrian court was reached. The Austrian court decided not to respect the international warrant for his arrest issued by Interpol in Munich and returned him to Slovakia, and, while doing so, it accused the Slovak official authorities of his abduction to Austria, without any tangible evidence. It "escaped" the Austrian court that Eng. Michal Kovac, Jr. was abducted to Austria with a Slovak passport, which the Austrian side quietly took away after the arrest and just as quietly returned after the release! To date, the Austrian Interior Ministry has not passed onto the Slovak Interior ministry the complete official documentation regarding this case, this official states, while the "independent" investigation commission from the Christian Democratic Movement, under the leadership of former Interior Minister General Pittner, has obviously been analyzing these documents....

It is remarkable that Austria is the only neighboring state with which, based on its exceptions, we do not have an agreement on interconnecting our highway systems. It is enough to flick through the Austrian press to determine that Slovakia is presented to an ordinary Austrian as a country of evil, terror, and dictatorship even after 1 January 1993, while one needs to travel just a few kilometers from Vienna to see that this is not so.

It is said that politics is the art of the possible, while diplomacy is supposed to be a fine game of chess.

We traditionally refer to Austria as a good and fair neighbor and a dependable support for Slovakia in our integration into the European structures.

Thus, the only realistic conclusion to the talks between Foreign Ministers Schenk and Schuessel that I can see is an assurance by Minister Schenk that the Slovak hockey players would not be a hindrance for Austria at the world championships, which our side confirmed with its immediate defeat.

Slovakia: Kovac Cancels ROC Press Meeting Under PRC 'Pressure'

OW0805084196 Taipei CNA in English 0742 GMT 8 May 96

[By Jennifer Huang and Sofia Wu; received via Internet]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava, Slovakia, May 6 (CNA)—Beijing has spared no effort to suppress Taiwan's activities in the international society, even its journalistic exchanges with the Slovak Republic.

Slovak President Michal Kovac was originally scheduled to meet with a press group from the Republic of China [ROC] on Taiwan Monday [6 May], but was forced to cancel the meeting under pressure from Beijing.

Kovac later designated his foreign affairs advisor to meet with the ROC delegation.

The press group is visiting the central European country at the invitation Jurag Halas, editor-in-chief of Slovak's largest newspaper, to boost understanding and friendship between the two countries.

Halas, who visited Taiwan in 1994, said he regrets Kovac's failure to meet with Taiwan journalists and Beijing's sensitivity to such a kind of exchange.

Slovak, which split from the Czech Republic to become an independent country through peaceful means in 1993, maintains formal diplomatic ties with Mainland China. It supports Beijing's so-called "one China" policy and opposes Taiwan's bid to join the United Nations.

However, Slovak doesn't rule out the possibility of forging closer trade and economic ties with Taiwan. Its trade with Taiwan totaled only US$5.93 million in 1994, compared to US$24.07 million in its trade with the mainland in 1994 and US$68 million in 1995.

Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the Slovak parliament's foreign affairs committee, said during his meeting with the ROC press delegation that he hopes Slovak and Taiwan can exchange representative offices as soon as possible to boost bilateral ties.

"I also hopes officials from the two countries can exchange visits frequently to promote mutual understanding and discuss possible cooperative programs," said Slobodnik, who maintains close ties with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

On Taiwan's UN bid, Slobodnik said the issue should be resolved through consultations and negotiations between Taipei and Beijing.

Slobodnik further said he believes peaceful ties between the Czech and the Slovak republics following their separation can provide some inspirations for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in resolving their problems.

Slovakia: Opposition Party Wants Closer Ties to Taiwan

OW0805091396 Taipei CNA in English 0831 GMT 8 May 96

[By Flor Wang and Jennifer Huang; received via Internet]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava, May 7 (CNA)—Slovakia should be more open to the world and further strengthen its ties with friendly countries, including Taiwan, an influential opposition party leader said on Tuesday [7 May].

Gigas, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, the leading opposition party in Slovakia, said he will take active measures to boost Slovakia's substantive ties with Taiwan once his party comes in power.

Although Slovakian maintains formal diplomatic relations with Mainland China, Gigas said he is willing to exchange representatives with Taiwan to promote bilateral economic and cultural relations. His party holds 13 seats in the parliament.

Slovakia currently is ruled by a coalition government formed by the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, Slovak National Party and Association of Slovak Workers, and enjoys a majority in the 150-seat parliament.

Slovakia: France's Juppe Hopes for Revision of Code Amendment

AU0705160896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 7 May 96 p 2

[TASR report: "KDH's Partners Reply to Jan Carnogursky's Letter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] French Prime Minister Alain Juppe and Theo Waigel, chairman of the Christian Social Union of Germany, in their replies to a letter from Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Chairman Jan Carnogursky, draw attention, among other things, to the "EU statement adopted in Turin." In letters to a number of representatives of European political parties with which the KDH maintains partnership relations, Jan Carnogursky provided information on the approval of the Penal Code amendment. According to KDH spokeswoman Lucie Faltinova, in their replies the two politicians confirmed their intention to monitor the situation in Slovakia, thus meeting the KDH chairman's request. They also expressed the hope that, after the president of the Slovak Republic did not sign the Penal Code amendment, "the Slovak Government will either withdraw the amendment, or will carry out the discussed changes in it."

Slovakia: Secret Service Assesses Status of Catholic Church

AU0705133196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 May 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "jo, bog": "Government Should Support Representatives of the Catholic Church Who Are Ready To Cooperate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The church hierarchy in the Slovak Republic clings painstakingly to its doctrine and is incapable of tolerating any other views." This is stated in the conclusion of a written report of several pages that is signed by Slovak Information Service [SIS] Director Ivan Lexa. We compared Lexa's signature with his signatures under other documents available to the SME editorial office. The paper is, basically, a report on the state of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovakia. Apart from a general part, it describes the situation in individual archdioceses and dioceses in the Slovak Republic. The concluding part characterizes the state of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovakia as a state of certain lethargy, disorientation, and temporizing. "The Holy See did not reckon with such an accommodating attitude of our government, was not prepared for it, and is unable adequately to respond to it. It did not prepare a comprehensive concept for its further course of action in Slovakia," it is written in the document, which states, furthermore: "The Roman Catholic Church has such an ossified leadership that it is incapable of resisting the aforementioned trends (new wave of secularization process, new pseudoreligious currents, attacks on Catholicism, etc.—editorial note), it is even incapable of holding an equal discussion with the innovators of church life and of replying to their questions." The document also assesses in detail individual church dignitaries: "Jan Sokol is not the personality who will lead the church in Slovakia toward general sociopolitical prosperity and support for the government. He has never overcome the intellectual level of the 'village' priest. He fears for his post, is afraid of Cardinal Korec, of the secret church, of Carnogursky's people.... He turns with the political wind, but it is possible to speak with Sokol and even to rely on him when necessary. In the future, the Government of the Slovak Republic can need a personality such as Archbishop Jan Sokol, especially in view of his image among believers. The government and the state administration ought to give support to church representatives who are ready to cooperate with the government and to support it, and should protect them against attacks," states the document with regard to the archbishop of the Bratislava-Trnava Archdiocese.

In an interpellation in February this year, National Council of the Slovak Republic Deputy Ladislav Pittner asked the prime minister whether a new department monitoring the activity of churches has been set up within the framework of the SIS counterintelligence and whether it makes use of the network of StB [communist-era secret police] agents. As Ladislav Pittner told SME yesterday, the prime minister has not even replied to the interpellation, even though the 30-day deadline has expired. Democratic Party Chairman Jan Langos also addressed an interpellation to Vladimir Meciar in this matter in March. Like Pittner, he has not received a reply to this day.

Hungary: Oil Pipeline With FRY Reopens After Four Years

AU0705125996 Paris AFP in English 1233 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lipovac, Croatia, May 7 (AFP)—The oil pipeline linking Croatia with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) went back into operation on Tuesday, United Nations Administrator for Eastern Slavonia Jacques Klein announced.

The facility, known as the Adriatic pipeline, had been closed since September 1991. It was put back into operation at Sotin in eastern Slavonia, following the reopening of the motorway linking Zagreb and Belgrade.

"Each of these is a major step forward. We are making progress," Klein told reporters.

Hungary: Defense Minister Views Army Reorganization Tasks

AU0705141196 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 7 May 96 p 10

[Interview with Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Janos Desi; place and date not given: "Who Threatens Hungary?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Desi] The war in the Balkans is over. Is anyone threatening Hungary militarily now?

[Keleti] One cannot fully exclude the possibility of an armed conflict in the region caused by ethnic, minority, or even economic reasons, an armed conflict similar to the Yugoslav crisis. However, this would not reach the threshold of an all-out war. Just as the events in the former Yugoslavia represented a serious threat to us, they nevertheless did not spread over the border. We are living in a changing world, and this world also has its military dangers, but I cannot name any country that would threaten us. Our situation has improved since the Yugoslav crisis, because we had to maintain combat-readiness in quite a number of our units—mainly the air force—during the war, and we no longer have to do that. The army is now in a peacetime state.

[Desi] Hungary is a poor country and, as you said, the military threat is diminishing. How big an army is it worth keeping in such a situation?

[Keleti] We already declared in 1994 that international circumstances make it possible to reorganize our army. The budget situation also made such a reorganization necessary. Besides, this reorganization can also be used to adjust to NATO requirements. In creating a new structure, we must take the NATO requirements into maximum consideration. When we took over the government in 1994, there were 94,000 soldiers serving in the army; we reduced this number to 60,000.

[Desi] However, the largest investments of recent years are currently under way in the Hungarian army. Take, for example, the often debated issue of T-72 tanks....

[Keleti] In accordance with the armed forces reduction agreement, Belarus had to get rid of its tanks. Destroying them would have cost a lot for Minsk. Making use of this situation, we could purchase the T-72's for 5 percent of the price of a new tank. Of course, these are not completely new tanks, but they are in good condition and we also received the manufacturers' guarantees, just as for new tanks.

[Desi] If so, this was a bargain purchase, but does the Hungarian Army really need so many tanks?

[Keleti] Yes, it does, although there were opposition parliamentary deputies who strongly criticized me for this deal, and there were also deputies who said that I am either corrupt or someone who does not understand these things. But it is not worth dealing with these accusations. It is a favorable development for our army to be able to replace the old T-55's with much more modern T-72's. These tanks are capable of cooperating with the already existing armored personnel carriers.

[Desi] This is a never-ending spiral. The army gets a more modern armored personnel carrier, and that needs a more modern tank, and that, in turn, requires an even more modern armored personnel carrier, and so on.

[Keleti] There is no armament spiral here at all. We will distribute these 100 new tanks between Debrecen and Hodmezovasarhely. There are already modern armored personnel carriers in operation in Hodmezovasarhely. The BTR-80's to arrive in exchange for the Russian debt will operate in Debrecen. Besides, the T-72 is not new in the Hungarian Army; such tanks have already been in operation here.

[Desi] Why will the new tanks be deployed precisely in the eastern part of Hungary?

[Keleti] Partly because the BTR-80 modern armored personnel carriers will be there, and partly because the old T-55's have to be replaced there. There have been such T-72's tanks in operation in Tata for a long time, so the new ones will not be deployed there.

[Desi] One of the criticisms against this deal is that this will increase our dependence on Russian military technology; another claim is that the new tanks are not compatible with the NATO system.

[Keleti] Before the deal, we consulted NATO officials, and they did not bring up any objection against the plan. Of course, this requires further investments, but we would not have been able to avoid that even if we had kept the T-55's, and we have to purchase telecommunication means that fulfill NATO requirements. The fact that such types are already operational in Hungary spoke in favor of purchasing the T-72's, as we had the opportunity to obtain experience in servicing them and in training the personnel. Besides, before coming to an agreement with Belarus, we informed the Defense Committee of the Hungarian Parliament.

[Desi] Modernizing the air force and purchasing new combat aircraft will be a much bigger problem.

[Keleti] Air force modernization continues to enjoy priority. Tenders have already been issued for the purchase of troop air defense means against low-altitude air targets, and seven firms have answered them. We want the budget to receive at least a two-year grace in payments. If we succeed in coming to an agreement, this equipment can arrive as early as in this year. We also have to replace our 25-to-30-year-old radars. These radars were not among the most modern ones in the Warsaw Pact even at the time of their installation. The present radars have electronic tubes the size of a flue pipe. A radar station uses as much electricity as needed for a small settlement. After modernization, we will consume much less electricity, and we will be able to operate the new radars with half the number of the current personnel. We would like to see the new system in operation by 1998, and we also want to coordinate the military and civilian air traffic control with the new system. One of the subdepartments of the Defense Committee heard the representative of every firm that can be considered. If everything goes well, we will be able to issue the tenders at the beginning of this summer, and we might even be able to show the results by this fall.

[Desi] Several reports have already appeared in the press on possible abuses in connection with the tenders.

[Keleti] They will speak about this as long as people are brainwashed that corruption took place here. Issuing tenders is a new thing for us, so we take even greater care to observe the rules. We can only take into consideration our national economy possibilities and the needs of our army.

[Desi] The purchase of combat aircraft will be the most expensive deal and the greatest pressure will be born here by those who will have to make the decisions.

[Keleti] Although representatives of several firms asked this, I have not met with anyone, in order to avoid even the semblance of having a preliminary position on the matter.

[Desi] But you visited the firm in Israel which offered to renew the old combat aircraft....

[Keleti] That is true, but I participated in a presentation that has nothing to do with a possible deal. As for the tenders, the government will evaluate the situation of our air defense soon, and will then decide on what exactly we want. If we purchase 30 combat aircraft, the price will probably be around 130-150 billion forints, and the price of the armament and the necessary infrastructure could reach 40-70 percent of the aforementioned sum.

[Desi] Is it worth spending such a tremendous amount of money?

[Keleti] According to the arms reduction agreement, Hungary has the right to operate 180 combat aircraft. If we purchase the new ones, we will operate a maximum number of 60 aircraft after the turn of the century. The neighboring countries have more combat aircraft, and they approached the stipulated limit from above. Besides, it is out of question that we want to increase our air force to demonstrate power, but we still have to show some force.

[Desi] Opposition against the reform of the armed forces seems to be strong within the army. A call to collect signatures against the reform also appeared in the official paper of the Defense Ministry.

[Keleti] Actually the reform of the armed forces was justified by the budget situation. Those who thought in the summer of 1995—when Parliament adopted the relevant concepts—that those whose jobs cease to exist will be happy made a big mistake. Like every reorganization, this one also has its losers. But it is not sure that one can judge the whole army reorganization from the level of a platoon commander. But the reorganization of health care will also have its losers. It is an illusion to think that we can win the appreciation of all the members of the Hungarian Army. Of course, we will do everything that our possibilities allow us to improve the situation of professional soldiers.

Hungary: Party Leader Orban Views Domestic Political Issues

AU0705145496 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 4 May 96 p 7

[Interview with FIDESZ-MPP Chairman Viktor Orban by Frigyes Varju; place and date not given: "The Coalition Wants Only a Sham Democracy—Viktor Orban on Left-Wing Advancement, Cooperation of Civic Forces, and the Reason for the Population Decrease"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic

Party [FIDESZ-MPP], finds the demographic indicators tragic and outlines the possible necessity of settling people into Hungary, which has been done a few times in history. [passage omitted]

[Varju] The split of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] was one of the most important recent domestic political events. Do you think that a possible civic conservative cooperation could also include the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP], the new formation, especially in view of the fact that the MDNP has announced a liberal economic policy after all?

[Orban] In my view, the right wing will sooner or later have to be united. We do not yet know what form this will take, whether a confederation or some other organization will be set up, but it is essential to unify the right wing because the left wing is being welded together very rapidly. The first step of right-wing cooperation could be if all forces occupying the political space between the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] put all their strength together, even if it is painful and flavored with personal conflicts and old disagreements. This is a historic compulsion which we must not evade. When the MDF split, I said that it is possible for this to accelerate the opposition's cooperation. I can already see signs of this in the latest statements by the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] and in the relations of the MDF and the FIDESZ. In my view, the opposition parties have an increasingly strong conviction that the period of opposition cooperation has to come after a period of solidarity.

New Political Calendar

[Varju] However, no kind of cooperation is feasible without a leading and powerful political force and politician. Would the FIDESZ and you accept this role?

[Orban] For us, the question is not whether the FIDESZ and I accept the responsibility—although we do not usually evade challenges. Setting up the correct order of goals is the most important task for all politicians, and this is the following: The current coalition definitely has to be removed from government. We must not allow the destruction of the past two years, which will probably go on for another two years, to continue after 1998. If the government is not changed then by 2002, we will have a country with a completely set social and economic structure and intellectual attitude, and then it will be very difficult to remove it from the tragic forced course on which the current governmental policy—mocked as left-wing—is taking it. We can only remedy this through opposition cooperation, and personal and party ambitions can only come after this goal on the list. We have said a number of times that the FIDESZ will definitely subordinate its own ambitions to the aforementioned tasks. [passage omitted]

[Varju] Let us now deal with a new-old, supposedly forgotten phenomenon. What is your opinion on the fact that, in a large segment of the press and culture, everything is again being measured by left-wing values, everything is seen through left-wing spectacles, and the politically exaggerated discussions of 10 years ago have reappeared.

[Orban] It is time to get rid of the illusion that the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]-SZDSZ government wants democracy in this country. The coalition only wants to maintain the appearance of democracy and has no intention of allowing a true political and economic competition to emerge in Hungary. Many preconditions of the Western democracies' existence are missing in Hungary, and even if something had already started to evolve, the government would by now have cut it back. The occupation of the media and culture is a visible element of the coalition's strategy. They are not even deterred by the fact that the actual political rotation system has serious preconditions, and certain areas are not to be occupied by party political commandos even if they have power dominance. They have completely occupied the television and radio, and Gyula Horn, [Education and Culture Minister] Balint Magyar, and [Budapest Mayor] Gabor Demszky are now constantly on public service television and radio. The newspapers are being destroyed, and the conversion [bedaralas] of newspapers close to the opposition parties is being done with renewed efforts. In the light of the events of the past few weeks, I need not go deeper into this in a MAGYAR NEMZET interview. With the knock-out of the Thalia theater, a section of the acting world has been colonized which previously was not under their influence. Therefore, intellectuals who are not part of the current coalition's circles feel that their room for maneuver is getting narrower every day. What we have here is an SZDSZ-MSZP-type post-Kadarist open society: Although the society is open, it is only open for them, and a group of them occupies every square centimeter of it. [passage omitted]

[Varju] Recently, the SZDSZ has visibly been trying to follow the FIDESZ's political strategy and partly its political self-definition. Are you not worried that this party is trying to occupy the FIDESZ's place and follow its political track?

[Orban] I do not think there is any chance for this. In September 1994 in Parliament we said that things that belong together grow into one. Today, we can perhaps say the same in the past tense, namely things that belonged together have grown into one. Very clear signs indicate that the future of these two parties will be the same in the long run, and I find this desirable for Hungarian politics. It is in Hungary's interest to have a consolidated center-left party which is able to hold back its voters from those who have also de jure remained communists. From this point of view, the coalition's performance is very remarkable. However, from the viewpoint of putting the country's affairs in order, the coalition's performance is very weak.

This Already Is Latin America

[Varju] What are your views on the chance of Hungary joining the European Union? You, after all, are at home in foreign policy, you have up-to-date information as chairman of the parliamentary European integration committee.

[Orban] Time has also come to call attention to the current economic policy which makes EU admission impossible in the long run. If the current economic policy is kept, then Hungary will go into the European Union in such a way that the entrepreneurs will not be competitive and we will see almost only the disadvantages of membership. If we do not have an economic policy assisting the emergence of the Hungarian national capitalist class, our badly prepared membership can easily have catastrophic consequences. A well-prepared membership can give a big boost to the economy but bad preparation can completely destroy it. In my view, it is in Hungary's national interest to be closely linked to Europe but not at any cost. Many people in government now believe that it is enough for the country to meet the Maastricht conditions, namely that adequate macroeconomic indicators are the most important factor of membership, but this is not the precondition of EU membership. A competitive economy and also a competitive social structure are the preconditions for EU membership and, at the same time, these are in Hungary's interest. It has to be accepted, however much it hurts the government coalition, that the European Union's democracies and market economies are based on broad and strong middle classes which have independent culture, self-defense capability, and independent economic power. In contrast, the government in Hungary is assisting the emergence of a social structure in which, rather than the broad middle classes, a narrow elite, controlling the politicians and the media, remains society's dominant participant, in addition to the sea of poverty which even exceeds 90 percent. This is a typical case of the Latin American model and it will never be possible to adjust this to the European model.

B-H: Muratovic on Mostar Refugees' Right To Vote

LD0705212496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and his aides received Mostar EU Administrator Ricardo Peres Casado and assistant, Klaus Metscher. The meeting was also attended by members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's General Staff and the Implementation Force.

The meeting reviewed problems pertaining to accommodating Bosnia- Herzegovina Army units in Mostar barracks. Owing to the fact that the elections are to be held soon, representatives of the EU Administration could not accept the goverment's request to use the Sjeverni Logor and Konak barracks.

Stressing the significance of Mostar elections, Prime Minister Muratovic said that it was necessary to enable Mostar refugees and displaced persons to participate in the elections. Dr. Muratovic recalled that two basic things were causing problems in Mostar—the presence of war criminals who have been indicted by the Hague Tribunal and the influence of war profiteers. [passage omitted]

B-H: Presidency Member Says Election Rules Lead to Division

AU0605191896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tatjana Ljuic-Mijatovic, member of the State Presidency, takes the view that the formulated elections rules, which make it impossible to vote according to the 1991 electoral rolls, lead toward a definite division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the situation on the ground established with force and arms is being verified in that way.

In a statement issued for the public today, Tatjana Ljuic-Mijatovic says, among other things, the following:

Today, when an attempt is being made to overcome the first [word indistinct] of the painstaking process of the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the organization of free and democratic elections has presented us with a bill in the form of election rules. By casting their votes, the citizens would be signing a decree that they are giving up their homes and family property and would be voting for the establishment of three ethnic ghettos devoid of Bosnia-Herzegovina's being and tradition, thanks to which we were able to resist brutal aggression.

How chaotic the situation called free and democratic elections will be is best illustrated by the example of Mostar. It is high time to realize the far-reaching consequences that stem from the Dayton agreement. One should always bear in mind the fact that no one has the right to gamble away and destroy the chances of survival and revitalization of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the sake of short-term gains, the statement issued by Presidency Member Tatjana Ljuic-Mijatovic says, among other things.

B-H: Silajdzic's Party, Liberals Criticize Electoral Rules

AU0705152496 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Electoral Rules in Conflict With Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As part of regular contacts between the parties that accept the Dayton accord and firmly support the preservation and strengthening of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral, internationally recognized state, Dr. Haris Silajdzic, chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rasim Kadic, chairman of the Liberal Party, met in Sarajevo, together with their aides.

During the talks, particular attention was paid to the rules and regulations issued by the Provisional Election Commission, in view of the extremely great political importance of this document. Officials of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Liberal Party agree with the assessment that the electoral rules have a few considerable deficiencies that are in discord with the Dayton accord.

First of all, this refers to the fact that the election project is not bound up with the implementation of the whole of the peace agreement. An important element of the Dayton accord is the liability of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] to first assess the possibility of conducting elections, taking into consideration the realistic social circumstances in both entities. It is obvious that the social circumstances in the entities are changing very slowly, and, in certain areas, they are deteriorating. Without freedom of movement, the return of refugees, independent media, and particularly without the extradition of persons wanted by the Tribunal in The Hague, one cannot speak about the elementary conditions for conducting democratic elections.

As for the voting of refugees and displaced persons, the electoral rules are in considerable disagreement with the Dayton accord. In Annex 3 of the peace agreement, a general rule is explicitly accepted that citizens should vote the in municipalities in which they used to live until 1991. However, the electoral document speaks unconditionally of a new rule; that the voting should be performed in accordance with the present real situation, that is, in the municipalities in which they are currently living. The factual state was created by aggression, genocide, and unprecedented violence, and lasting political solutions cannot and must not be built on such a basis. That would mean that the usurpation by those who are now occupying houses and farms of refugees from Foca, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Banja Luka and other places throughout Bosnia would be legalized. The electoral rule that every refugee may choose the place to vote if realistic conditions do not exist for that refugee to return to his home and the place from which he was expelled is also inconsistent. It is certain that the intent of such a rule is to maintain the situation created by the so-called ethnic cleansing and eliminate any hope for return, even before the elections are conducted. Behind all this is the very recognizable idea of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is, in its essence, incompatible with the spirit and goals of the Dayton accord.

The electoral rules also do not give answers to a number of other questions, such as the way of voting and the way of establishing the election results, the financing of election campaigns, the efficient control of polling stations, the annulment of voting results in areas where cases of misuse are uncovered, the participation of candidates with dual citizenship, and the elimination of the influence of neighboring countries on the election procedures. These and other unresolved questions encourage the further obstruction of the implementation of the peace plan.

It is unacceptable that the electoral rules actually revise the entire Dayton accord. The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Liberal Party consider that there is still enough time and a great possibility for the electoral rules to be corrected and supplemented, so that the elections will be conducted in accordance with the peace agreement, it is said in a joint statement.

B-H: HDZ Chairman Comments on Election Rules

AU0705193596 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 3 May 96 p 5

[Interview with Bozo Rajic, chairman of the Croatian Democratic Community for Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Veso Vegar; place and date not given: "Silajdzic Offers Yugoslavia!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] One third of the IFOR [Implementation Force] mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina is over, and the military part of the Dayton agreement has been implemented with fewer problems than expected, but the more difficult part, the civilian part—the most important part of which is the organization of the elections to be held by 14 September 1996 at the latest—has yet to be solved. The Provisional Election Commission has published the election rules and guidelines, which have been accepted by political parties and the people in various ways. Their reactions have predominantly been negative, however. We heard in a conversation with Bozo Rajic, chairman of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the opinion of the HDZ about the election rules and other current issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Rajic] The HDZ has not responded officially to the published election rules yet. At one of our next meetings, we shall discuss the materials that are being prepared now, and, after that, we shall formulate our official stance. For the moment, I can just say that the election rules have resulted from the spirit of the Dayton agreement. It can be claimed that there are reasons for criticizing some of the rules, but the nervousness of some parties, which can be seen in the media, arises from their poor interpretation of the Dayton documents.

[Vegar] There have been serious reproaches from most of the parties from Sarajevo that the election rules and guidelines are leading Bosnia-Herzegovina toward a final split.

[Rajic] Certain political circles claim that elections conceived in this way will lead to a split of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas others deny it, although it has to be admitted that the consequences of the war, ethnic cleansing, oppression, etc. have been rewarded. The HDZ is in the situation that, today, it cannot win the election in some communes in which we could have won because there is no democratic basis. All these things, however, including the elections, were considered in Dayton, when the concept for Bosnia-Herzegovina was made. If we make calculations or criticize the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] rules today, it means that we deny the Dayton agreement. If we begin to divide the Dayton agreement into the parts we like and those we do not like, the Dayton project for Bosnia-Herzegovina must fail. Having accepted the project as a whole, we must also accept those parts that we are not pleased with.

HDZ Campaign

[Vegar] What do you think about the opinions of some political parties, even the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], that the election must be postponed and that they should not be held unless all the conditions have been fulfilled?

[Rajic] Whether the elections will be held or not and whether they will be honest or not remains to be seen. It is our task to fight for the elections to be held. We should take care that the obligations assumed with the Dayton agreement are respected, and it is in our own interest that these elections are honest. The most important thing for us at the moment is to treat the elections as part of the Dayton agreement, which we are obliged to respect. We should not do anything that could obstruct the elections.

[Vegar] Although the election campaign has not officially started yet, most of the political parties are using every moment and every occasion for promotion. It seems that the HDZ is not doing so.

[Rajic] Political work can be performed in various ways. The fact that we are not very present in public, at public meetings and gatherings etc., does not necessarily mean that the HDZ underestimates the importance of participation in an election campaign. It is up to us to decide when and with what means we will lead a campaign. I think that the parties need campaigns that create their images and prove who they are as good as those who think that political consciousness can only be changed with pressure. We are not in such a position. We think that the HDZ is an absolutely legitimate party that has had the huge support of the Croat population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this might be the reason why we are not very loud at the moment. We believe strongly in our political program, our achievements, and the political maturity of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Vegar] Do you expect some other Croat parties to participate in the election and is a joint participation possible?

[Rajic] It is only logical that other parties might also decide to participate in the political race, but I have not thought very much about who could appear. The success of every Croat party that appears in the elections will depend on the political profile it has created so far and on its relation toward the struggle and the destiny of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been led by the HDZ in the last six years, has become politically mature, and, in that sense, what Croat parties will appear is not a big problem for the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fact that they carry the adjective "Croat" makes our attitude toward them positive. All parties that want to cooperate with the HDZ, especially Croat parties, are welcome. There cannot be any cooperation, however, with parties that have a concept that is significantly different from ours. We have a position that enables us to participate in the elections alone and to win them, but we do not exclude any form of cooperation regarding several aspects of the political reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and these are: It is and should remain a complex state; the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a federation of the peoples organized in counties; the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the three constituent and sovereign peoples with equal rights.

[Vegar] How would you comment on the announcements of some parties from the Republic of Croatia that they will support Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Rajic] This is the right and a responsibility of every party. The parties that think that they will reach political subjectivity by submitting to another party in this region are completely wrong. The HDZ is not bothered by the problem of who will support Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina and how successful Haris Silajdzic will be. We know that the political concept offered by Silajdzic's party is unacceptable for the Croat population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His project is completely clear to us. He speaks about a Bosnia of Bosniaks, a Bosnian Bosnia, which is a completely new term. If he means a Bosnia of Bosniaks as alienated members of their nations—the new political term determined by the Bosnian nationality—it is a dangerous illusion. If Silajdzic speaks about a unitary and democratic Bosnia and, at the same time, sends messages that all those who do not support that idea support war, the question of whether this is a political offer or a political dictate must be asked. With the term unitary Bosnia, Silajdzic spreads the dangerous thesis of unitarianism and a melting pot of peoples, which is nothing else but derogating the Dayton agreement. This is a modified model of Milosevic's democratic Yugoslavia. If there are Croat parties that want to support Silajdzic's concept, they are welcome to. [passage omitted]

[Vegar] If we accept the thesis that its nations will decide on the destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the latest incidents, in which there were victims, show that there are not very many chances for reintegration.

[Rajic] Honestly speaking, I think that the Federation has much better chances than a complete reintegration, not because I do not want it, but because this is a fact. I think that energy should be primarily aimed at the Federation as an entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas the process of reintegration of the other part of Bosnia-Herzegovina will face considerably more difficulties. This does not mean that it is impossible, but, after the message the Serb side sent regarding the events around Sarajevo, we have to be realistic: It will be difficult, perhaps even impossible. I think that the Serbs have shown the political direction they want to take, regardless of what the price will be. On the other hand, even if we forget about the Serb messages, I think that we must restrain from crying that Bosnia-Herzegovina will be a unitary democratic state with powerful central authorities. This is a bad recommendation for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina should be reintegrated, respecting the fact that there are three nations, that there are consequences from the war, that people are highly frustrated and embittered, that there are mistrust and ideological conflicts, and that every ultimatum reduces the chances for its reintegration. [passage omitted]

B-H: TEC Official Says Election Rules Change Dayton Accord

AU0605124296 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 2 May 96 p 7

[Interview with Kasim Begic, representative of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Temporary Election Committee, by Zdravka Soldic; place and date not given: "The Elections Are a Revision of Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The published rules and regulations of the Temporary Election Committee [TEC] for the coming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina have attracted much attention and dissatisfaction among the political parties and the citizens of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of the rules says that those expelled or voluntarily moved to other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina have voting rights in their new place of residence. This rule, which forms part of the election regulations, is most often subject to severe criticism and dispute.

We have been speaking to Kasim Begic, the representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the TEC, about all the controversial issues and defined solutions that are in the election rules and regulations.

The TEC is, according to the Dayton agreement, under the authority of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and is headed by an American, Robert Frowick. However, representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and the Serb Republic are all cooperating in its work. In addition, Begic has participated in all the agreements, from Washington to Dayton, as a legal expert.

[Soldic] Mr. Begic, how do you comment on the rules and regulations of the TEC, which you also took part in?

[Begic] From an objective analysis of the rules and regulations of the TEC one can conclude that a number of solutions exist that work to reintegrate Bosnia-Herzegovina, but there are also solutions that question the confirmation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state. The biggest problem in these election regulations, which question the meaning of the entire Dayton peace agreement, is primarily that they allow voting according to the situation on the ground, that is, displaced people vote in places where they are now and intend to live in the future. This solution, which was made by the head of the TEC, Robert Frowick, has given rise to condemnation by all the political parties in the Federation. The view put forward by the president of the Federation, as well as myself, not to permit such voting, was not successful in convincing those presiding over the committee.

Even Criminals Vote

[Soldic] You also participated in getting the Dayton agreement through. What does Dayton explicitly state on this matter?

[Begic] The basic rule of Dayton is also the basic rule of the TEC, which explicitly states that citizens are to vote directly or indirectly in the municipality in which they had their residence in 1991. This is a general rule in Dayton and in the rules and regulations of the TEC. However, the exception to the rule, as stated in the Dayton agreement, is "that a citizen can, however, register with the Commission to vote elsewhere." Therefore, from a legal point of view, the possibility to demand to vote elsewhere, and not only in the municipality from 1991, was left in the Dayton agreement. The problem is that this exception was foreseen for some special circumstances, for instance, if someone had moved between the 1991 census and the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April 1992, or if someone had changed his residence as a resuklt of marriage, etc. This has now somehow turned into a rule that results in the following: According to the current rules, in Srebrenica even those who killed and expelled the inhabitants from their own town will be able to vote there. I tried to explain this to Chairman Frowick, but I was not successful. He simply decided on the matter in that way.

[Soldic] What conditions need to be fulfilled for the elections to be held?

[Begic] Annex 3 of the Dayton agreement defines the necessary conditions for holding elections. These are: freedom of movement, freedom of political activity of all political parties, freedom of the press and speech, and the beginning of the return of the refugees and displaced persons. All these decrees need to be fulfilled throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The obligation and fulfillment of these conditions is to be done by the parties that signed the agreement. According to the suggestion made by Frowick, the OSCE is to decide whether the conditions for holding the elections have been fulfilled. If the conditions are fulfilled, then this controversial registration of voters will not be problematic to such an extent.

[Soldic] To speculate a little, do you think that Frowick will conclude that the conditions have been fulfilled, even if they have not, owing to the pressure of holding the election, that is, the world pressure for them to be held?

[Begic] If there are no democratic or fair elections as stated in the Dayton agreement, then the entire agreement will come into question. There will, therefore, be a great deal of pressure from the international community for the OSCE to rule that the conditions have been fulfilled. It will be difficult to fulfill these conditions while Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are pulling the main strings in the Serb Republic. However, with the political games regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this would be nothing new, a great deal of pressure will be applied to have a ruling made that the conditions have been met, even if this is not so, to judge from everything else. It would be a miracle if the conditions for the elections were fulfilled, but the elections lose their basic meaning without them. Such elections will not militate toward the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rather the maintaining of the current demographic and political picture. The elections will actually be a legalization of the existing situation. Not even the current authorities will be able to alter the final decision of the OSCE. That is how it was decided in Dayton.

Peace and Justice

[Soldic] Why did Frowick decide to make it possible to vote in one's current place of residence?

[Begic] Frowick defended his decision with the argument that this country needs peace. However, this echoes Carl Bildt and his team. In their public statements, they often say that the situation on the ground is such that some of the decrees of the Dayton agreement need to be revised. Well, they forget that they have a mandate to implement the Dayton agreement and not to adapt it to the situation on the ground. That they are not doing enough is also indicated by the fact that the implementation of the Dayton agreement in half of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being made by a man who should have been in The Hague long ago. It is obvious that a great deal is missing in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, from not keeping to the deadlines to tolerating that Pale gang, who even today hold everything in their own hands.

[Soldic] As we are already mentioning Pale, could you answer [Bosnian Serb Republic Vice President] Nikola Koljevic's threat to hold a referendum in the Serb Republic after the elections. At this the citizens of this entity are to decide whether they want to join the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Is there a legal possibility for something such as this?

[Begic] Koljevic stated a very simple stupidity. However, the problem is that he is not alone in making such statements. He is sometimes encouraged by those who are tasked with implementing the peace agreement. The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina was coordinated in Dayton and it went into effect in Paris. It defined Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state, with an international legal integrity, which is made up of two entities. Even if Koljevic does hold a referendum, which no one is stopping him from doing, it will have no legal value.

[Soldic] Will the Serbs who escaped from Croatia and the Bosniaks from Sandzak be able to vote in the elections?

[Begic] No, they will not. This is an issue that is also defined in the Dayton agreement and has been considered by the TEC. The electorate of Bosnia-Herzegovina is made up of those citizens who had residence in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991. This means that those who now live in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not have the right to vote, regardless of how they got there or for what purpose. Only those who had the status of a citizen in 1991 will be able to vote.

[Soldic] How are the members of the Presidency elected?

[Begic] The members of the Presidency are elected in a unified method into two election units, that is, into two entities. In the Federation, one Bosniak and one Croat are elected, and in the Serb Republic one Serb is elected. Of the candidates from the three groups, those that get the most votes will be members of the Presidency.

[Soldic] Therefore, only Serbs will be on the election lists in the Serb Republic, which means that the refugees, for instance from Srebrenica, will only be able to vote for a Serb?

[Begic] Exactly. This is not a democratic solution, but it was agreed upon in Dayton and we have to abide by it. The Serbs in the Federation will also only be able to vote for Bosniak or Croatian candidates for the Presidency.

[Soldic] How will the Bosnia-Herzegovina House of Representatives be chosen?

[Begic] The Bosnia-Herzegovina House of Representatives is to have 42 representatives, 28 from the Federation and 14 from the Serb Republic. There are no national limitations on voters' rights. This means that all of the parties can participate throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. A proportional system will be applied, which means that the total of votes received by a political party is divided by the number of representative seats. This is how the number of votes needed for a representative seat will be obtained.

Elections in the World

[Soldic] And the representative houses of the entities?

[Begic] They are elected on the same principle, based on the party lists and independent candidates, and considering that the Federation has two houses. The House of Representatives is elected by all the citizens, and the House of the Nation [Dom Naroda] is elected by the cantonal assemblies, that is, representatives are delegated by the cantons. The proportional system also applies at the level of cantons and municipalities.

[Soldic] How and where will the refugees abroad be able to vote?

[Begic] Refugees can vote directly in the country that has offered them sanctuary, but only for the municipality in which they lived in 1991. Those that intend to live in a different municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina and want to have the right to vote in it will have to come to the municipality on the day of the elections and vote there. This is according to the election rules and regulations. They can later also return to the country that has offered them sanctuary. They will not lose their refugee status.

[Soldic] You mentioned the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. Well, the HDZ Bosnia-Herzegovina is an autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovinian and not Croatian party. Why do you question its legality?

[Begic] The status of the HDZ Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been questioned until now. It is true that the party is registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but some of the statements by the head of this party, such as "our president is in Zagreb; we conduct a single Croatian policy...," could cause problems for them in the classification by the TEC. In my opinion, Zagreb and Belgrade should not participate in the elections either publicly or in a hidden manner. This is because their participation would be a direct interference in the internal matters of a sovereign state. Both Tudjman and Milosevic signed the Dayton agreement, which, among other things, treats Bosnia-Herzegovina as a internationally recognized country.

[Box, p 7]

A Campaign Without the HSLS and the HSP

[Soldic] The HSP [Croatian Party of Right] and the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party], political parties from the Republic of Croatia, have announced their cooperation in the election campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you comment on this?

[Begic] The Croatian liberals and right wing are behaving like the HDZ on this matter. However, the election rules have defined that participation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections is open only to those parties that are registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina and are from Bosnia-Herzegovina in their membership and leadership. The election rules will rule out political parties that represent branches of parties that operate in other countries. Therefore, only Bosnia-Herzegovina parties, regardless of national, social, or any other prefix, will be able to participate in the elections. That is, they will be able to register with the TEC. Moreover, each party that is looking for registrationn by the election committee will, among other things, have to make a statement that it accepts the Dayton agreement. It was possible for branches of parties from other states to participate in the 1990 elections, because Bosnia-Herzegovina was then not yet internationally recognized as a state. This is why their participation is now no longer possible.

B-H: Mostar Administrator Interviewed on Elections

AU0705205896 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 96 pp 30-31

[Interview with Ricardo Perez Casado, EU administrator of Mostar, by Miljenko Karacic; place and date not given: "Mostar Is Increasingly Free"]

[FBIS Translated Text] EU Mostar Administrator Ricardo Perez Casado has been staying in the city on the Neretva River for three weeks now. Unlike his predecessor, Hans Koschnick, he arrived in Mostar without big pomp. He was not received by representatives of the city authorities, let alone by higher state officials. Casado's arrival did not cause any particular excitement in the EU Administration either. He spent his first days in Mostar touring the city and meeting the two mayors and his staff. He was out of reach only for journalists. Until his first news conference, he refused to talk to the media. Even at the first news conference last Friday [3 May], he did not offer many answers. At the start, he presented biographical data, the basics of of which we will provide here.

Ricardo Perez Casado was born on 27 October 1945. He is married and has one son. He graduated from the

University of Complutense in Madrid, majoring in political sciences and sociology. He continued his studies in economic sciences at the University of Barcelona and at the Center for Studies of Mediterranean Societies at the University of Aix-en-Provence. He worked as a professor at the High Technical School for Architecture in Valencia and at the Faculty for Economic Sciences and Trade, also in Valencia. Later, he managed companies and services engaged in city planning, the environment, and marketing. Before his arrival in Mostar, he led a team of professionals, engaged in city planning and the development of real estate projects.

Casado started his political career with the Socialist Party, as he is one of its founders, who founded the party in 1964 in Valencia. In 1975, he became a member of the Democratic Alliance of Spain and, three years later, he became an active member of the Socialist Labor Party of Spain. In 1979, he was elected mayor of Valencia and, at the same time, he performed the duties of chairman of the Alliance of Mediterranean Cities. Undoubtedly, those were the elements that induced the European Union to appoint him as the new administrator of Mostar after Koschnick's early departure from the post.

[Karacic] Why did you keep yourself at a distance from journalists at the beginning of your stay in Mostar?

[Casado] I was in Mostar for the first time. Although I had heard a lot about the circumstances and problems here from my aides and my predecessor, I did not want to say anything until I had seen for myself what the real situation was like. I wanted to create my own view of the situation here. Of course, for such a thing, one needs more time than just one or two weeks. I am coming to new conclusions every day and fitting together new impressions like a mosaic.

[Karacic] Your predecessor left behind many unresolved questions in Mostar. Certain jobs have already been started. Which issues will you start with first at the beginning of your mandate?

[Casado] There are two issues that are the most topical in Mostar at the moment. Those are the elections and the economic recovery of the city. The first part of job emanates from the Dayton peace accords and the Memorandum on Understanding. Therefore, in this respect things are quite clear. One needs to conduct thorough preparations, however, and take a serious and responsible approach to the job. After several meetings with the two mayors, the advisory council, and members of the electoral commission, my impression is that both sides want the elections to take place as soon as possible.

[Karacic] Have the conditions for holding elections been created yet?

[Casado] The electoral commission and other services to the EU Administration have already employed all their technical potential for the preparations for the elections. The Croat side considers that all the conditions for conducting the elections have been created. The Bosniak side, however, considers that there are still some unclear things regarding who is entitled to vote, what will happen with those who are absent, and the parties' media presentations. In any case, the EU Administration will fully support the conducting of the elections and will be following all the rules agreed upon by the sides, of course, observing everything that is specified by the agreements that have been signed.

[Karacic] Will the elections be held before the deadline anticipated by the Dayton accord?

[Casado] There was a proposal by the advisory board that six weeks should pass from the day of the announcement of the elections until they are held. Taking into account the Dayton accord and the opinions of legal experts, I have decided that the elections will be held on 31 May. Thus the deadline set by the Dayton accord has been formally met, and we should now make considerable efforts to prepare the elections by that date. The electoral commission and other bodies ought to work at full speed. A lot of work awaits them, particularly regarding drawing up the final election register.

[Karacic] The Dayton accord clearly specifies who is entitled to vote in the elections. What is unclear in that respect?

[Casado] Bosniak representatives have stressed on several occasions that certain provisions of the Dayton accord should be altered to accommodate the Mostar circumstances and that the citizens living elsewhere should now be enabled to come here and vote. I believe that this is an issue that can be resolved to everybody's satisfaction. I am a real optimist.

[Karacic] What do you think these elections can bring to Mostar?

[Casado] First of all, the elections are supposed to make possible the establishment of a joint administration over the entire city. The EU is supposed to facilitate this goal. This is part of its mandate specified in the Memorandum on Understanding, which was accepted by all three sides at the beginning of the EU Administration's mandate. Consequently, the EU Administration will not prejudge any political solution for the city. The establishment of the joint city council and the municipal councils of Mostar's six municipalities will facilitate the establishment of all bodies of authority and create realistic conditions for a far better life for all citizens of Mostar.

[Karacic] How much will the Mostar elections cost?

[Casado] The EU will take on all the costs regarding the organization of the elections in Mostar. This is a task that we have taken on, and we shall do it. It is clear that the elections will cost some money. However, my aides who are directly in charge of the technical organization of the elections, Messrs. Winterstein and Winkler, will prepare a financial plan for the elections in a week or two. We shall certainly present it to the public. For the time being, it is still not possible to talk about any more concrete amount, though.

[Karacic] Will the mandate of the EU Administration in Mostar be extended if the elections fail, and will the mandate end then, as was initially anticipated, if the elections succeed?

[Casado] The extension of the EU Administration's mandate in Mostar is not directly bound up with the elections. The ministers of the EU member states have not presented their attitudes yet. Of course, all member states want the elections to succeed, because the Mostar project is a project of the EU. There is a possibility that some EU member state might make the success or the failure of the elections a provision for the extension of the EU Administration's mandate over Mostar, but no one has declared their attitude on that issue yet. We shall certainly have more details on that in late May, when I will travel to Brussels.

[Karacic] The Croat side is rather satisfied with the implementation of the Dayton accords and the Rome agreement on Mostar. The Bosniaks, however, are not showing great satisfaction. On the contrary, in the Bosnian media, one can hear or read increasingly often that the implementation of the aforementioned agreements in Mostar cannot be assessed positively. How do you view the implementation of the agreements in Mostar?

[Casado] The Rome agreement and the Dayton accords have yielded satisfactory, even pretty good results in Mostar. Freedom of movement has been established precisely after those agreements. It is improving every day. Nobody can deny this. This is certainly something that encourages. The safety of people and their property is also improving, day by day. Of course, all this could be much better, but if we do not start going in that direction, we shall never reach our goal. My close aide, (?Martin Gerod), has told me that the freedom of movement is improving, but that it is not perfect because men of military age still rarely go from one part of the city to the other, but that it is very important that women and children may freely move in the entire city. Every day, there is a noticeable progress.

[Karacic] Your predecessor, Hans Koschnick, certainly left Mostar in a different manner and earlier than he had initially intended. He had a chance to see what the real situation in Mostar is like. He diagnosed some problems accurately, while he burnt his fingers on others. Did you have an opportunity to discuss the situation in Mostar with him?

[Casado] My predecessor did a lot in this city on the Neretva River. I appreciate that. I certainly did talk about all this with him before my arrival in Mostar. We hold the same opinion on many issues. I will certainly accept some of his suggestions, but there are many things I will understand and form my own opinion on in time. When I speak about the conversation with Koschnick, I can say that he was very cooperative and helpful. I think that my own experience in city government will be useful to me, not only in terms of the political part of the mandate or the economic reconstruction, but also in terms of the cultural and spiritual life in Mostar. When I was the mayor of Valenica, I was always interested in culture as a way of building understanding among people. Culture is supposed to bring people closer to each other. I am proud that I organized a number of film festivals and art exhibitions and helped the building of cultural institutions.

[Karacic] To what extent can your success in Mostar influence the relations within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Casado] I expect talks with officials of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to take place soon. I think that the success of the elections in Mostar will primarily have an impact on the elections and the overall relations throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: War Considered 'Only' Alternative to Integral Bosnia

AU0705131996 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by Ibrahim Prohic: "Integral Bosnia-Herzegovina or War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warnings issued by Haris Silajdzic, the chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than a month ago, that tendencies toward Bosnia's disintegration are assuming dangerous and threatening proportions, have not been understood in the correct way. He was accused of dramatizing things unnecessarily in order to promote his party, of struggling for power rather than for Bosnia, and of liberating what had already been liberated. Now it is clear that there cannot be any reliable peace, let alone a stable state, in the free territory until it is free for everyone. Partial solutions for Bosnia do not work. There are only two possibilities: an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina or war. Is there anybody left who does not understand this? The time for illusions has gone. What Bosnia has now has been too dearly paid for to allow us to give up the authentic idea of Bosnia. Any move that does not oppose its division, either into two or three parts, may be damaging. The idea of Bosnia's division has not been defeated either militarily or politically. Tensions in Bosnia suit both the Belgrade and the Zagreb regimes: They draw public attention away from the internal tensions in their own countries, and by keeping Bosnia as a hostage they are trying to get for themselves more favorable solutions for unsolved questions that are still lingering. Milosevic is maneuvering, using Karadzic and Mladic. The option of stripping the two of power only for the elections is dangerous not only for freedom of movement, but also for the overall atmosphere and conditions for the elections and for the character of the authorities and the so-called Serb entity before and after the elections. The influence of the leaders of the rebel Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic and Mladic, is unquestionable. They are the masters of obstruction and disorder. As long as they are on the scene or directing the game behind the scenes, there will be no freedom of movement or any other elementary conditions for the normalization of life. This is how the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being blocked, as well as communications between the entities and any transformation of the political situation in the so-called Serb entity. Expectations that political alternatives in the so-called Serb entity will democratize the society from inside have proven to be exaggerated while Karadzic is still at large. Even though his future is not at all rosy, he is still not politically dead. He has even been consolidating his position. The time immediately after Dayton was not used in the best possible way. We missed the chance to strike while the iron was hot. Now, every day at liberty brings political strength and influence back to Karadzic. Only in The Hague would he be harmless .

B-H: Bosniaks Prevent Serb Visit to Sarajevo Cemetery

AU0805140096 Paris AFP in English 1354 GMT 8 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 8 (AFP)—A 100-strong group of young Moslems, some armed with sticks, stopped Bosnian Serbs from visiting a cemetery in a suburb of Sarajevo Wednesday.

They positioned themselves at the entrance to Hadzici, which is under Moslem-Croat federation control, threatening to take revenge over the killing of three Moslems last week.

Meanwhile a group of around 20 elderly women, some also armed with sticks, took up positions at the entrance to the cemetery in Hadzici which the Serbs were due to visit.

The visits had been planned in advance, UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko said, but stressed they were visits by individuals and not groups.

"I'll stop the Serbs," Hajrudin Covic, one of the first group, told AFP. "I will do to them what they did at Doboj and Trnovo," he added, referring to the incidents last week.

"Our police will not be able to prevent us stopping them. Our leaders cannot arrest us. How could they?"

The visits are allowed under freedom of movement which is enshrined in the Dayton peace accord. Federation police are supposed to ensure security for any Serbs wanting to visit areas where they used to live.

Colonel Horst Tiemann, head of the UN police in Sarajevo, said he was asking local police "to do their job. The local police have to deal with the problems when they are happening in the area."

A Serb woman, Gospava Milutinovic, managed to get into the Hadzici cemetery earlier, but explained that she had always lived in the area and did not move out when it passed to Federation control in March.

"Today is Saint Mark's day. It is a tradition to visit graves (today). I do it every year," she told AFP as she stood in front of the graves of her grandchildren and other relatives.

B-H: Muslims, IFOR Warned Against Planned Entry Into Knezevo

LD0605181496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1550 GMT 6 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Knezevo, 6 May (SRNA)—Vukadin Miljic, chairman of the Knezevo Municipal Assembly, today warned the Muslim leadership and representatives of the IFOR [Implementation Force] Sector Southwest about the possible consequences of any unannounced and forcible entry by Muslims into this municipality's territory.

"According to the authorities' information, a large number of Muslims are making secret preparations to go to Banja Luka across Knezevo municipality territory," Miljic says in a statement.

"In spite of this information, there is no fear or panic among our citizens, who have the right to initiate their own defense and prevent such uncontrolled trips which may trigger unwanted incidents," the chairman of Knezevo Municipality says in the statement.

Stressing that Muslims are abusing the Dayton articles on freedom of movement and using them for their own political goals, the statement warns that "every large movement of unannounced groups into the territory of the Serb Republic must be considered a threat to the personal security of its citizens."

"The aim of such attempts by Muslims and their authorities is to initiate conflicts and incidents," the statement adds, and concludes that "such tensions do not contribute to strengthening peace or toward the creation of a more stable situation in this region."

B-H: IFOR Deploys Advance Command in Serb-Held Visegrad

AU0705160196 Paris AFP in English 1507 GMT 7 May 96

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Visegrad, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 7 (AFP)—The ground commander of NATO-led troops in Bosnia has deployed a tactical command centre to this Serb-run eastern Bosnian town, demonstrating NATO's ability to move around the country.

The commander of NATO ground troops, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Walker, set up the forward headquarters operation in Visegrad Tuesday [7 May], the first such operation since NATO troops deployed to Bosnia in December.

Allowing meetings with local military, and political leaders in the nearby towns of Gorazde and Foca, as well as Visegrad, the command will be packed up Wednesday and returned to Sarajevo, Walker told reporters here.

The advance command HQ, comprising some 170 support and command staff, 65 vehicles, and batteries of high-tech communications equipment, is intended to move with the second most senior IFOR commander for short periods of time around the country.

The purpose is to allow the commander, number two in the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR), to focus his attention on particular areas of the country some way from the main command in Sarajevo, Walker said.

While the deployment went smoothly, the town chosen for the first visit, raised chill memories among Bosnian journalists visiting Visegrad Wednesday.

The town, is to many appearances quiet and unremarkable, save for its famous bridge, and memories of what went on here in the early days of the Bosnian war.

The bridge, a 15th century stone construction of over twenty arches spanning the Drina River, was the subject of a Nobel prize-winning novel, "The Bridge Over the River Drina," by the novelist Ivo Andric, detailing the brutality of Balkan wars.

After serving as the site of thousands of brutal killings during World War II, the bridge, became a killing ground again in 1992, when several hundreds, reportedly thousands of Moslems, were slaughtered in the town in a campaign of ethnic cleansing and tipped off the bridge into the waters of the Drina.

While IFOR has been able to deploy to the town, with Greek, British, Portuguese and French troops, few Bosnian Moslems have yet felt safe to revisit the town from which they were forced to flee in 1992, according to one Bosnian journalist in Visegrad Wednesday.

Asked about the return of Moslems to Visegrad, Walker said Tuesday it appeared unlikely many would come back. "I am not anticipating the move of displaced persons here in the way that we have seen in central Bosnia," he said.

The right to travel and the right to return to property owned before the war broke out in Bosnia are written into the Bosnian peace treaty, signed by all the former warring parties.

But in practice even determinedly optimistic IFOR officials admit that real freedom of movement for civilians, as opposed to IFOR troops is still "a long way away."

Walker said IFOR would "robustly support campaigns to rid this country of the legacy of wartime roadblocks, of thugs demanding money or papers," of those wishing to travel again freely throughout the country.

But freedom of movement "can only be something that is bestowed on the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina by their own leaders," he said.

"They promised to do this by signing the Dayton agreement. Fulfilling that promise is the solution to the problem," he said.

Before the war broke out in Bosnia, 21,202 people lived in the Visegrad municipality. A total of 63.4 percent were Moslem, 32.2 percent were Serb.

B-H: Croatian Embassy Denies Karadzic May Visit Zagreb

LD0705173596 Sarajevo Radio Hajat in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina strongly rejects any possibility of Radovan Karadzic [Bosnian Serb leader] traveling to Zagreb to meet Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, as reported by the Sarajevo press recently, the Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina said in a statement today.

The articles were described by the embassy as tendentious and an attempt to discredit the state authorities of the Republic of Croatia and its president in the eyes of both the Bosnia-Herzegovina and international public. It sees them also as an attempt to convince the public of the futility of the efforts to build the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to undermine the Washington and Dayton agreements, especially on the eve of the planned meetings of the council for cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the meeting on building the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Washington on 14 May.

The Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina believes that good relations between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to develop for the benefit of both the Bosniak and Croatian people, the statement says.

B-H: Karadzic Interviewed by Greek Media

LD0705235196 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1835 GMT 7 May 96

[Interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by unidentified Greek reporters; place and date not given; questions and answers in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation; interview processed from the English, which is audible beneath the translation—recorded]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Question] Six months after the Dayton agreement, what is the situation like in so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially in the Serb Republic?

[Karadzic] Well, we have not been completely satisfied with the Dayton agreement, but we accepted it and we are very decided to implement it and to preserve peace and stability in the region. Unfortunately, the Muslim-Croat federation is not stable. We would like them to stabilize and not to endanger the Dayton agreement.

Many of the Muslims leaders are threatening with another war; many of them want to alter the Dayton agreement, to change it in terms that the Serb Republic lose its own autonomy and its own sovereignty which it has been given in Dayton. We will not allow that. We simply accepted the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina which is comprised of the federation and the Serb Republic. Of course, we wanted something else but we have accepted it for the sake of peace.

The situation in the Serb Republic is very stable; people are recovering from the war economically and psychologically. There is a political stability, although we do not get any help from the international community. Muslims and Croats have already almost $300 million, and the Serbs did not get anything and we know that the international community will not treat us equally. If they want peace here, they should treat us equally. But, we will survive.

[Question] What is the future of the Serb Republic, not in the short future but in the far future?

[Karadzic] The Serb Republic is a fact. It is a fact of the importance of the international politics, international community, because we have signed peace in front of President of the United States, representative of Russia, representatives of European countries; and this is a historical fact—that we have our own borders and a certain degree of sovereignty and it is going to stay in that way or be increased in terms of more and more sovereignty. But, everything that we want to achieve, we want to achieve by political means, not by the war.

As a matter of fact, we did not want the war. The Serb Republic has been offered to us before the war by the European Community during Lisbon Conference, and the Serb Republic is a child of European Community so it has been given to us. During three and a half years of the war, we have been defending the results of Lisbon Conference while the Muslims are trying to ruin even the Dayton agreement, as they did with the Lisbon agreement, and they should be watched by the international community because they are not frank [word indistinct].

[Question indistinct on the U.S. role in Bosnia]

[Karadzic] Well, some Americans, not all America. But some parts of the State Department are fully responsible, like Ambassador Zimmerman, who has persuaded Muslim leader to abandon Lisbon Conference. If he did not abandon Lisbon Conference we could have avoided this war. Somebody is responsible for four years of fighting and destruction.

[Question] What will be your policy, the policy of the Serb Republic to Bosnian borders?

[Karadzic] Well, according to Dayton agreement we have only a thin roof over the Serb Republic and federation as two entities, completely autonomous from each other. This thin roof is presidency, council of ministers, and foreign ministry, ministry of foreign affairs. All the others in our competences and we can stand it, Bosnia, to look as European Union or something like that. [sentence as heard]

[Question] What about your standing upon International Court of Hague?

[Karadzic] Well, we do not recognize this court of justice because it is not a court of justice but a court of political manipulations. But, we are ready to try any allegations if they submit some evidence against any of us. Our national judiciary would try even me if they give good evidence about that. On the other hand, we can't hand over a single person because our constitution is not envisaging this possibility. We have already sentenced more than 5,000 people in our own courts martial, mainly Serbs—99 percent Serbs. We have sentenced some Serbs that have been killing Muslims; we have done it without any pressure before any court in Hague was founded. So, we will continue to try and to sentence according to the law every single case that is proven by the evidence. We take obligation to try every single criminal.

[Question] Will you be president after the elections of September?

[Karadzic] Let the people decide. I will do what is best for my people.

[Question] And relations with Serbia [words indistinct]?

[Karadzic] This is basically good relations because people are the same. We are the same nation. There have been some differences toward the Vance-Owen plan, Contact Group plan. But, Dayton agreement has been accepted and now there are no other reasons for the dispute between us and Serbia.

[Unmonitorable question asking Karadzic to comment on Belgrade's decision to recognize Macedonia]

[Karadzic] Well our minister has said already our own standpoint. I think Skopje under any name has the right to be a state because they have decided that way. But, the matter of name should be resolved before and I would like Athens, Skopje, Belgrade to make Orthodox axis and to work with full cooperation and accordance because we have common enemies. This should be resolved between Skopje and Athens.

[Question] Do [words indistinct] particularly a role between Belgrade and Athens over the problem of Skopje?

[Karadzic] If I can do anything about that, I would be happy to do. I do think that Greece and Skopje would resolve the matter of name. As I understood, Greece has nothing against Skopje except the name, name of the state. I hope it is going to be solved. After that we would recognize Skopje.

[Question] [Word indistinct] send a message to the Greek people, and what do you want more from Greece?

[Karadzic] First and the most important what we wanted from Greece was understanding and friendship and we got that. We got even more, we got some volunteers here, fighting and helping us. We got some political, psychological, and material support from Greece, from the government and institutions, associations, syndicates, unions, and so on. That was very, very precious for us to know that the Greeks are supporting us. Now we are getting some material help but very soon I hope we will not need help any longer. We will need good business relationships and we hope that Greek economy is going to be met here and welcomed here and I do hope we will develop our own relations so that your children can come here to ski during winter as our children have been accepted in Greece during the summers.

What I would like Greek people to know is that we have lost many things during this war but we have got something very, very important—Greek friendship. I want Greeks to know that we, if you get any trouble, that we will stand behind you. Many soldiers of mine are now demobilizing and there is [word indistinct] employment. They ask me: If Greece needs us, please, send us there. So, if you get some enemies, and I hope you will not get any enemies; because if you are strong you will not get any enemies. [sentence as heard] But, if you get, you can count on our friendship.

I want you not to need any help but God's help. Unfortunately, Turkey is behaving like a regional power and we are following what is... [pauses] They have been [words indistinct] and you stood very bravely [words indistinct] courage and wisdom to avoid it. Conflicts are terrible but sometimes unavoidable. Your conflict [word indistinct] is avoidable and I wish you not to have any conflicts forever.

[Question] After the full normalization of the situation here, are you intending to call, to have an invitation for the Greek leadership to be the first country to [word indistinct] here?

[Karadzic] Yes, both economically and politically. I would like to invite the president of Greece and the prime minister of Greece. Even now they can come here because we are recognized as a part of union and I would like them to come as many Greeks come to our country.

B-H: Karadzic Receives Greek Humanitarian Delegation

LD0705215296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1725 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7 May (SRNA)—Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, received in Pale today a delegation of Greek humanitarian organizations who arrived with $1.2 million worth of humanitarian aid.

President Karadzic expressed thanks for the aid, "the first delivery to arrive by rail from Thessalonika to Bijeljina," and said that through their unselfish help, the Greek people have confirmed their traditional friendship with the Serb people.

The Greek delegation, comprising 23 representatives of Greek humanitarian organizations and the Ministries of Culture, Sport, and Health, is led by Miltos Karakapelis, chairman of the Thessalonika-based Balkan Strategy Institute.

B-H: Tadic's Lawyer Says Fair Trial 'Impossible'

AU0705124096 Paris AFP in English 1223 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, May 7 (AFP)—Defence lawyer Michail Wladimiroff said Tuesday [7 May] it was impossible to guarantee a fair trial for Bosnian Serb Dusan "Dusko" Tadic whose trial for war crimes opened here.

"There is a danger of high media exposure and low-quality justice," Wladimiroff said, opening his submissions Tuesday.

His comments came after the prosecution at the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia outlined in graphic detail a lurid litany of murder and torture against Tadic, 40.

He is accused of killing, torturing and persecuting non-Serbs in detention camps in northern Bosnia in 1992.

It is the first war crimes trial before an international court since the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders 50 years ago.

Wladimiroff said Tadic risked becoming a "symbol" of all that had happened in the former Yugoslavia and the case against him risked being "blown out of all proportion."

He said the defence had been hampered in preparing its case on several accounts, including a lack of detailed information on the charges against Tadic.

Wladimiroff said a lack of a tribunal police force to bring witnesses to the trial had hampered the prosecution but had been a far greater problem for the defence.

B-H: Serbs Cite U.S. IFOR Officer on Freedom of Movement

AU0705203096 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] IFOR [Implementation Force] is not and will not be a guarantor of freedom of movement in former Bosnia; it is up to the authorities and police in its entities—the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation.

This is part of the statement that the commander of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored division of IFOR, Colonel (Gregory Fontano), issued today at the news conference held at the IFOR base in (?Cerik) near Brcko. Moreover, the U.S. colonel fiercely condemned the daily [word indistinct] of the Dayton accord regarding the guaranteed freedom of movement.

In the specific case of Brcko, we had several excellently organized Muslim visits to cemeteries, during which the Serb police carried out their tasks professionally, said (Fontano), after Croat and Muslim press correspondents insisted that IFOR should facilitate the return of the Muslims and Croats to the town.

(Fontano) stated that, in the theater of operations of his brigade, which consists of 4,300 troops and covers the area of Brcko, Orasje, Samac, Srebrenik, Modrica, Odzak, and Gradacac, all aspects of the civilian parts of the Dayton Accord have been fully implemented. The only [word indistinct] date included in the Dayton accord is the deadline for clearing mines, of which, according to U.S. intelligence information, there are several million in this area and which will present a threat to the civilian population for the next five years, said Col. (Fontano).

B-H: Bosnian Serb PM, UNHCR Discuss Refugees

LD0705181096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1220 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 7 May (SRNA)—Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic of the government of the Serb Republic had talks today in Banja Luka with Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], about the problems facing the municipality in its efforts to find accommodation for and look after more than 80,000 refugees.

Ogata said that the UNHCR would soon embark on the reconstruction of 1,100 accommodation units in Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad to enable the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes.

"All the refugees and displaced persons from the area will be allowed to decide freely whether they wish to stay where they are or return to their homes," Ogata said.

Asked about freedom of movement in the area, she announced plans to open two regular coach services, Banja Luka-Drvar and Banja Luka-Zenica.

Kasagic said that the key problem was the return of and accommodation for the refugees from Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, where, according to him, Croatian forces destroyed over 55 percent of the electricity substations, thus making any large-scale return of the population impossible.

"The UNHCR promised to rebuild and equip schools destroyed in the war," Kasagic said, adding that the problem of freedom of movement would be resolved in the coming period.

The meeting was also attended by Slobodan Ecimovic, assistant minister for refugees and displaced persons.

B-H: UNHCR's Ogata 'Very Satisfied' With Kasagic Talks

AU0705154396 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 May 96

[Report by Branislav Bozic from Banja Luka—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the opening of his office in Banja Luka and the talks with the officials yesterday, UN senior representative Carl Bildt today held talks with a great number of representatives of nongovernment organizations. At the moment, he is in a meeting with the representatives of the religious communities active in this area.

Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic received Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, this morning. Our wish is to speed up the care for the refugees, and I am very satisfied with today's talks with Prime Minister Kasagic, Sadako Ogata stated. She announced the imminent opening of the bus lines between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croatian federation. According to Ogata, all visits between the two entities will be coordinated in the future by the UN Commissariat for Refugees and the visits will take place in smaller groups with a mandatory prior announcement. Ogata is currently visiting Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo and her wish, as she says, is to personally see what the people require for some sort of normalization of life in this area.

Rajko Kasagic signed a special agreement with the EU representative for Bosnia (Donat Carini) today, whereby the EU bestowed $2 million in aid on the Serb Republic, half for the purchase of the protection of the means of agriculture and half for the revitalization of [word indistinct] and (?pig farms).

A news conference by British General Michael Jackson, Implementation Force South East commander, started at 1500 [1400 GMT]. UN special human rights rapporteur Elisabeth Rehn called a special news conference for 1700.

B-H: Bosnian Serb Official Comments on Borders, IFOR Mandate

LD0405150996 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Serb Republic, described the situation in the Serb Republic as better than during the war, but she also pointed out that it is still very complex, because the Muslim incursions into the Serb territory threaten our borders.

In an interview for the latest issue of JAVNOST, Plavsic explained that the Serb Republic had been given the right to its own borders under the Dayton agreement and warned that there were various players trying to annul this right in the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

Commenting on the controversial information on the possible extension of the peace troops' mandate in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Plavsic said she was confident that IFOR [Implementation Force] would stay on the territory of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation, even if in smaller numbers. She also pointed out that now it is clear that the peace forces will withdraw by the end of the year.

B-H: SPRS Head Says Authorities Trying To Postpone Elections

AU0705153696 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Peace, reconstruction, and development should be the main priorities of the Serb Republic. The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic [SPRS] will strive for them, SPRS President Dragutin Ilic said in an interview for Radio Yugoslavia. For that reason, we will have to work faster and better in the future to catch up with the developed world, a part of which we wish to be, he said.

The SPRS president assessed that it is inevitable that the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be held within the envisaged deadlines, pursuant to the Dayton accord. He stressed, however, that the current authorities in both entities are trying to postpone the elections in various ways because they see this as the only possible way to maintain their positions and realize their own interests rather than the interests of the people.

The parties and the forces that are directed toward the future rather than the past must arrive on the political scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina, those who hold a clear answer to the question as to how to live tomorrow and create the conditions for a better life for our children, Dragutin Ilic, SPRS president told Radio Yugoslavia.

Croatia: Tudjman Denies Meeting With Bosnian Serb Leader

LD0705141496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Office of the President denied rumors published in a number of Bosnia-Herzegovina papers controlled by Bosniak Muslims about a meeting that allegedly took place recently between the president of the Republic and Radovan Karadzic. The president and Radovan Karadzic, the latter in his capacity as representative of the Bosnian Serbs, last met at the request of the international community representatives during the negotiations in Geneva in December 1993.

In view of the fact that similar rumors appeared in the Slovene and other foreign press, the conclusion is that they are designed to compromise the Dayton peace agreements and lay the blame on the Republic of Croatia and its president.

Croatia: Commentary Views 'Rumors' of Karadzic Visit to Zagreb

LD0705224296 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 7 May 96

[Commentary by Obrad Kosovac, Croatian TV editor]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The Office of the President of the Republic has resolutely refuted rumors, which have been printed in several Bosnia-Herzegovina papers controlled by the Bosniak Muslims, in connection with an alleged recent meeting between President Tudjman and Radovan Karadzic.

The president and Radovan Karadzic, at that time a representative of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs, last met at the request of the international community during the Geneva negotiations in December 1993. The fact that similar rumors have appeared in the Slovene and international press shows that this is obviously an attempt to compromise the Dayton Agreement and reveals a desire to point the blame at the Republic of Croatia and its president, the statement by the President's Office concludes.

[Kosovac] While one war criminal is being tried in The Hague, another, Radovan Karadzic—whom a good part of the world would also gladly like to see at the international tribunal—instead of being seen in The Hague, was allegedly seen in Zagreb. This is a lie put forth by a Sarajevo paper.

Several days ago SLOBODNA BOSNA published the news that Karadzic, in a car with Herzeg-Bosnia number plates, had secretly arrived in Zagreb via Orasje, where he had talks with none other than Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman. Some foreign news agencies immediately carried this sensational news and today's LJUBLJANSKO DELO has an article by its colleague in Sarajevo on this which implies it was a fact.

The lie perpetrated by SLOBODNA BOSNA, which is obviously aimed against the Croatian state leadership and is just another of the frequent accusations that Croatia does not want to implement the Dayton Agreement, yesterday acquired a fresh dimension at the political level as well.

During a visit by John Kornblum [acting U.S. assistant secretary of state] to Sarajevo, a journalist there asked the U.S. assistant secretary of state whether he was aware of such a Tudjman-Karadzic meeting. He was not aware of any such meeting and it was the first time he had heard of such a thing, was the reply of Kornblum, who himself was surpised by the stupid allegation.

UPI reported that Alija Izetbegovic joined in, saying: If this is true, then it is a very bad sign for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Thus a premeditated falsehood did its tour of the media, from a little article in SLOBODNA BOSNA to almost a fact in the journalist's question to John Kornblum, to the UPI report on Izetbegovic's inaccurate and ambiguous reaction. The reason is clear: Croatia should again be accused of being against the Dayton Agreement and carving up Bosnia-Herzegovina with Karadzic's Serbs.

In this way some Bosniak circles are once again showing that they are not in favor of revitalizing Dayton. They would thus prefer to put the blame on the Croats, as they have done in many concrete situations on the ground. And now they are coming out with these lies of the worst kind.

Croatia: Editor, Reporter Indicted for Criticizing Tudjman

LD0705224896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2158 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, May 7 (TANJUG)—The editor-in-chief of the renowned Split satirical weekly FERAL TRIBUNE Viktor Ivancic and reporter Marinko Culic were indicted Tuesday for publishing an article desribed as besmirching the name and the reputation of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

Charges were brought by state attorney Visnja Loncar, who said the accused had slandered and insulted the president, but refused to provide further details.

The indictment was approved by President Tudjman, a state attorney's office statement says.

If found guilty, Ivancic and Culic face a prison sentence of between one and three years in line with a new law.

On April 29 FERAL TRIBUNE published a text by Culic titled bones in a mixer, criticizing Tudjman's proposal to bury at the site of the concentration camp Jasenovac, where about 700,000 people, mainly Serbs were put to death during World War II, also the remains of their executioners—Croatian ustashis.

In this article, Culic compared Tudjman to Spanish fascist dictator Franco, who had realized a similar idea of 'reconciliation' in his country.

Croatia: Serb Colonel Views UNTAES Cooperation

AU0705202696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 6 May 96

[Interview with Colonel Slobodan Antonic, head of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps Headquarters, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The demilitarization process in our province should begin soon and, as General Jacques Klein said, will be completed by the end of June. The officials of the command of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps say that cooperation with UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] in implementing the joint peace mission has been highly successful.

Here is what Colonel Slobodan Antonic had to say:

[Antonic] The command of the Corps has been cooperative with (?the UNTAES forces) since the beginning, and we are helping them with the deployment in the area. At the very beginning, we made it clear that the [word indistinct] they are building in this area must provide a safe and peaceful life to all the people in the area. In that sense, we have achieved a high degree of cooperation with the UNTAES command and all the [passage indistinct] what we have been doing [word indistinct] safely and peacefully, and I think [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] Does demilitarization imply that the Croatian Army will withdraw from the separation lines? Do you know how the other side has been carrying it out?

[Antonic] Immediately after the signing of the Erdut Agreement, we insisted that the Croatian Army withdraw from (?certain) lines, and [passage indistinct] indicators we have [words indistinct] that they have carried out demobilization, and in that sense the international community sent (?200) observers, forming eight groups, six of which are on our [word indistinct], and two on the Croatian side, their task being to monitor any movement that would indicate any military action. I think that this has been [words indistinct] well.

[Correspondent] Colonel Antonic, do you as a soldier believe that the UNTAES forces will be able to secure personal peace and security for all citizens of the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem?

[Antonic] At our insistence, Mr. Schoups, as the new commander of the UNTAES forces, addressed the people and [words indistinct] General Klein, the head administrator in the area. They issued a statement and said that [words indistinct] approximately 5,000 people and anything else that may be necessary (?can) guarantee a peaceful and safe life of all citizens in the area.

I believe that [words indistinct] the statements are in accordance with the resolution for the problem in this area.

Croatia: Serb Leader Receives ICRC, Belgian RC

AU0705203796 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 6 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Next in our program are the current issues regarding the humanitarian aid for our people. This time, we will talk about the aid provided by the Belgian Red Cross [RC] that is to be allocated to the health system in our province.

This was the topic of the discussion between the prime minister, Dr. Stanimirovic, and the members of the mixed delegation of the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross].

[Unidentified correspondent] Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, president of the Executive Council of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, received members of the mixed delegation of the ICRC today. In addition to the head of the Vukovar ICRC office, (Michael Frey), representatives of the Belgian Red Cross were also part of the delegation. Mr. (Frey) informed President Stanimirovic about the activity that the ICRC is carrying out on the territory of the province. According to him, the priority tasks involve informing the population, primarily about the potential danger of mines and explosives and the activities regarding the [word indistinct] of the universal human values in the province.

(Frey) pointed out that the ICRC is playing an active role in organizing the meetings of separated family members that take place at the Sarvas-Nemetin border crossing and, since recently, at Nustar.

We do not organize the refugees' visits to their houses, either on the territory of the province or outside it, he said, adding that it is very important that the people know these visits are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mission.

According to the head of the Vukovar ICRC office, this fact is important in order for the humanitarian and nonpolitical character of the ICRC not to be politicized.

The representatives of the Belgian Red Cross stated that, according to the information available, the most necessary factor in the area of health care, in which they intend to invest, is the number of ambulances.

Acknowledging this position, President Stanimirovic added that the priority investment in the area of health care is the founding of a dialysis department at the Vukovar health center.

Informing the guests that the opening of the department is in its final stages, he added that, for the department to be opened, it is necessary to acquire equipment costing up to 120,000 German marks. He said that the help of the Belgian Red Cross would be welcome in that respect, and pointed out that the cooperation with the British Red Cross has been very good; they have been distributing humanitarian aid to the people in the province for a long time.

Stanimirovic accepted the invitation to attend a reception that will be organized by the ICRC on 8 May, the Day of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Croatia: Hadzic Urges Serbs To Fight Crime, Remain in Region

AU0705202496 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 6 May 96

[Interview with Goran Hadzic, president of the "Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem," by Petko Koprivica; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The deployment of all the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] formations that will be in charge of security and peace in the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem is almost complete. Petko Koprivica, editor of Beli Manastir Television, interviewed President Goran Hadzic on this and some other current issues regarding the military and political situation in our province.

[Koprivica] The deployment of the UNTAES forces is almost complete. Mr. President, what is your assessment of the cooperation with the representatives of the peace mission in this major task?

[Hadzic] With the engagement of UNTAES in this area, we have achieved our ultimate goal, which is peace in the area. That is why I am taking this opportunity to thank all those who helped us preserve the peace in the area. I would particularly like to commend the UNTAES and Mr. Klein, who are working towards the peace becoming permanent.

[Koprivica] Do you believe that the UNTAES military forces, which consist of about 5,000 troops, will be able to provide complete peace and security for the people of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem?

[Hadzic] Peace and security have been secured [words indistinct]. I do not think that 5,000 people are enough to (?fight against 100,000 or 200,000 people). I support the position—which we have started to implement, and I am sure we will succeed—that politics should be the guarantee of our safety, since these 5,000 people are here (?symbolically), to secure the implementation of the international peace policy [passage indistinct] and I am sure that they are a good enough guarantee of our safety if you bear in mind that Mr. Klein is a general of the U.S. Army and that the powerful IFOR [Implementation Force] is just across the border in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that anyone who attempted to attack this UN-protected territory would face a large-scale conflict [words indistinct].

[Koprivica] Mr. President, please explain whether the demilitarization involves the withdrawal of the Croatian Army from the separation lines.

[Hadzic] When we accepted the demilitarization plan, we understood that our weapons were no longer the guarantee of our safety and that our politics had to be that guarantee instead. That is why whether, according to the Erdut Agreement, this province will be demilitarized, there is no—it was not agreed there that any of the neighboring areas will be demilitarized—not Hungary, not Croatia, and not Serbia. [sentence as heard]

Once this area is demilitarized, it will no longer be necessary for military forces to be deployed along our border, which is a process that will take its own course; it should not be a cause of particular concern.

According to the information I have, the Croatian Army [passage indistinct] and this process is not in danger unless we start to conduct some bad policy.

[Koprivica] May we conclude then, with some caution, that all the dilemmas about the implementation of the Erdut Agreement—specifically the safety of the Serbs staying in the area, primarily regarding their ethnic and human rights—have been resolved?

[Hadzic] We can be sure of that. All the dilemmas about whether we can survive in the area have disappeared. [Words indistinct] I can confirm now, which is that we will survive here. The only danger, which I must emphasize so that all our people can hear, is that the process [words indistinct] that we stopped, and that was conducted by people we have now exposed, is happening at another level and could result in an intervention against us either on the part of Croatia or on the part of the international forces. The process I am talking about is crime. The individuals who persuaded people to move out are recognizable, and [words indistinct] now continue (?to cut the forests) [words indistinct] and we must openly fight the [word indistinct] and everything else that is happening in the area of [word indistinct] in order to eliminate such people from the political life in the area, and, if they continue to behave that way, we must banish them from the province so that the people can continue to live in peace, as they deserve.

[Koprivica] Considering that this is your first official interview for our television, I must ask you to send a short message to the public.

[Hadzic] In addition to everything else I have said, I must point out the most important thing: Let us all fight those criminals who present a direct threat to us, who are undermining us, and who are trying to expel us from this area. Let us agree that only if we stay here can we survive. Again, I appeal to you not to believe those stories, but to stay in your homes, since we have nowhere to go.

[Koprivica] Mr. President, thank you.

[Hadzic] Thank you.

Croatia: Slavonian Serb Leader Interviewed on Reintegration

AU0705142896 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 3 May 96 pp 13-15

[Report on interview with Goran Hadzic, president of the "Srem-Baranja Region," by Jovo Paripovicin in Erdut on 30 April: "We, the Slavonian Serbs, Want To Live in the Croatian State: My Grandfather Also Died Defending Croatia!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Tuesday, 30 April, at around 1000, I entered Goran Hadzic's presidential office in the Erdut castle. Goran Hadzic greeted me personally; he was elegant, but a little worried. The former office holder, Milanovic, who until recently had been the leader of the Serbian negotiating team, had taken all the paintings from the office walls with him to Belgrade—even the picture of Slobodan Milosevic. Fortunately, he had left the leather sofa and the armchairs. Hadzic ordered his associate to find new paintings for his office, and then our conversation could begin. My first remark was that his bitterness when mentioning Croatia and the peaceful reintegration had been absent for the first time in the speech he delivered upon entering office as president of the so-called Serb Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem ("the name was changed for the sake of continuity, because the Serb Region of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem was, according to the Constitution of the RSK [the Republic of Serb Krajina], a constitutional element of the RSK").

[Hadzic] That is absolutely right. I have always delivered my political speeches "by heart," but this was the first time that I had actually written down what I had to say, in order to avoid digressions and remain moderate. I do not think there is any danger of war in these areas anymore, although there are certain dangerous hints, like the statements made by Gojko Susak in his address to the Guards formations. I want this area to be a place where all people will be able to live a normal life, a life of welfare. This is a multinational territory.

[Paripovic] What do you mean?

[Hadzic] Baranja is multinational to a great extent—more than 30 percent of the population are non-Serbs. As this is an interview for a Croatian paper, let the Croatians themselves decide to what extent Croatia is a multinational state. In accordance with the Erdut Agreement, I will make an effort for this region to remain multinational, and for the agreement to be fully implemented.

[Paripovic] Can the different nations in that area live together?

[Hadzic] We are already living together. Viewpoints change. I can give you my own example. My opinion was different six years ago, even six months ago—before the Erdut Agreement was signed—and it is different today. I am talking about progress in the quality of thinking. If we manage to have peace here, my opinion will be even more normal and optimistic.

[Paripovic] What are the chances for the return of the Croats, Hungarians, and others who used to live here before?

[Hadzic] All the Hungarians and Croats who will not be bothered by the present Serb population can return. That is my main message. I am sometimes worried when I hear the statements of refugees on HTV: They say "they will return here, but they will not live with the people who are here now, etc." They mean they will only come back here if we leave. They have to come to terms with the fact that they will live with the people they fought with. I would be glad if they did, and I would like them to be ready to accept that and finally end this process.

Two Sides of Sorrow

[Paripovic] Do you think they will be able to forget the way they were abused here, or the way the Croats, Hungarians, and Slovaks who remained in this area were tortured and mistreated?

[Hadzic] I cannot tell whether they will be able to forget that, but I know that there has been a lot of sorrow on both sides. A mother is a mother, whether Croatian or Serbian—it does not matter. On the Serbian side many mothers have lost the children, brothers, parents, or friends—as have the Croatian mothers. The question you have asked should therefore be asked in a different way. Should we venture to open that Pandora's box, the answers we received would take us back to 1991.

[Paripovic] Why were Dokmanovic, Drzajic, Milanovic, and other officials dismissed?

[Hadzic] There was no political background to those dismissals; it was a kind of democratic process being applied here. The previous situation was illegitimate.

[Paripovic] Were the Serbian signatories of the Erdut Agreement sincere when they signed the document?

[Hadzic] Yes, they were. We signed the Erdut Agreement with the intention of realizing all the plans that were included in the document. I guarantee we will realize everything.

[Paripovic] The Council and the negotiating team were said to disagree on many points, were they not?

[Hadzic] We were united in the political sense. I was the only cause of confrontation. I could not accept the idea of living in a state without the control of power.

[Paripovic] It is a little strange that you should be the president. Have you been appointed by somebody from abroad?

[Hadzic] There is no place for such doubts. I would never have accepted the appointment from anybody but my people.

[Paripovic] There was a time when you and Ilija Kojic announced the rebellion of the Serbs. Now you have the chance to try realizing what the Erdut Agreement offers. How do you explain the long way you have gone during the past five years?

[Hadzic] We did not declare war on Croatia when we tried to protect out interests. I would not say that I ever waged war on the Croatian state. I, as well as some of my friends and relatives, was proud to say that Croatia was my country, too, when the Croats were so excited about Croatia being their country. My grandfather died for that state. I have never rebelled against Croatia. It was a confrontation of political opinions. We know that we, the Serbs, were not satisfied with the principles of the Croatian authorities established in 1991, and those principles are now being adjusted. We could not accept being molested by people who used to favor fascism. We feared fascism, nothing else—we had nothing against Croatia.

Interests of Our Brothers

[Paripovic] You said your opinion had changed. How?

[Hadzic] My personal attitude has not changed, but I have noticed certain positive changes on the other side, and those have affected my opinion.

[Paripovic] You once said that your politics consisted of "obeying the voice of your people and the suggestions from Serbia and Belgrade."

[Hadzic] I probably said that immediately after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. I am trying to protect the interests of my people. We have no choice but to stay here and avoid provoking a possible Croatian aggression. I am aware that the 150,000 Serbs in this area cannot be the cause of the ruin and disappearance of Serbs in this part of Europe. The interests of 10 million Serbs cannot be jeopardized because of us. I think of the interests of our brothers, and I do not want to force anybody into war. I do not want anybody to be hurt just because, say, 100,000 of us want to have war.

[Paripovic] That is opposite to the attitude of the Knin leadership, who have made hostages out of the Serbs in Croatia.

[Hadzic] It would not be polite to talk about the people who ended up as they did. However, I will tell you my opinion. I was the president of the RSK, and I think I would have been better off spending a part of that time at home instead of in Knin, despite some good friends and pleasant memories. We had a "wish system" in our assembly at that time. Everybody said what they wished. Those were really fantasies. Our wishes were not equivalent to our possibilites. The agreements we signed were resolutely turned down by the assembly. Some Serbs will be held responsible for that in the eyes of history.

[Paripovic] What was the cause of your conflict with the Knin leadership, which even resulted in your not being allowed to come to Knin? Martic's guards and Arkan's militiamen, who were your guards, almost had an open armed conflict?

[Hadzic] I asked the Knin leadership: "Gentlemen, do you want the Croatians to destroy Knin?" "No, we do not," they said. "Then let them go across Maslenica," I said. "Why do you want to blow up the bridge? Let them use that way—if they go around Knin, they will not be forced to attack you." I tried to persuade them to open the railway lines through Knin. You cannot be a thorn in somebody's side forever, and Knin is the side of Croatia. Sometime or another they will be forced to take the thorn out. That is exactly what happened to Knin. I phoned them from Erdut to tell them not to blow up Maslenica. Certain people, I do not want to name them, told me: "Goran, are you aware that they are ustashas? How can we allow ustashas to cross that bridge?" I said I did not know whether they were ustashas or not, but they had to be allowed to cross the bridge in order to be kept from passing through Knin. That was the main point. In that period people did not want to fight, and they shouted in Split: "I will not let my son fight, not even for two Knins." Had we been a bit more flexible, Croatian forces never would have had to attack Krajina and have their young men die there. The lack of flexibility was obvious. Those people now have to face responsibility for their actions.

Strange Mentality

[Paripovic] You have always had separatist ideas, as the Knin leaders always reproached you. You said that sending anything to Knin is a waste, because—supposedly—there was no one who would unload what was sent.

[Hadzic] I said that, and that is the truth. I still maintain that. We thought that was our common struggle, and we did our best for our common goal. We gave everything we had to give. We chopped down oaks for firewood. The forests in Lika are so abundant that they cannot be severely damaged by chopping down the trees, but we never got any firewood from them. Peaches were rotting in Benkovac, and no one remembered to send some to Borovo Selo for our children.

While we were paving the memorial walk for our victims here in Vukovar, Benkovac offered us their stone at a price double what they offered us in Arandelovac. In addition, they wanted us to send them a free truckload of wheat, and they would send us the same truck loaded with stone at a market price. As a country child, I can say that relatives from the town make better guests than hosts. They were of the same kind. They thought that we, the Slavonian Serbs, were obliged to help them.

[Paripovic] In everything?

[Hadzic] After I left the presidential post, in 1993 and 1994, I tried to stop the Slavonian units from going to the Knin region, because it was useless. Batallions went from here to Knin, that is not a secret anymore, but no one was sent here from Knin. That is a very strange mentality, and I do not want to talk about that anymore.

[Paripovic] Can your appointment as president of the region also be interpreted as readiness by Serbia to agree with and cooperate in the peaceful reintegration of this region into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia?

[Hadzic] I will stress that the process of peaceful reintegration is formally over, according to international law. We do not dispute the Croatian borders. There would be no sense in doing so, as Croatia has been recognized by almost all the countries in the world except the FRY—and relations with them are even in progress. We have to negotiate the conditions under which the people here want to accept the Croatian authorities. As to the Croatian borders, those have been recognized by the United States and Russia, so Goran Hadzic cannot change that. He does not want to change it, either. The Croatian authorities have to ask themselves why, for instance, 150,000 Serbs would leave this area if Croatian rule were established here today. That is the major problem, and it will take a year or two to solve it. It cannot be done overnight—no one would stay here then. That is not only the problem of the local Serbs anymore, that is the problem of the Croatian state, which is now a member of the Council of Europe.

[Paripovic] As the leader of the negotiating team and the representative of the Serbs from this region, what will you request from the Croatian authorities, and what will you suggest to them?

[Hadzic] It is too early to say. We must first "carry out" the first part of the Erdut Agreement, the demilitarization. We will on our part do everything the Agreement requests concerning demilitarization. The economy here is in poor condition. It is time the international community helped with that. As I hear, the economy in Croatia is not very good, either. I told the ambassadors who came here that we are a protected area and should therefore be helped. We do not mind Croatia being helped, too. I was asked whether we would accept help from Croatia. We told them that there was no reason we should not accept help from them, but why should we be a burden to our Croatian friends, who are in a difficult situation themselves? Our agriculture should be supported and our oil placed on the market—all our problems would be solved then.

[Paripovic] How can robbery be stopped?

[Hadzic] Before the government was established, I decided to prohibit the export of goods from this area.

Only wood is still shipped away, over one bridge, although the cutting has stopped. People are trying to smuggle the chopped wood over.

[Paripovic] They are bothered by the statements of Mr. Klein and Ambassador Galbraith about this region being "Croatian territory" and everything being "settled in Belgrade."

[Hadzic] I do not want to discuss whose territory this is. According to the internationally recognized borders, this is Croatian territory. However, this is also Serbian territory, being inhabited by the Serbs who want to stay here.

To Forgive Each Other

[Paripovic] According to some opinions, Dokmanovic was a hindrance to the implementation of the Erdut Agreement. Would you not say that his successor, Mr. Keravica, is another hindrance, as he recently asked in a proclamation published in the "Vukovarske novine": "Shall we really leave everything to the ustashas?"

[Hadzic] Dokmanovic was dismissed because he was the head of the Council—an illegitimate body. Such terms as "ustashas" and "chetniks" should gradually disappear from our vocabulary. We should talk like decent people. We have to forgive each other, if not forget. We should not allow ourselves to worry about some things; for instance, we do not worry about the messages sent by Mr. Susak.

[Paripovic] Can you comment on the program that permits the Serb refugees who are now in Serbia to take up residence here?

[Hadzic] I would not like to talk about that. That program was not carried out, and we terminated it. It was a humanitarian program that took care of people who had relatives in this area.

[Paripovic] Taking care of 30,000 Serbs who are presently in Serbia is out of the question, is it not?

[Hadzic] That is just a theoretical possibility. It is actually impossible. The present authorities inherited an empty budget. The oil fields near Deletovci are not functioning. There is no influx of money, and we are having problems taking care of the people who already live here. The individuals who seek political profit are the only ones speculating on that. We have to stop and think it over.

[Paripovic] Are you not afraid of the radical majority in the Assembly?

[Hadzic] I am not afraid, as the most radical option is not necessarily the best. The moderate option is the best. I think this region should be completely open. That includes the opening of the highway, as well as the railway lines and the border with Hungary. The region must be open for relations with Serbia and Croatia. The people must understand that they can live together if they are ready. If they are not, let the Croatian Army attack us and kill us all, because we are fed up with lies about the necessity of living together, while the Croatian media have information about an alleged 20,000 war criminals from this region. Even the number of our soldiers is smaller than that. That means that every Serb is a nuisance.

[Paripovic] Where do you live, in Pacetin or in Novi Sad?

[Hadzic] I have been living in Pacetin for two years already. While I was president, I mostly resided in Erdut. Part of my family lives in Novi Sad for their education. I have not spent a single night in Novi Sad in the last two years.

[Paripovic] Will you stay here?

[Hadzic] I will try very hard to stay here. When I think of the Sarajevo syndrome, when people dig out the caskets of their loved ones and take them along with them, I would have to dig out half the Pacetin cemetery, and I have no idea where I would take the mortal remains of my family. I have no right to leave.

[Paripovic] After that answer, I have to remind you of one of your statements: that all Serbs who remained in Croatia are fascists.

[Hadzic] I said that in 1992, did I not?

[Paripovic] You should know that. I know that many loyal Serbs in Croatia were offended by that statement.

[Hadzic] I said I have not changed my viewpoints. The situation has changed; it is only human now that I should apologize for such a statement. I apologize. Sometimes we had to make statements in accordance with the politics of the moment. I think it is human to apologize to everyone who felt offended.

[Paripovic] After the conversation with Goran Hadzic, we visited the area of the so-called region—the remaining part of the occupied Croatian territory. We wanted to see whether Hadzic had been speaking the truth when he said that the people from that territory had stopped moving away. We were suddenly caught in the headlights of a tractor.

"You journalist bastards, you will help the police discover this path, too, and the people will not have a single way to get across," a sullen old man said. His tractor was loaded with things: pieces of furniture, pillows, covers, even a washbasin on one side... He explained that he was not afraid of being sent back by the police. He was only afraid they might take his last German mark to let him pass! The places the people usually go are Sid, Set, Kukujevci, Morovic... Only some people go futher into Serbia or Vojvodina.

The population of the so-called region, really the remaining part of the occupied territory of Croatia, is in a panic.

"It is normal that all those who have exchanged property and thus own houses or apartments in Serbia should leave, as well as those who have sacked a lot. They should only stop spreading propaganda and defeatism among honest people, who panic and hastily move their things away, staying in empty houses without a stove to brew their coffee on. I have to say that a great number of our police and our army have done so, and we see the consequences. I hope that 30,000 refugees from the camps in Serbia will be settled in the Srem-Baranja Region in May as planned, and those who have moved away their things will have to bring those things back or go after them," the "mayor" of Ilok, Bosko Jovanovic, said for the ILOCKA REC newspaper, and thus explained who moved away and why....

Cutting Down and Robbing

"I cannot see where they want to settle the people they want to settle—those who are now plundering this region are leaving a wasteland behind! They take windows out of the walls; they tear out doors and doorposts; they take tiles off the roofs and good lumber off the beams, saw it up and load it onto tractors and trucks; at the same there is a lot of activity in the nearby forest, where oak trees are being chopped down, and the woodcutters are guarded by armed persons. Hadzic used to cut down trees before; he allegedly sold the wood and bought uniforms with that money. These people now ship the logs to sawmills in Serbia, and get tremendous sums of money for that," one of the people we talked to said. We met him in front of the Fazan cafe, near the gas station in Miklusevci.

In driving from Sotin to Tovarnik, we saw that the oak trees in Croatia and Srijem were really being felled in great numbers. Along the road, near the woods, the sawed trunks of oak were being prepared to be shipped away. We overtook a number of platform trucks with license plates from BM (Beli Manastir), KE (Korenica), and DO (Doboj) hurrying toward Sid loaded with oak trunks. We waited for them at the checkpoint before Sid. The procedure was unusually short. The policeman just waved his hand and the platform trucks loaded with wood entered Serbia, as well as the tractor with another tractor on a trailer. The driver was a man in uniform, and there were two more guys in uniform on the trailer. Maybe the uniforms were the passport that provided unhindered passage in broad daylight. Why would the police run afoul of the army?

Goran Hadzic himself said that more than 40 percent of the Serbian population have moved a part or all of their belongings away, and claimed that to be the reason for the cessation of the nighttime movements.

"Can a small number of thieves and profiteers, who move their things away to hide the origin of their property, scare you away from your homes?" "Are we going to leave everything to ustashas, give them everything we have worked for for years?" That is how the "Serbian authorities" are trying to encourage the inhabitants of the so-called region.

Those "authorities" promise new devices that will "bring results," and "the starting results will assure us of a better and safer future for the people of this area, while Vukovar will remain just a distant dream to our enemies, whose main weapon is hatred toward the Serbian nation."

We tried to check the efficiency of that propaganda among common people.

In Srijemski Cakovci, on a corner, one man parked his car, put the goods on the hood, and was selling them. Several customers came, as well as several curious passersby. Mile Prodanovic, who had come from Otocac, agreed to answer our questions.

"We do not know what will happen to us. They say we have been sold by Slobodan Milosevic. Only God knows how many people have sold us, but I know no one has bought us. We are nowhere. How can I go to Serbia when people there are in such a dismal situation? I have read about it; they even look for bread in garbage cans. People are being moved again and again, and they do not like being treated like sacks of potatoes. Ljubica Guzvica, the old woman who had left Obrovac, as the papers said—our papers here, not the Croatian ones—attempted suicide rather than living through such an undignified old age. They saved her, they said. She did not kill herself. What did they save her from?" Mile asked us.

Reality Not Accepted

We drove and passed by large fields. We could not see many people working on them. People said they did not feel like working in these uncertain times. They had already left their fields sown and their crops unharvested when they left their original homes. They did not want to do that again. However, those who had started working were afraid of those who had not: If they all stayed in Srijem and Slavonia over the winter, the latter would probably survive by taking food by force from those who worked for it.

Many people still repeated: "We do not want the Croatian flag!" However, some say they "would not mind the Croatian authorities and a salary of 1,000 German marks."

"You are like those people who phone the Croatian owners of their present homes every day to tell them what is going on in the village. You think it will help you to stay here safely when the Croats come back," commented one of the people we talked to in Srijemski Cakovci.

We could say that Borovo Selo is the only place we visited, while gathering material for this report, that was not in a dilemma, at least judging by what the people we talked to told us. The only thing they would accept were "the Serbian authorities" in that region, "strengthened and preserved by the local people and all those who came from the Knin region."

Of course, there are people who offer their "help" to the Serbs in that region, and thus make their dilemma and their illusions even worse.

Among those are Miss Biljana Plavsic and the inevitable Milic of Macva. In this situation, the open letter of the Coordination Board of the local communities sounds a little strange; it is a certain kind of "appeal for help" that was sent to the highest places in the FRY, Montenegro, and Serbia. They expressed hope that "not everything is lost, and there must be a way to change the course of events."

What the authors of the letter meant by the changing of "the course of events" was the establishment of "the Serbian authorities in our region, and having our Serbian army and our Serbian dinar. Nothing more and nothing less."

Otherwise, the letter proceeded, "we can only be the passive onlookers in the future tragic fate of the Serbian people," described as the "eve of the fourth great moving of the Serbs."

Running Away From Sid

We were first asked to show our documents in Sotin. We wanted to talk to a group of people in front of the Palermo inn in Sotin.

"Which newspaper do you work for?" asked one man from the group.

"For a foreign one," we answered.

"Which foreign one?"

"Make it just a foreign one," we answered evasively. Finally we admitted: for a Croatian newspaper.

"I will tell you that many things have been changing in the relations between Croatia and our mother state Serbia. Diplomats have been talking, and people from Pancevo recently closed the oil fields near Deletovci—oil is not pumped out there anymore," the man said.

"That is nonsense," another man interrupted. "Deletovci was not closed by people from Pancevo; Slodoban Milosevic did that." He also added that Arkan's guards remained there, ready to blow the oil fields up and cause an ecological disaster.

Our conversation proceeded with commentaries on Slobodan Milosevic and statements we had heard before about everything being "already settled by Milosevic and Tudman."

"We, the refugees, do not stop. We are looking for new places to live, here by the Croatian border. I especially avoid stopping in Sid. People say that Tudman and Milosevic have exchanged Sid for Prevlaka," one man from the group said.

Croatia: Stanimirovic Says Serbs Have Right To Stay in Croatia

LD0305211796 Belgrade TANJUG in English [illegible]923 GMT 3 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Borovo, May 3 (TANJUG)—Executive Council President of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem, Vojislav Stanimirovic, said Friday it was vital that Croatia abolish all Serbs who 'have taken part in the political or military defence system,' this being a condition of the region's peaceful reintegration.

Stanimirovic told TANJUG that it was encouraging that U.N. administrator in the region Jacques Klein discussed the abolition issue in all talks with Croatian authorities, evidently pressuring Zagreb into passing the abolition law as soon as possible.

Stanimirovic said the Serb side did not oppose exclusion of persons who had committed war crimes from abolition, but said at this point there were no reports that the Hague-based war crimes tribunal had indicted a Serb from eastern Slavonia, Baranja or western Srem.

He said the Serb side would insist that an investigation be launched into war crimes committed in the region by Croats, against whom he said evidence was being gathered.

The region is the only part of the Republic of Serb Krajina that has not been occupied by the Croatian

Army. Under an agreement reached in Erdut late last year, the region was placed under a one-year transitional U.N. administration.

Stanimirovic described excellent cooperation with U.N. administration officials in the region.

He said he and his associates had convinced U.N. officials that they did not intend to turn the people against the administration and that they were ready to fully cooperate and honour the Erdut agreement.

He, however, said Serb authorities feared that there might be incidents once the region was fully demilitarised and mixed Serb-Croat police units began to patrol the region. 'We fear that once they start patrolling the region, there may be arrests and interrogations that may lead to large-scale incidents, although (administrator) Klein has repeatedly reassured us that they do not have a mandate to arrest or interrogate anyone,' he said.

He said it was vital that eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem remain a Serb territory or Serb region, no matter if it were a European region or a region of the Serb people in Croatia.

It is crucial for Serbs that they be enabled to remain in the region, that their human rights and freedoms be guaranteed and that they be enabled to live and educate their children in peace and to survive, he said.

Stanimirovic called on refugees who have fled other parts of Croatia to think about settling down in the region, but said at this point it was not possible to populate the region with refugees massively due to the lack of funds.

'In the light of the fact that the Erdut and Dayton peace agreements call for the repatriation of all refugees we have the right to insist on reciprocity in the case of Croats' return to the region,' he said.

'About 60,000 Croats have left the region, while about 600,000 Serbs have left Croatia—it would be therefore logical that 10 Serbs should be allowed to return for each Croat,' he said.

Croatia: Granic Says Bosnia Still Needs International Presence

AU0805111496 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 4 May 96 p 11

[Interview with Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, by Branka Primorac on 1 May; place not given: "UNTAES Will Be the First Successful Mission of the UN"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Primorac] Is it important for Croatia for our admission to the Council of Europe to be completed in the next 15 days? Does that change anything in our plans?

[Granic] Nothing crucial, Croatia would survive with or without that. However, delays do disturb the rhythm of further European integration. Croatia has just completed talks with the London Club. It wishes to cut off all its tails with the former state and to remove any deliberation on the so-called global approach, as has officially been proposed by Carl Bildt, although he supports the regional cooperation of sovereign, independent states.

[Primorac] Did Hans van Mierlo [Dutch foreign minister] not mention the so-called Yugo-package a few days ago?

[Granic] Yes, Mr. Van Mierlo mentioned such an approach as well, but it has never been completely defined, although there was an idea present that first economic relations would have to be established between the states created after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, even more than that. We were decidedly against that approach straight away. That does not mean we do not wish to develop good bilateral relations with all those countries, but we do not want the slowest in that train to impede Croatia's development. That was also opposed by Macedonia, Albania, and most certainly by Bosnia-Herzegovina. We do not wish to be anybody's hostages, particularly not the hostages of the FRY, which, as can be seen, will have problems with Kosovo, Montenegro, minority rights, not to mention the process of normalization of relations with Croatia, in which numerous questions still have to solved.

[Primorac] How then could Croatia's admission to the Council of Europe be conditioned by the admission of the FRY?

[Granic] There were such ideas too, even some members of the [European?] parliament suggested that. However, the answer was clear. Serbia must apply, fulfill certain conditions, and go through the normal procedure, just like other countries.

[Primorac] When will we get rid of the weights of Yugoslavia? Among the public there is a predominant impression that nothing Croatia has achieved on the way toward the creation of an independent state is as important as recognition by Serbia?

[Granic] That was important a year ago, while more than 20 percent of Croatian territory was still occupied. At that time recognition by the FRY would have been welcome because of the reintegration of those territories. After Operations "Flash" and "Storm" [Croatian Army operations in summer 1995], and the legal presence of the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation has changed dramatically to our advantage. At that time recognition of Croatia by the FRY would have had impact on the Serb population, and on the process of reintegration. Now, when only 4.6 percent of the territory is left to be integrated, it is important for us that Serbia participate in the process of peaceful reintegration. That is now more important than the recognition.

However, the normalization of relations with Croatia is much more important for Serbia than it is for Croatia. The pact on safety and stability in Europe demands the normalization of relations between all European states, but national interests have priority. We feel no pressure to expedite that, or the need to make any concessions to them.

[Primorac] Recently the charge d'affaires of the Office of Serbia in Croatia, Mr. Veljko Knezevic, visited you. On that occasion, was there any mention of your visit to Belgrade, of the protocol for the opening of the [Zagreb-Belgrade] highway, or of mutual recognition?

[Granic] He was received by me, and by my deputy. We gave him my proposal on the protection of minorities. That is a big step forward, because that is something that Belgrade did not even want to talk about earlier. Croats are not recognized as a minority in the FRY, and the explanation was that Serbia had not recognized Croatia as a state. Now they have agreed to talk about that topic. A ministerial-level meeting has been agreed for 13 May, after that a date for my trip to Belgrade will be agreed, and the agenda for the meeting. In the meantime meetings of expert groups have been held, first those for missing persons; the opening of the highway has been agreed for 7 or 8 May, Djeletovci [oilfield] was closed, we are expecting the opening of the gas pipeline, and of the northern and southern air corridors, which is very important from the financial side. We are also expecting the opening of consular departments.

[Primorac] So, your trip to Belgrade is not expected to take place before the end of May, and recognition is not on the agenda?

[Granic] There is no sense in meeting before there is compliance with the things that were previously agreed upon. There are some objective obstacles in the way of the fulfillment of the agreements; for example, clearing the railroad of mines before opening it for traffic. As for mutual recognition, I do not want to make any guesses on that, because the obstacle is that we do not accept any proposal for the exchange of territories; that is not being discussed at all, and Croatia does not want to talk about it. So, it depends on Belgrade.

[Primorac] Their condition was Prevlaka?

[Granic] Exactly.

[Primorac] Are they not running out of time now, because the agenda for the fall session of the UN General Assembly is being drawn up now, and if they do not get on this agenda with their application for membership, they will lose a lot of time; on the other hand, they will not get on it if they do not fulfill certain conditions?

[Granic] They will be running out of time for the September session of the United Nations, but also for the complete normalization of relations with the international community, because when it came to their recognition by the EU, they were also told which conditions they had to fulfill. One of the important conditions is that they are only one of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, and that they have to recognize the other states; that is not all, because Kosovo is also a serious problem, and so on. In other words, Croatia is so much ahead that it has no reason to be impatient at all.

[Primorac] Has the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia finally given up the interpretation that it is the only successor of Yugoslavia?

[Granic] That is exactly where they can reach no consensus. One of the victims will probably be Governor [of the National Bank of Yugoslavia] Avramovic. He has not been removed, because it is not easy to remove a governor who has already been included in all negotiations. He is one of those who understand the reality, who is not blind to the fact that the attempts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to inherit the continuity of the former common state have failed.

[Primorac] Have you heard what Mr. Avramovic recently said on HTV [Croatian Television]? How do you evaluate his insisting that the remaining foreign currency reserves and gold be used as basis capital for a bank from which the countries of former Yugoslavia would be granted credits for development?

[Granic] We will never agree to that, and the other countries neither. The property should be divided and the divorce of the marriage be brought to an end.

[Primorac] Let us go back to the question about the protocol for the opening of a part of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway. Mr. Klein [civilian administrator of Eastern Slavonia under UNTAES, UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] announced that he would bring the highest Croatian and Serbian officials to that occasion. Is the composition of our delegation known?

[Granic] On our side there will be the deputy prime minister Ivica Kostovic and the representatives of all services. We believe it is very important for them to be there and stay there, because that implies our policemen and customs officers with Croatian insignia. That is a big step forward, because right from the opening of the highway near Lipovac Croatian rule will appear on the occupied territory. One day earlier I will visit Osijek and Vinkovci, and I will talk to district governors ["zupani"] and to Mr. Vrkic [not further identified].

[Primorac] Does that mean that you will still be present at the opening?

[Granic] No.

[Primorac] How satisfied are you with what General Klein has done up to now?

[Granic] We are very satisfied, in the first place because Gen. Klein has a very clear vision of the job he is doing. He said very clearly, not only to the Croatian press but also on the radio for the local population, that eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem were parts of the Republic of Croatia, and that they should be integrated in the Republic of Croatia, and he appealed to the Serb population to accept tha . That is the direction in which he conducts his activities. Already in the course of this week we intend to propose precise dynamics of the implementation of the agreement, and of the introduction of Croatian rule.

[Primorac] What will that refer to specifically?

[Granic] We want the entire reintegration to be completed by the end of the mandate, which means the introduction of all elements of Croatian rule, from documents to the customs and police. Another very important thing is the rate of withdrawal of heavy artillery, which, according to our information, and according to UN observations, has already started. The remaining paramilitary troops, remaining members of Arkan's troops, must also leave, and those closely associated with them will also leave, and are leaving. We expect that the local population will mostly stay, because Croatian rule guarantees them all minority and human rights, as well as all forms of international supervision, from the temporary administration to the OSCE, the mission of Ms. Rehn [UN human rights rapporteur]. They are all welcome.

[Primorac] Are you afraid of a reaction by the Serb population similar to the one in Bosnia?

[Granic] There have been some indications that there could be a mass exodus, which UNTAES is afraid of, because they believe that that would mean the failure of their mission. We believe that Croatia has done a lot to prevent that, and that we have clearly said that we wish to return to the ethnic structure that existed before the war, excluding those who have committed crimes.

[Primorac] In his interview for VECERNJI LIST Gen. Klein said that in a year he would pack his bags after completing his work, but that he believed that that will also happen to IFOR [Implementation Force] in Bosnia. How do you evaluate that statement of his?

[Granic] I believe that his evaluations are rather true, which means that the UNTAES will be the first successful UN mission in the region. As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, IFOR has succeeded in the military component, but the process of implementation of the complete Dayton Agreement is much more complex. It concerns the strengthening of the Federation, but also the processes in the Serb Republic. The key thing for further developments is whether Karadzic and Mladic go to The Hague or not, whether the elections will be free and carried out properly, at what rate the refugees return, and many other things. I am certain that after the elections the presence of some form of international forces will still be necessary, until Bosnia-Herzegovina is completely stabilized. I have said several times that the Federation is the basis for all that: Not only as a firm basis for the relations between Croats and Bosniaks, but also of the Dayton Bosnia, and then it is also a factor for peace in the region. That view is being more and more accepted in the world.

[Primorac] Do you believe that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is calming down?

[Granic] It is obvious that the big war is over, and that nobody will allow it to start again, because it influences the whole of Europe. Some form of international control and help will still be needed for the stabilization, both for the process of development of the Federation, and particularly before the Serb Republic is completely integrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Primorac] However, in Mostar the elections should take place earlier, already this month. What should they solve, and do you believe that Perez Casado [new EU administrator of Mostar?] is the person to finish that job?

[Granic] We support the idea that the elections take place as announced, which means at the end of May, and I believe that after the elections it will be possible to organize the city in accordance with the Dayton and Rome agreements. Mr. Casado does his job well, he cooperates well with both sides. We wish him success.

[Primorac] However, not everything is going smoothly in the Federation. That was the reason for your trip a week ago—to Bonn, to Petersberg. Will those talks and the achieved agreements simplify the solution of the situation in the federation, particularly in the four municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which municipal authorities have still not been established, although that should have been done by now?

[Granic] I believe that my visit to Sarajevo, before I visited Bonn, was very important. Then we agreed on some very important things, so that the meeting in Bonn was pretty easy-going. I visited Mr. Izetbegovic as an envoy of President Tudjman, and I forwarded certain messages to him. Croatia was concerned because there was less and less mention of the Federation, and of the Washington and the Dayton agreements. At that meeting President Izetbegovic firmly confirmed that the Bosniak side remains faithful to all agreements, and then we agreed on some practical moves as well. One of them was that in Bonn we should complete the talks on the organization of the four municipalities—Vares, Bugojno, Stolac, and Capljina, and that we should agree on police and on some financial laws, so that later that can be accepted by the Federation Assembly. I believe that in the coming days there will be an agreement on the defense law, so that all disputed questions would thus be removed.

[Primorac] During the talks on finances was there any mention of compensation for the soldiers of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], which they have not received, whereas the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have?

[Granic] We talked about that too, and Mr. Izetbegovic agreed that that question should also be resolved, and all tensions from the past diminished.

[Primorac] Did you talk about Ploce?

[Granic] Yes, we did. We will make a temporary contract for the duration of one year, as a basis for the contract for a longer period, and I believe that the talks that are now going on will be finished in around 10 days. I believe that the people in Ploce will also be satisfied. The town of Ploce will be included in all talks. Important for those talks, as we have agreed, is that Mr. Izetbegovic and his aides come to Zagreb, to the second meeting of the Council for Cooperation, which is presided over by President Tudjman. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 11]

Tito Is Important for Them Because of the Property

[Primorac] In a recent interview for the Croatian media President Tudjman opened some taboo topics from our history, in first place those referring to Tito and Pavelic. It seems that this time Belgrade was not upset by the mention of Pavelic, but much more so by the mention of Tito?

[Granic] There has been no official reaction, but papers close to the regime reacted fiercely at the mention of Tito, and first for material reasons, and then for the known reasons of the succession and the continuity of Yugoslavia. In any case, the idea that Tito's remains should be returned to Croatia, to Kumrovec [Tito's birthplace] is important from the human point of view, and also from the political one. His son Miso Broz is also in favor of it. That will certainly still be a subject of talks.

[Primorac] In connection with that, there is also the alleged wish of Jovanka Broz [Tito's wife] to move to Croatia. Is Croatia ready to give her citizenship, and has she asked for it at all?

[Granic] Certain contacts exist, and if she officially asks for those documents, I see no reason for us not to give them to her. She was born here and that entitles her to get them.

[Primorac] Has there been any talk about where in Croatia she would live?

[Granic] There has been no talk about that.

[Box, p 11]

Who Is Izetbegovic's Rival?

[Primorac] Who do you believe will be the strongest rival of Mr. Izetbegovic at the elections in September?

[Granic] I would not like to indulge in prognostication, although there is no doubt that Mr. Silajdzic is a strong contender for the present president Mr. Izetbegovic. But, one should add that every constituent nation will choose its member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 11]

War Reparations

[Primorac] Will we ever get war reparations from Serbia and Montenegro?

[Granic] It is quite certain that we will pose that question when the time comes. We have to be realistic in our expectations: Those talks will be difficult, because they imply general questions of property—Croatian property in Serbia and Serbian in Croatia, and not only state and social property, but also private. On the other hand, there will be claims of present Serb refugees for reparations too. It is a complicated matter, but we will not evade it.

Croatia: Commentary Urges Rejection of 'Croatian Chauvinists'

AU0605103496 Beli Manastir Radio Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1815 GMT 3 May 96

[Commentary by Petko Koprivica]

[FBIS Translated Text] The inhabitants of the former Sector East are burdened by worries, uncertainty, and partly also by fear. The main cause of the unhealthy atmosphere disrupting the normal flow of life on the right bank of the Danube River is not the hubbub of Tudjman's radio-television machinery about peaceful reintegration, nor hasty and ambiguous statements by some local and foreign politicians, nor even the handful of war profiteers who, once they left Baranja, revealed the true nature of their much-talked-about patriotism.

Misconceptions that have been used by the international community and its wards for years to shape the picture of the Croat-Serb conflict in the Podunavlje [Danube River basin] area are the biggest problem. Western peacemakers have in vain been trying to revitalize the Z-4 plan for solving the problem of former UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones that were overrun by Croatian tanks during "Operation Storm" a long time ago. The failed project was supposed to give wide autonomy to Banija, Kordun, Lika, and the Knin krajina, while the former Sector East, following several years of transitional administration, was definitively to melt into the so-called Croatian county of Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Srijem.

The Z-4 plan is founded on a misconception that was for years being imposed by Croatia and its mentors—Germany and Austria—who finally succeeded in imposing it as a criterion. Here is the essence of the misconception: The rebel Serbs wage war against all non-Serbs. As the international community is generous, it will allow the possibility of autonomy, for instance, in municipalities which had more than 50 percent of Serbs. In areas where the Serb majority was relative or that had fewer Serbs, it is the non-Serbs who have absolute priority and they all want Croatia and Tudjman. Consequently, there is no need to discuss the rights of Serbs in those areas.

Croatian intellectuals close to the Tudjman regime—Klemencic, Milardovic, and Vrdosic—in their book *Facts About Croatian Baranja* issued last year in Osijek, best prove that the above phrase "Serbs against non-Serbs" is wrong. The book says that data of the Croatian Office for Refugees and Displaced Persons show that there were 18,088 Baranja refugees on the territory of Croatia in June of 1995, 86.5 percent of whom were Croats, and 9.5 percent Hungarians. However, considering the fact that the prewar census of 1991 registered 54,365 people in Baranja, it is not hard to figure that the said 18,000 Baranja refugees in Croatia make up less than one-third of Baranja's population at the time. The same information shows that 31 percent of Croats did not obey Tudjman, nor did as many as 81 percent of Hungarians. An overwhelming majority of them remained in Baranja to coexist peacefully with their Serb neighbors and many also defended Baranja from the Croatian aggression. Few of those who chose to avoid the maelstrom of war by fleeing to Western Europe and Hungary picked those countries as their second homeland, which again proves that they do not consider Croatia to be their mother country, either. Consequently, only one-third of the former population of the Beli Manastir municipality still listens to Tudjman, Glavas, and their empty promises. Everyone else trusts and believes only in Baranja. Native inhabitants of Baranja—having been a part of prosperous and civilized Vojvodina as well as multiethnic Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—simply do not care to live in a humiliating position under the heel of the clerical and Nazi Croatian regime.

A just solution of the Srijem-Baranja crisis can be reached only if the international community rejects the thesis about the Serbs being against all others and accepts a new thesis: The rest against Croatian chauvinists. Though not very promptly, we more often hear of old misconceptions cracking open at the seams. The resolution that mentions Baranja and Western Srijem as Croatian territories is no longer that topical. Moreover, Administrator Klein openly stated that the 1991 census would not be accepted as a basis for forming local police forces. The fact that the international community did not say the inclusion of FRY into its institutions was conditional on recognition of Croatian borders shows that foreign potentates have finally realized the truth. The actions of official Zagreb are loud, scary, but blank shots fired from an empty gun. The only thing the people of Baranja and Srijem can do is not fall for them and remain peacefully in their homes waiting for the final outcome and the realization of their natural rights.

FYROM: NATO Official Arrives To Discuss Cooperation

LD0605170996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1316 GMT 6 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 6 May (SRNA)—NATO Assistant Secretary General Anthony Cragg arrived today on an official two-day visit to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], where he will discuss cooperation under the Partnership for Peace program and NATO expansion with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov.

The Macedonian officials are in a hurry, as they point out, to resolve as soon as possible the issue of the collective security of their state.

It is believed in Skopje diplomatic circles that Cragg's visit to Macedonia is an attempt to mollify "the disappointed political leadership" because Macedonia was not included on the itinerary of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in the course of his recent tour of Central and Eastern Europe.

Timothy Wirth, an under secretary in the State Department, has said that the United States is unable to help Macedonia with armaments and military equipment and can only offer education for officers.

Wirth thus indicated indirectly to the Macedonian leadership that it will have to wait a long time before Macedonia is admitted to NATO.

FYROM: Albanian Parties Criticize Gligorov Statement

AU0705151996 Skopje MIC in English 7 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Gligorov's assessment that only a direct dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade can lead to a peaceful resolution of the problem of Kosovo was given wide publicity in the electronic media in Albania yesterday.

Radio Tirana brought excerpts from the interview with President Gligorov for the newspaper FRANKFURTER ALGEMEINE ZEITUNG in which he expresses concern over the latest wave of violence in Kosovo, MAKFAKS reports from Tirana.

The official press in Tirana left out the part from Gligorov's interview for the German daily, where he discussed the position of the Albanian minority in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. In this context, the assessment that the so-called Tetovo university is an illegal institution formed by separatists, is not mentioned.

All the political parties of the Albanians in Macedonia reacted negatively to President Gligorov's statement that the Tetovo university is an illegal institution and the doing of a group of separatists.

For NDP [People's Democratic Party], the theses expressed in Gligorov's interview for the German daily are not surprising as, according to this party's announcement "it has been clear to us for quite some time that our political opponents are wolves in sheep's skin, who do not forget to uncover their teeth at certain moments." The President of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov said in the interview for the FRANKFURTER ALGEMEINE ZEITUNG that it is an "institution planned and realized by separatists." Describing Gligorov's stances as "tactless, irresponsible, and totally anti-Albanian," the NDP says that "the Tetovo university is not an institution established by Albanian separatists."

"We are convinced that Kiro Gligorov has not forgotten, but, in any event, we will remind him that the University was established by legitimate Albanian legal entities, that is the Albanian political parties which participate in Parliament, in associations and local assemblies, and which enjoy the support of the entire Albanian population, as its inalienable need for education," the NDP's announcement says, in which it is assessed that "Kiro Gligorov has finally proven that he is not the president of the Albanians."

"The assessment about the interethnic relations in Macedonia and especially the negative qualifications about the Tetovo university by President Gligorov represent a serious provocation for the political engagements of the Albanians in Macedonia, for the accomplishment of their legitimate aspirations and rights by means of civilized political dialogue," the statement of the Central Presidency of PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] says.

This party believes that "President Gligorov has acted hastily by making such qualifications about the legitimate demand of the Albanians to have a university in their native tongue." "That," according to the PDP, "represents an attempt to deceive the German and European public into believing that, allegedly, the university is demanded by a small group of separatists because, President Gligorov knows very well that this is the demand of all the Albanians in Macedonia, which has actually been discussed with him many times before."

"President Gligorov is also familiar with the fact that there is stable unity among the relevant Albanian political factors precisely in relation to this demand, as well as readiness to settle this question by means of dialogue and with joint political will," the PDP announces, concluding that the stances of President Gligorov are "truly concerning for the future democratic development of Macedonia." These stances of President Gligorov's can be comprehended as an indication that in the establishment of the new interethnic relations, the President is bent on a policy of cooperation in the region, and is deviating from his to-date vision about these relations.

In its announcement on this issue, the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] feels that "actually, a recycled Communist cannot even offer anything more." These assessments, which are actually derived from an a priori ideological approach, threaten the well-being of all the citizens, the peace in Macedonia, and the region, the PDPA claims.

The vocabulary of the President and his assessment about the "Tetovo university," according to the PDPA, show that he is "detached from reality" and that his conceptions "neither explain the social phenomena, nor offer visions for a new society."

"President Gligorov knows very well that the Tetovo university is supported by all the Albanian people in Macedonia and wider, the organized political forces, various international associations and institutions, and that such an irrational disregard of the explicit will of the Albanians for education expresses either a great and dangerous Albanophobia or a psychology of the ostrich," the PDP says.

FYROM: Albanian Parties Denounce Gligorov's 'Albanophobia'

AU0705164996 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 7 May 96 p 3

[Article by I. Arsllani: "Pigeonholing the Albanians—An Out-of-Date Idea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetovo, 6 May—The interview given by Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG a few days ago, which, among other things, set out his views about Tetovo University, has aroused deep indignation and an extremely bitter response among the Albanian population in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia—FYROM]. The Tetovo-based Albanian political parties also replied to his unacceptable statement that pigeonholed the Albanians into categories of separatists and those who recognize Macedonia and called Tetovo University illegal, which was conveyed by the local media here and by Macedonian news agencies.

A Serious Provocation to the Albanians' Political Commitment

The Presidium of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP—PPD in Albanian] has issued a press statement, signed by party chairman Abdurrahman Haliti, which calls the views on interethnic relations in Macedonia and especially the pejorative label attached to Tetovo University in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG a serious provocation to the political commitment of the Albanians in Macedonia, who wish to realize their crucial legitimate aspirations and their rights through civilized political dialogue.

The PDP Presidium considers that President Gligorov has acted hastily in disparaging the Albanians' legitimate demands for a university in their mother tongue and believes that his attempts to sway the German and European public with the idea that the university was supposedly demanded by a small band of separatists are tendentious. It is utterly clear to this presidium that President Gligorov knows full well that it is a demand of all the Albanians in Macedonia, which the PDP has raised for discussion at many meetings between the leaders of this party and the president. Gligorov also knows well that there is solid unity on this matter among the Albanian political parties in Macedonia, which are ready to solve the issue through dialogue and a common political will. The PDP considers that this statement by the president arouses anxiety for the further development of democracy in Macedonia, because it might be taken as a signal that President Gligorov, in his recent establishment of new interethnic relations, may be inclined to support an opportunistic policy in the region and is deserting the vision of these relations that he has maintained hitherto.

Denying the Will of the Albanians—Albanophobia

The Information Service of the Party for the Albanians' Democratic Prosperity [PDPA—PPDSh in Albanian] stated in its response that these remarks stink of the incense emanating from the most orthodox schools of communism, which have taken their toll of Albanian young people for decades on end. The president of all citizens of Macedonia has persuaded the last remaining victims of delusion, supporters of his idyllic oasis of peace, that he has not changed his spots. His views about Tetovo University not only summon up ghosts of the past, but show that he is out of touch with reality and that, with his world view, he is unable either to explain social phenomena or to offer the vision of a new society.

We remind President Gligorov that there is no way in which the Albanians can feel that Macedonia is their homeland when everybody knows that it was formed as the state of the Macedonians, thus trampling on the political and historical heritage of the Albanians. It's anthem glorifies Macedonianism, while the language and flag of the Albanians are trampled underfoot, their culture, education, and sports are strangled, and their national substance, their territories, and their communes are pulverized. Tens of thousands of them remain without citizenship, without a homeland, and without work, while their institutions are destroyed and the people are encouraged to emigrate.

President Gligorov knows full well that not only the entire Albanian people in Macedonia and beyond, but many political forces and international organizations and associations support Tetovo University, and that ignoring the explicit will of the Albanians in such an irrational way when they so badly need education is an expression of dangerous Albanophobia or a psychology that refuses to face reality. The Albanians, as peace-loving people with a civilized heritage of thousands of years in these lands behind them, would no doubt once again cooperate constructively to found the new state and would feel Macedonia to be their homeland if only this state were to guarantee them their inviolable interests and if a part of Macedonia were finally Albanian. If the reasonable, democratic, and human demands of the Albanians are not considered, they will inevitably be separatists, because President Gligorov himself will foster this idea. We finally remind the president that the entire Albanian people, in their great need for education, support Tetovo University, and he is setting himself against this legitimate desire. We suggest that a referendum be used to test the real situation.

The President Sows the Seed of Destabilization

The Management Council of the Peoples Democratic Party [NDP—PDP in Albanian] called part of President Gligorov's interview immoderate, irresponsible, and utterly anti-Albanian. Tetovo University, the council states in its reply, is not an institution founded by Albanian separatists. We are sure that President Gligorov's memory is not in fact failing him, but we remind him that Tetovo University was founded by legitimate Albanian legal bodies, i.e. the Albanian political parties that are represented in the parliament and the communal assemblies, with the support of the entire Albanian population. The NDP is not surprised by the ideas he expresses in his interview, because this party has long been aware that its political opponents are wolves in sheep's clothing, who, at certain times, do not hesitate to bare their teeth. His statements are evidence for the public at home and abroad that this person, so highly praised and indeed decorated for his contribution to the preservation of peace and security in the region, is, at the end of his political career, sowing dangerous seeds for the possible destabilization of Macedonia and of the region, in spite of the fact that he himself is convinced that the Albanians will not give up Tetovo University.

The division of the Albanians into separatists and unionists, the loyal and the disloyal, and what for him are the acceptable and the unacceptable, demonstrates his nostalgia for the time of political differentiation, show trials, and the contrivance of scandals of various kinds whose goal was to cast the blame for the possible destabilisation of his oasis of peace on the Albanians.

The NDP informs President Gligorov that the Albanians in Macedonia do not demand anything more than what the Macedonians have. The NDPs reply states that Mr. Gligorov has shown that he is not the Albanians' president.

Poland: President Said Unopposed to Walesa-Clinton Meeting

LD0705225296 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have asked presidential spokesman Antoni Styrczula how Aleksander Kwasniewski reacted to the report that Bill Clinton is planning to meet Lech Walesa.

[Begin Styrczula recording] The president accepted this quite calmly because we cannot tell the President of the United States whom he can and whom he cannot receive. It should be said that Lech Walesa's institute made this announcement. I do not know if the U.S. State Department or President Clinton's advisers will confirm this. So, if we get confirmation from this side, too, then this report will be completely true.

Minister Rosati has returned from the United States. He held talks with President Clinton's National Security adviser, Mr. Anthony Lake, and at present talks are in progress aimed at fixing a specific date for President Kwasniewski to visit the United States. This will take place in the next few months. [end recording]

Poland: Spokesman Reports on Kwasniewski's Meetings, Talks

WS0705124496 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 7 May 96 p 3

[Article by "EWAR": "Spokesman on President; Seeking a Compromise"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *"The meeting that President Kwasniewski held on 6 May with Prime Minister Cimoszewicz and [Foreign] Minister Rosati, [Defense] Minister Dobrzanski, and [Interior] Minister Siemiatkowski had a routine nature," Spokesman Antoni Styrczula assured journalists.*

The spokesman reported that, because the president was very interested in the issues of security of the state and citizens, he asked questions concerning equipment in the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] and committed himself to offering some suggestions to the government. This, however, does not mean additional spending on the MSW because purchases should be planned on the basis of the budget, which has already been earmarked. It is not known whether any preliminary attempts were made to present a candidate for the head of the Office of State Protection [UOP] because what journalists heard in reply to this question was "no comment." The spokesman added, unasked, that issues related to UOP are of interest to the president.

Now that he has held talks with members of the Constitutional Tribunal, the president is considering launching a legislative initiative that would guarantee the irreversibility of the Tribunal's rulings. According to the spokesman, the rationale behind the initiative is not to replace the Constitution but to prepare the legal ground for the introduction of a new Basic Law.

Asked to comment on the recent statements by bishops on the draft constitution, Styrczula recalled that, at a meeting with the Polish primate, President Kwasniewski proposed that talks be held between the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly and the Episcopate to dispel doubts and clarify differences of opinion. "The president, who would like the constitution to be passed by the National Assembly in 1996, will seek a compromise with all forces in Poland," stressed Styrczula, recalling that the final shape of the Basic Law would be decided by the Polish people in a referendum. [passage omitted]

Poland: U.S. Polonia Accuses State of Bowing to Jewish Lobby

WS0705121296 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 7 May 96 p 3

[Article by "(ara)": "U.S. Polonia: Government Overly Submissive to Jewish Lobby"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chairman of the U.S. Polonia Congress Edward Moskal criticized the Polish authorities for being "overly submissive to the Jewish lobby," which is demanding that its property in Poland be returned.

The chairman claims that, at the same time, the Roman Catholic Church is being "closely watched."

Moskal sent letters of protest to President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, Senate Speaker Adam Struzik, and Primate Jozef Glemp. Reporters were informed about the fact by Presidential Spokesman Antoni Styrczula.

"Mr. Moskal criticized the Polish authorities for their stance on the restitution of Jewish property," he said. He claims that the criticism of the U.S. Polonia Congress chairman "is not entirely based on fact."

The spokesman stated that action has been taken to return what is now municipal property to churches and religious associations grouped within the Polish Ecumenical Council, and that the Sejm is debating a bill on the restitution of former Jewish property that remains under municipal proprietorship. The reprivatization law will define the principles of returning property to private persons. It will provide for all of the individual cases of illegitimate expropriation, regardless of the nationality of those concerned.

The author of the letter to the president avoided reporters yesterday. "Please approach President Kwasniewski on the issue," we heard at the U.S. Polonia Congress office. Chairman Moskal will not speak on the topic. The letter says everything. A Polonia leader told SZTANDAR that the chairman of the Congress "does not wish to be more Catholic than the pope."

Poland: Solidarity Rejects Parliamentary Draft Constitution

WS0705121696 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7 May 96 p 3

[Report by "EK" under the "In Poland" rubric: "'S' Will Not Support the Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a referendum on the new constitution, Solidarity will call on Poles to vote against the draft to be developed by the National Assembly. As we learned from Piotr Zak, the Solidarity Independent Self-Governing Trade Union spokesman, the major shortcoming of the draft is the lack of a preamble that refers to God. "Such a provision would by no means imply a religious state. The 3,000-year tradition of the Polish state, however, cannot be ignored," said Zak. He added that the Civic Draft of the Constitution endorsed by Solidarity is based on the social teachings of the church. It includes a provision allowing one to quote specific articles of the constitution in court. "It is very important. The previous Constitution, dated 1952, contained guarantees of civil liberties and freedom of speech. However, they hardly had any practical implications," he said.

Romania: President Iliescu Stresses Black Sea Cooperation

AU0705141496

[FBIS Report] The Bucharest daily DIMINEATA on 4 May on page 1 of its Saturday supplement carries the 2,500-word text of the speech made by President Ion Iliescu at the inaugural session of the Businessmen Forum of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation [BSEC] in Bucharest on 25 April. After welcoming the participants in the Forum, Iliescu emphasizes the need to "expand the multilateral economic cooperation" of the Black Sea "subregion" in such "key spheres" as: "trade, industry, agriculture, science, technology, tourism, and obviously the environment." Iliescu adds that the "subregional cooperation which we want to extend further in the Black Sea basin is of primary importance for the economic and social progress of the nations in the region. Nine out of the 11 BSEC members are countries in transition, faced with difficulties caused, to a large extent, by the complex process of economic and social restructuring started after 1989. Cooperation among them is an additional means of attenuating and overcoming these difficulties and of accelerating their integration in the European structures." Similarly, "the development of a broad multilateral cooperation among these countries will have a positive impact on the entire political climate in the region. It can contribute to the development of relations of authentic good-neighborliness among these countries and to the creation of favorable conditions for politically solving the differences in various parts of this zone. Therefore, BSEC is also another form of consolidating peace and stability in this region, and consequently throughout the European continent." After briefly reviewing the progress made along the course of reform in Romania, Iliescu adds that "in this framework, the international cooperation is for Romania an essential part of the process of reform. We do not view economic cooperation as an end in itself, but rather as an efficient means toward implementing the major program of modernization that we are committed to." Iliescu concludes his speech by wishing "full success" to the Forum proceedings.

The same DIMINEATA issue carries on the same page the 1,500-word text of Iliescu's speech at the opening of the meeting of foreign ministers of the BSEC countries. Iliescu "cordially" welcomes the guests, whose presence in Bucharest he considers "an expression of the special importance attached by each of your countries to expanding multilateral economic cooperation in the Black Sea basin." Noting with satisfaction that "the priority objectives and fields of cooperation have crystallized" since the last meeting, Iliescu urges the conference to focus on "further expanding economic cooperation" and "combating, through concerted action, certain phenomena that jeopardize not only our economic development, but also the region's overall security." In this respect, he mentions the need to "combat and prevent the actions of organized crime, particularly the illicit traffic of drugs and weapons, 'money-laundering,' and the attempts to institute a kind of 'Mafia-like control' over certain sectors of economic activity." After briefly reviewing the "BSEC progress in promoting regional economic cooperation," Iliescu mentions the "growing interest of other countries and of various regional and world economic and financial organizations and institutions in participating, in one form or another, in the cooperation currently being developed in the Black Sea region. A telling expression of this interest is the presence on this ministerial meeting's agenda of several applications for admission or for observer status. Romania welcomes and supports these applications, considering that new countries joining the BSEC is in the major interest of the countries in this area and of peace, stability, and security in the Balkans and throughout the region." Iliescu ends his speech by dwelling on the likely "political consequences" of this economic cooperation, namely the "creation of a favorable political climate for solving various differences in certain parts of the region and for lessening and eliminating potential sources of conflict. Therefore, through our cooperation programs in the Black Sea region, our countries are also making a noteworthy contribution to consolidating peace, stability, and security in the region, and implicitly on the entire European continent."

Romania: Melescanu Summarizes WEU Conference on Security

AU0805093996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1930 GMT 7 May 96

[Telephone interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Iulia Gherman in Birminghan on 7 May—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gherman] Mr. Minister, did the conference discuss any new ideas today concerning the place and role of the WEU [Western European Union] in the future setup of European security?

[Melescanu] There are several very active organizations—the first of which is NATO, but also the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as various regional structures, among which they often mentioned the Black Sea Cooperation Zone. However, one of the most appropriate places belongs to the WEU, an organization that is made up of only European countries. The conference came up with the idea, on the one hand, that the WEU should be the

European pillar of NATO, a very important pillar, and, on the other hand, they insisted very much on the idea that perhaps the most appropriate role for the WEU is to manage crisis situations.

For the very first time, this year's conference openly contemplated the idea that the WEU should manage crisis situations outside Europe. The ministers discussed the WEU's involvement, if need be, in other areas such as Africa, the Caucasus, and even in Asia. It proved an interesting discussion on how to define the WEU's role, as well as the role that each European country has to play within the organization—foremost, of course, the countries that are full members, on the one hand, and the associated partners, such as Romania, on the other. The ministers also discussed the possibility of more developed relations with Ukraine and Russia, an issue that was the focus of one of our discussions.

[Gherman] Mr. Minister, could Ukraine and Russia obtain any status within the WEU?

[Melescanu] The conference did not discuss this possibility in depth; namely, that Russia and Ukraine should participate in WEU activities. It did, however, strongly state that without a dialogue with those countries, it is difficult to conceive stability in Europe.

[Gherman] How did they assess Romania's cooperation with the WEU, since our country is one of its associate partners?

[Melescanu] Generally speaking, our activity within the WEU is much appreciated and well known, especially as a result of Romania's participation in reinforcing the Danube embargo [imposed on Yugoslavia], in which, as you may know, together with Bulgaria and Hungary as well as other countries that are full WEU members, we created an entire apparatus to reinforce the economic sanctions, an action that is acknowledged by everyone as one of the greatest practical successes ever achieved by the WEU. They also appreciate our participation in the regular sessions of the WEU member countries, as well as the fact that Romania offered to the WEU its armed forces—theoretically speaking, of course, but it did indicate what kind of military it could deploy in the event of a crisis situation. I would say that our activity is very much appreciated.

[Gherman] Did this conference offer you a chance to hold bilateral talks?

[Melescanu] Yes, I held several discussions with the foreign minister of Denmark in order to prepare for his Bucharest visit. I consulted rather extensively with the Swedish foreign minister, as well as some of my colleagues from our region, such as [Hungarian foreign minister] Mr. Kovacs and [Slovak foreign minister] Mr. Schenk. I also had some very good talks with my Bulgarian counterpart on putting into practice the Bulgarian initiative to hold a conference of Balkan foreign ministers My talks with Mr. Pirinski focused on issues related to the agenda of that future conference, the group of participants, and its objectives; that is, the results we expect and the probable issuing of a document. We also discussed how cooperation in the Balkans could be expanded in the future.

Romania: Prisacaru Sees PFP Linked to NATO Membership

AU0705185296 Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI in Romanian 1 May 96 p 2

[Interview with Ghiorghi Prisacaru, head of the Department for European Integration, by Mirela Neag; place and date not given: "We Are More and More a Country That Provides Security Rather Than Benefits From Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Neag] Mr. Ghiorghi Prisacaru, how did you react to the proposal that [president of the Democratic Party—PD] Petre Roman made in Rome regarding a new structure of the Partnership for Peace [PFP]?

[Prisacaru] I join those who have understood the danger of sterile initiatives which try to offer inadequate solutions to Europe's acute problems. I am happy that once again public opinion in Romania showed maturity and the ability to select when it came to accepting some ideas and initiatives that violate our national interests. Public retraction of the proposal made by Petre Roman and the fact that he is returning to the option of integration in the big European family represents for the PD(FSN) [National Salvation Front] leader a moment of political maturity, brought about by the firm and opportune reactions of public opinion. In this respect, Gebhardt von Moltke, assistant to the NATO secretary general, stated during his recent visit to Romania that "turning the Partnership for Peace into an organization would represent a useless and pointless change."

It would be extremely serious if other interests were hidden behind the "initiative" of reforming the Partnership for Peace program launched by Petre Roman. I noticed with greatest annoyance that the initiative included, without any analysis or evaluation, some concepts circulated in a neighboring country regarding the division of Europe in the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asiatic area; that is, an amputation on religious criteria of the system of European values into two segments: the Catholic world and the Orthodox world. Such definitions of old Europe no longer have a place in today's series of geostrategic debates.

[Neag] What are the latest measures taken to increase relations with NATO?

[Prisacaru] In our view, the development of relations of cooperation and partnership with NATO are fundamental to the national interests of Romania's emancipation as a rule-of-law, democratic, and sovereign state, with this military alliance being the only organization today capable of ensuring security guarantees in Europe. Moreoer, this alliance is not directed against anybody. he common enemy of all of us in Europe is instability. Currently, the agenda of political dialogue with NATO is very significant through a high level of representation, the content of the issues it approaches, and its character of continuity. To illustrate all this, I can mention some recent actions or those that are going to take place this week: A series of meetings started on 26 April in Brussels with the International Secretariat and the NATO military authorities in connection with the opening of the alliance; aspects regarding Romania-NATO military cooperation have recently also been discussed in Brussels by the chief of staff, Army General Dumitru Cioflina; the supreme commander of the allied forces in the Atlantic, General John M. Steehan arrived in Bucharest on Friday, 26 April, for a three-day visit; and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who is currently touring the Central and East European countries that signed the Partnership for Peace program, will arrive in Romania on 3 May.

[Neag] What is the role played by the Partnership for Peace program regarding Romania's association to NATO and what is the role of our country among the states that wish to integrate into NATO?

[Prisacaru] Launched in 1994, Partnership for Peace is an American initiative aimed at ensuring in a first and unique stage the rapprochement of Central and East European states to NATO. This program is valuable because it offers an adequate framework for the development of the spirit of military cooperation and establishes direct channels of contact with decisionmakers in the area of military policy in West Europe. This permits a more rapid adaptation to the NATO criteria and standards, the evaluation of the high cost of integration prospects, the development of the concept of security in Europe through concrete actions, as well as the development of bilateral relations with NATO countries.

The PDSR [Party of Social Democracy of Romania] believes that Partnership for Peace will remain the major instrument for joining NATO, and it is superfluous to attach any other role to this program.

I remind everybody of the fact that Romania is the second country in size and population after Poland, and from a geographical viewpoint integration will also benefit NATO by consolidating its eastern flank through the presence of the Black Sea as a barrier, some would say, or a means of connection, opening, and communication, we would say, with Central Asia and the Mediterranean basin. In the current context, Romania is increasingly asserting itself as a potential security-providing country, while other smaller sized countries in this region will continue to remain beneficiaries of security.

Romania: Janssen Report on Country's Situation Reviewed

AU0505191696 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 30 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Gabriel G. Stanescu: "The Janssen Report on Observing Commitments Assumed by Romania Is a New Dagger in the Ribs of the Cotroceni: The Council of Europe Is Supervising the Very Core of the Iliescu Regime"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The report on the situation in Romania, two years after admittance to the Council of Europe, will be discussed by the Judiciary Commission of the European forum and then passed on to the Bucharest government to suggest on what points Romania will be monitored. The autonomy of local administration has been seriously violated by the demotion of the mayors who belonged to the opposition (133 mayors and 98 municipality councilors in the 1992-95 period; of the total of dismissed mayors, only 17 were Party of Social Democracy of Romania members). Moreover, the European Charter of Local Autonomy has not been ratified. Judicial independence is not guaranteed (the establishment of a group of inspectors from among judges and not from among Justice Ministry employees is suggested). Although those who were suffered political persecution by the communist regime were rehabilitated, their confiscated assets have not been returned according to the principle of "restitutio in integrum"; limiting the compensation to those who never received their property is a violation of the correct compensation principle. The Higher Commissariat for Minorities assesses the education law as correct; however, it mentions that implementation of the law must not lead to reduction of minority rights. The conditions in the Romanian penitentiaries are viewed as being in line with European standards, within the limits of Romania's resources. The report draws attention to the fact that the problem of returning the church assets is far from being solved. The reports requests respect for the rights of homosexuals and, therefore, modification of Article 200 in the Penal Code.

Just as in the case of finalizing the other basic treaties with neighboring countries, obstruction of Romanian-Hungarian negotiations at the level of Recommendation

1201 has been noticed and a compromise solution has been requested in light of the documents discussed by the Commission of Legal Experts in Venice, without granting collective autonomy. Although freedom of the press is ensured by the Constitution, a number of acts of limiting the freedom of expression has been noticed; for example, the cancellation of the BBC's broadcasting license; the monopoly of the state over paper production and the existence of only one paper factory, which permits the appearance of an artificial crisis, which results in "the censorship of the opposition press"; the monopoly of the state over the press distribution network, which has the same effect as above; and manipulation through public television. The modification of Articles 205, 206, 238, and 239 in the Penal Code which hamper freedom of expression is being requested. The presidency is criticized because through the interdiction imposed on the daily ZIUA, it blocks readers' access to information. In our subsequent issues, we are going to examine this exceptional document and the reaction it will provoke in the Romanian political arena.

Romania: Labor Minister on GDP, Unemployment Rate, Inflation

AU0705182896 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 4-5 May 96 pp 8-9

[Interview with Dan Mircea Popescu, Romanian minister of labor and social protection, by Marius Vintila; place and date not given: "We Could Have Done More in These Years"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Vintila] The Romanian Government did receive financial assistance from abroad. To which extent did they help us?

[Popescu] Of course, at the beginning of this six-year period, they did grant us financial assistance, but now I do not think we should rely on them too much. As I have already said, our own efforts, the work done by each of us, is far more important, and the partnership with world outside should only come second. It is much more dignified, much better both for us and our country to become the equal partner of other countries in everything we wish to undertake.

[Vintila] The slogan "We do not sell our country" is a well-known one, and it refers to the joint companies in which foreign partners hold the majority of the capital. Would you comment on the "sovereignty" idea that some people insist on?

[Popescu] Currently, less emphasis can be placed on the sovereignty and independence of our country. These are fundamental values of this nation and this country, however, and we will have to keep them in mind because it is my belief that each of us ranks them as one of our foremost values.

[Vintila] The election campaign for the local elections is noe wide open, but it does not stop merely at local issues. The opposition is quick to point out what you did not do or did wrong in the past four years. What did you actually achieve, Mr. Minister?

[Popescu] In spite of all the difficulties we encountered, in the last four years, we had some successes. The media, however, did not talk about them. The government has achieved many positive things, which are, above all, the result of the work of the people. I would like to offer you some examples, so that I would not be talking in general terms. Regarding unemployment: Currently, our nationwide unemployment rate is 8.7 percent. Experts consider this low, and not just the experts. If one views the situation in the surrounding countries, which are facing the same issues, one will see that this 8.7-percent unemployment rate is truly low, even at the European level. Our neighbors are facing a 12-percent unemployment rate in Bulgaria, 10.5 percent in Hungary, and 11.8 in Poland. Let alone much higher rates in western Europe, going as high as 22 percent in Spain. Germany's unemployment rate is 8.7 percent.

[Vintila] That is, it is similar to ours.

[Popescu] From this point of view, we are comparable to Germany. What I mean to say is that there were times when, in Romania, the unemployment rate exceeded 11 percent, but, owing to the steps we took, it has since dropped. So the experts say that a 8.7-percent rate is bearable. But of course, by means of the measures we are planning, together with the people, we will continue to make the unemployment rate drop further in Romania.

[Vintila] How could it drop further, Mr. Minister?

[Popescu] I would like to point out that, since 1992, over 1.5 million new jobs have been created in Romania; that is, the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] has kept the promise it made during the 1992 electoral campaign, and, if you so wish, it has even surpassed its word. One and a half million new jobs is no trifle, and this means that those who really want to work can do so. All that is needed is to wish strongly that each of us should really work in concordance with one's work potential.

[Vintila] Top government officials often talk about the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product [GDP]. What can you tell us about this?

[Popescu] Our GDP growth rate is very high even at the European level. Only Poland exceeded it with a

7-percent average GDP growth rate in 1995. Romania closely follows Poland with 6.4 percent. This is a figure that is quite significant regarding what is happening here. In Europe, they have much lower rates, somewhere around 2 to 3 percent, which means that, in Romania, things are evolving in the right direction and, through the joint effort of us all, within the next years, we will reach the level of 1989. We have not reached it yet. There will probably still be complicated and difficult years, but, as I said before and as you probably know very well, we cannot only overcome this situation by our own efforts and by work.

[Vintila] The inflation rate is an incontestable reality. You, as a minister of state and the holder of the labor and social protection portfolio, are directly involved here. So what is the situation in this field?

[Popescu] You know perfectly well that there were years (1993) when the inflation rate reached 314 percent. That was the most difficult year for everyone, but, by the end of 1995, we managed to make inflation drop from 314 to 28.6 percent. This is a nationwide figure, the performance of Romania, if you wish, by which it achieved an inflation rate comparable to that of the neighboring countries, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, and in 1996, as we already declared, we set ourselves the goal of getting that rate down from 28.6 to somewhere around 20 percent. I gave you these examples of our achievements, despite the major hardships we encountered, with the intent of proving that things can turn out this way, too, and that, despite everything, there are still people left in Romania who are professional and who know what they have to do.

[Vintila] Some people might conclude that the road of transition, which is mentioned so often, is now "paved" and that, from now on, one can travel on them as on the German or Italian freeways.

[Popescu] That would be a mistake, because an uphill struggle is still ahead of us. That is why we ought to imagine that we have to go along a difficult road, by making efforts, by working, and by facing deprivation. As a matter of fact, very much as we have done so far, because no one can achieve great results without a life of hard work and deprivation.

Romania: CDR Denies Coalition With PDSR After Elections

AU0805110796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 8 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A communique sent to us today by the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] Press Office—which refers to the assertions made by Mr. Viorel Hrebenciuc at the 7 May news conference of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] claiming that a so-called CDR-PDSR agreement exists on a future joint governmeny—says that, quote, CDR President Emil Constantinescu has never discussed such a possibility with any PDSR representative.

In statements to the media, the CDR president repeatedly said that such a CDR-PDSR agreement would be illogical and immoral. The president and the CDR member groupings have never held talks on this issue with the PDSR. The CDR's objective is to win the parliamentary and presidential elections and set up a democratic government in Romania, unquote, says the communique of the CDR press office.

Romania: Roman Speaks on PFP, NATO at Rome Meeting

96P20410A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 22 Apr 96 p 5

[Speech by Petre Roman, special rapporteur of the North Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly, at the annual meeting of the NATO Defense College in Rome from 17 to 21 April 1996: "The Partnership for Peace and NATO Expansion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The annual meeting of the NATO Defense College was held in Rome 17-21 April 1996. During the meeting, addresses were given by Karsten Voigt, the president of the North Atlantic Assembly, Dariusz Resati, the minister of defense of Poland, and Petre Roman, special rapporteur for Central and East Europe of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Political Commission. Petre Roman's address follows:

[Roman] While the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War period has disappeared and the threat of a communist invasion no longer exists, during the past year new dangers to security have appeared. Drug trafficking, mass migration, weapons proliferation, conflicts of the Bosnian type—those small wars which cannot be stopped—terrorism, and international crime are becoming, more and more, the most threatening dangers to security. To stand up against these new perils, it is not necessary to use armed forces and arsenals but, rather, international cooperation and political will are needed.

Achieving a viable international cooperation presupposes the realization of a number of basic steps in the world arena: the determination of the values on which the society and the economy are based, the peaceful resolution of all disputes, the creation of instruments for rapid and effective intervention wherever and whenever peace is threatened. The promotion of democracy, the strengthening of existing institutions and the creation of new ones are elements of the logic of full success in confronting the new threats to security in the post-Cold War era.

Beginning in 1994, the Partnership for Peace [PFP] has added new dimensions to the cooperation between NATO member states and their partners on the road opened up by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). By participating in various activities in the framework or in the "spirit" of the PFP, the partners developed their military cooperation in areas such as: transparency in planning defense and the budget, democratic control over the armed forces, bringing about confidence, and intensifying the interoperability of their military forces, etc.

In addition, the PFP reconfirmed the commitment of the partner states to respect the basic principles of international law and to abstain from acts of aggression and their readiness to find peaceful solutions for conflicts which might appear. The appearance of these two institutions has been crucial for the overall security in post-Cold War Europe. They have eliminated the confrontational nature of relations between the states which had belonged to the former military blocs and have avoided a new division of the continent, as a result of the nondiscriminatory relations of NATO with all partners. The successful results of the NACC/PFP were acknowledged in the report, "Study on NATO Expansion," which was distributed by the Alliance to the candidate states last September. This study confirms that the dynamism of cooperation in the framework of the NACC/PFP is an integral part of the architecture of European security, by strengthening relations of cooperation among participants, by preparing candidates for NATO membership, and by reassuring countries that will never join NATO that their legitimate interests will not be ignored.

Please allow me to present my views on the way in which the process of PFP expansion will continue.

First of all, I believe that the development of the PFP should aim at its transformation into an independent security institution, which will provide a strong framework for relations between NATO and countries in the Eurasian zone which are not NATO members. Such an institution would become a consistent part of the network of institutions whose common actions would ensure the necessary conditions for security in Europe. Alongside other similar institutions, the PFP would ensure confidence among participants and would develop a framework of security guarantees among them.

Second, it seems that a regional approach to the acceleration of the development of the PFP would be useful and rich in results. By developing the multiple relations among states belonging to a certain geographic zone—Balkans, Baltic Sea region—the PFP would achieve a significant role as an institution which could immediately control provocations to security which might apppear in one of the zones mentioned.

Third, the PFP could create—not only at the continental level but also at the subregional level—a security network which would include member states and partners, in order to confront specific threats and risks to security. Actually, this path for development is appropriate for the creation of a collective security system in Europe, which could be formed by the multiplication of PFP regional networks and by the strong development of connections between them. I would like to emphasize a common characteristic of the process of enlarging both NATO and the PFP. They are two means for ensuring security in the OSCE zone, but they do not overlap and they do not replace each other. In particular, this characteristic is evident in the case of the candidate countries, which think of the PFP as a way to become members of the Alliance. On the other hand, it could be harmful for each one of them to transform the PFP into a substitute for membership in NATO. The very fact that NATO members are also participants in the PFP confirms the idea that the two (NATO member and PFP participant) cannot replace each other. In addition, there are a number of differences in criteria and standards for PFP membership and for NATO membership.

So, is the PFP "a Western provocation aimed at Russia?" Of course, the answer is NO. The PFP cannot be viewed as a movement (or plot) against Russia, since Russia itself is included in the PFP and has an opportunity to monitor its development. In addition, the formation of new security structures, of which every OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] country can be a member, is in accordance with Moscow's desire to design this organization as an important institution for, stability in Europe. Second, to consider the PFP and NATO expansion as a widening of the sphere of influence of any country and, at the same time, as the lack of this possibility on the part of others means to understand current international policy on the basis of outmoded paradigms. This means minimizing or not recognizing the great historic transformations which took place in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and which paved the way for the construction of a united continent, in a state of security, without spheres of influence or other forms of domination exercised by any great power. In fact, the PFP program is, in itself, a rejection of the old rules of management of international relations, uniting all the countries of Europe on the solid foundation of the same defining values of democracy and individual freedom and using common means to safeguard peace whenever it is threatened.

Romania was the first country to join the PFP and to sign the framework document of 26 January 1994. In contrast to the other Central European countries, Romania understood, from the very beginning, the positive impact which the PFP had on European security and, implicitly, on national security, as well as its essential role in the NATO expansion process as a transitional stage on the way to membership with full rights. Certainly, in its beginning phases, the PFP succeeded in superseding the suspicions with which it was viewed initially (in this regard, Romania was one of the few exceptions among the Central and East European countries) by making a significant contribution to the development of practical military relations, intended to increase the confidence and security of all the European states and to increase their capacity for participating in multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention missions. The objectives of the PFP and the obligations assumed by the Alliance have permitted the partners to adapt themselves to NATO's planning mode and to participate in joint exercises with forces of the Alliance. The long-term objective is the achievement of interoperativity among the partners and military structures of the Alliance. Therefore, for Romania, the PFP is also a way to achieve the objectives of the modernization of its military organism and to make it compatible with that of the West and, at the same time, a means for modernizing its military industry.

The "Planning and Forecasting Process," initiated in December 1994, at the North Atlantic Council meeting has been of real assistance in this regard. It has proven to be of real use, offering all the nations involved an effective mechanism for developing the military capacities required for joint actions with NATO. Participation in this process has permitted access to the technical standards of the Alliance. In the first planning and forecasting cycle, the Romanian armed forces are pursuing 19 interoperativity objectives, involving all the military branches, with special emphasis on communications (technology, equipment, mode of operation), the fuel supply system, training, work with the general staffs, rules for training and operational command, contact teams, logistical support. In the fall of 1994, small units (platoons and companies) of the Romanian armed forces participated in numerous multinational exercises and training programs, in fields such as: peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance on land and on sea. In 1995, Romania hosted two major PFP exercises: "Cooperative Determination 95" and "Cooperative Rescue 95" (second phase). Five NATO countries and three partner countries participated in the "Cooperative Determination" exercise and it was unanimously regarded as being a real success. It permitted the participants to apply NATO procedures in the areas of defense planning and the budget, simultaneously with the execution of a peacekeeping exercise.

Other PFP exercises in which Romanian forces have participated include: six PFP activities abroad; 27 "in the spirit of the PFP" exercises—21 in Romania and six in other countries; admitting observers to our exercises; reciprocal visits and joint exercises of Romanian military vessels and those belonging to NATO countries; the organization of a NACC seminar in Romania on the subject of civil protection. All these activities were paid for by the Government and Parliament of Romania, which made $4.4 million available for them. On the basis of the conclusions drawn from this PFP experience and the belief that the exercises are the best way to evaluate training and interoperativity, Romania intends to increase its participation in this program in 1996. The country will take part in 15 PFP exercises, eight "in the spirit of the PFP" exercises and two mixed-services exercises. All these exercises have received much praise from foreign officials for Romania's contribution to the successful development of the PFP, in particular, from R. Holbrooke and General J. Shalikashvili.

I would like to try to classify the arguments for and against NATO expansion. It has been noted that there are arguments against the expansion of the alliance but there is not a single argument against the continued development of the PFP. In other words, the PFP has the general approval of the states in the Eurasian zone, which is proven by the broad participation in the PFP, while NATO expansion is greeted either by enthusiastic support or by violent rejection. Both attitudes must be taken into consideration. After we have examined the arguments for and against NATO expansion, allow me to conclude that such a movement will take place in an irrevocable manner since it represents the major effort for the creation of a new security environment in Europe.

What can be done in Central Europe, after the first wave of NATO expansion? From this point of view, the role of the PFP is incalculable. The PFP will provide the means for maintaining the interest of these countries in developing their relations with NATO and in maintaining friendly relations with neighboring countries. This presents the possibility of expanding the PFP so that it will become an independent security institution in Europe, along with the traditional ones (see Paragraph 6 of the document). Since it includes not only states which are candidates for the status of NATO members but also states which have clearly stated that they do not want to become members of the Alliance or have reaffirmed their status of neutrality, the PFP has an opportunity to be transformed into an independent organism which aims at ensuring the stability of a large territorial area. At the same time, the PFP would provide an instrument for crisis management by means of joint actions with other institutions charged with managing local conflicts, such as the OSCE, in particular, in the framework of NATO missions "outside the zone." The PFP can carry out this role since it is only in the framework of this program that humanitarian or military intervention exercises have been carried out so far, in the case of natural disasters. In addition, the spectrum of PFP missions could be expanded in the near future. For example, I am thinking about crisis management or intervention between parties in conflict, etc. Accordingly, the execution of such missions will add to the range of NATO missions restricted by territorial limitations (in the case of member countries) or by limitations of the decisionmaking process (such as in the case of the rule of consensus). The successful development of the PFP in the domain of the military interoperationality of the partners deserves more than a statement such as "indeed, it has worked."

General Shalikashvili visited Romania in February 1996 and expressed his great satisfaction with the good results obtained in the process of building confidence among former enemies. He said that "the best thing is that such ordinary activities have now become routine." We will have to profit from this strong interactive level of cooperation, which was recently created, and we will have to try to use the same means for the management of the new dangers and threats which can be kept under control only by a system of international cooperation. In brief, I believe that the military interoperationality achieved by means of the PFP can be extended to the fight against organized crime and against trafficking in drugs and radioactive materials. All these activities must achieve a high level of interoperativity.

It is obvious that the enlargement of NATO and the expansion of the PFP are two separate, but, concomitently, concurrent means which aim at the creation of a new climate of security in Europe. Allow me to explain this paradox. There are two independent courses for increasing security in Europe which are complementary in the overall structure of what would be the architecture of continental security. In the period of the admittance of new members to the Alliance, the PFP will play the role of maintaining relations of cooperation with the countries outside the process of the extension of the Alliance. Thus, the PFP will ensure the necessary structure for avoiding the isolation of states which do not intend to become NATO members or which are proposed for the second wave of integration. Gradually, the PFP will be transformed into an independent security institution in Europe, in which not only members of other institutions but also neutral countries will participate, along with members of NATO or the EU. Inherently, the expansion of NATO and the development of the PFP are inseparable parts of an extensive process which aims at the achievement of security in Europe. Active participation in PFP actions can be a way to differentiate countries which seek to be NATO members and the development of the PFP will avoid feelings of frustration on the part of countries remaining outside the Alliance, temporarily or permanently, and will continue to strengthen the confidence between the Alliance and other participants in the PFP.

Romania: Roman Urges Expansion of Partnership for Peace

96P20414A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 24 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Cornelia Draghici: "There Is No Middle Course"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, Petre Roman returned from Rome after participating in the annual meeting of the NATO Defense College. As a special rapporteur for the North Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly, Petre Roman presented a lecture on the "Partnership for Peace [PFP] and NATO Expansion." When he returned to Romania, he made the following statement:

"My idea was to place us on the position of some politicians who are on equal footing with those who are in the Alliance. At the present time, I believe that an 'expanded NATO' is a reality. It is operating as such from a political point of view. And so, my proposal was as follows: NATO expansion means a NATO alliance together with four, five, and even six countries, and, at the same time, it means an obligatory partnership with those which remain outside the bloc. The only formula for success up to now has been the Partnership for Peace. We have to move forward for interoperability in the area of organized crime, trafficking, terrorism, etc. After a discussion, there was unanimous agreement that the PFP was faced with two possible paths of development—either dissolution because of NATO expansion, or development because of its success up to now and the need to cooperate with the countries which remain outside NATO. The dissolution of the Partnership is not viewed as a good thing by anyone since the Partnership program was very successful. So its enlargement seems to be the better choice. Under such conditions, we must find an organizational form for this program. A program alone means little and could be a fragile thing in the face of Russia's much stronger insistence on making the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] into something like a Pan-European security institution. We cannot accept this. We believe that NATO membership is the only sure and viable alternative for ensuring our national security. My proposal—the idea that there is no middle course—was discussed, debated, and finally accepted. We must set out to expand the PFP program and give a response to the increasingly insistent demands of Russia, demands which are nothing but an attempt to put NATO under a common umbrella, which does not interest us."

Romania: Roman Terms PDSR's Actions 'Dictatorial'

AU0605165196 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 3 May 96 p 5

[Report by Liana Sega on news conference by Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party, in Resita on 30 April: "Justice Should Necessarily Start From the Top"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mr. Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party [PD] and presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Union [USD], held a news conference during an electoral tour of Caras-Severin County, in Resita to be precise. Here are the most significant questions and answers of his latest meeting with the press:

[AZI] Mr. Roman, how do you view the actions of the ruling party, which is intimidating the electorate and forcing it to turn to the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]?

[Roman] [Passage omitted] The PDSR-ization of the electorate, which means the political conditioning of one's social promotion or one's holding on to a post, was typical of the dictatorial regimes that have succeeded in our country, beginning with King Carol II to the one installed by Gheorghiu-Dej [Romania's first communist ruler after World War II], which was then taken over and continued by Ceausescu. I thought such practices had been abandoned but it seems that I was wrong. Nevertheless, I am convinced that we live in a much freer country in which the forced PDSR-ization accepted by some does not mean that the party promoting it also succeeds at it. [passage omitted]

[AZI] If you win the presidential elections, what are you going to do to help agriculture in the next four years?

[Roman] I will proceed with the same conviction that led me to make my wager with agriculture [in 1990-91 as prime minister]; namely, that agriculture is the source of Romania's immediate economic growth.

[AZI] Then, why did you lose that wager?

[Roman] I did not lose it! One cannot talk about losing it, when the efforts made at that time have contributed to Romanian agriculture producing more today than at any time during the 25 years of Ceausescu.

[AZI] It was announced recently that [NATO secretary general] Mr. Javier Solana did not appreciate your proposal on institutionalizing the Partnership for Peace [PFP]. What do you have to say about that?

[Roman] Unfortunately, I noticed that my PFP proposals were used for electoral maneuvering by some people. I withdrew that proposal in order to avoid the emergence of misunderstandings or even of a lack of consensus among all the political forces that must cooperate in supporting Romania's adherence to NATO. But I have never said that I am retracting it. [passage omitted] Let us not forget—as a matter of fact, that was the meaning of my proposals on the PFP program—that if NATO has not expanded so far and it is facing so many difficulties in this respect, the only reason for this is Russia's hostility. Russia has certain institutional proposals of its own in the sphere of European security and cooperation, proposals that I consider disadvantageous for Romania. Therefore, the meaning of my proposals was to find another cooperation variant and formula, in spite of the present contradictory interests. [passage omitted]

[AZI] You said that, if you are elected president, you will do your best to ensure that justice emerges victorious in Romania. Where will you start in this endeavor, from the top down or from the bottom up?

[Roman] Justice should necessarily start at the top, because this is how you gain the people's trust: They must see that it starts where it should! [passage omitted]

[AZI] What is your opinion about the recent Russian-Chinese partnership?

[Roman] It came as a surprise, although a more careful analysis would have revealed that it is quite a natural thing. Russia currently has an interest that happens to coincide with an interest shared by China, too. The two interests have met and are supporting each other. The first thing that the two countries said is the one I least wanted to hear; namely, they expressed their hostility toward NATO's expansion. [passage omitted] This mutual support seems rather logical and somewhat disturbing.

[AZI] With whom would you like to govern the country after the elections if the results put you in a position to decide on that?

[Roman] It would be correct and good to rule together with those who have opposed, alongside us, the political developments of the past four years. This would be the logical thing to do, so as to overcome what has been done incorrectly and badly. However, as I have said on many other occasions in the past, the united alternative message of the opposition has not yet been formulated. [passage omitted]

[AZI] If you win the elections, do you have a clear foreign policy line of your own?

[Roman] Of course. We have thought of such things, particularly regarding Ukraine and Moldova, where we are dealing with two totally different situations. Regarding Moldova, I believe that after we missed a real chance in 1991 to achieve the reunification—on an emotional basis, at that time, but true nonetheless—we must now proceed with great confidence, by acknowledging reality. I noted that in Moldova, particularly in Dniester, how little we know about what they think over there about Romania. [passage omitted] After 50 years of forced Russification and Sovietization, our policy toward Moldova should be one of building trust. This can only be done through patience, by fostering natural links.

Regarding Ukraine, the matter is totally different, albeit also very important. Ukraine is the area between Romania and Russia, and it must be very secure, in our opinion. In order to achieve that, we need efforts for a political construction, something that has not yet been started in the last four years.

Federal

FRY: Foreign Minister Praises Reopening of Pipeline, Highway

LD0705204396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1407 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 May (TANJUG)—Milan Milutinovic, federal minister of foreign affairs, said today that the reopening of the [Krk-Pancevo] pipeline and the resumption of traffic on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway represented a significant step in the process of normalizing relations and good neighborliness between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia.

The following is Minister Milutinovic's statement sent to TANJUG:

"I am convinced that the reopening of the oil pipeline and the resumption of road traffic on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway represent a significant step in the process of normalizing relations and good-neighborliness between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia. In practical terms, this is the start of the agreements reached during my visit to Zagreb on 11 March. It is further confirmation of the constructive and peace-loving policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its lasting commitment to strengthening peace, stability, and good-neighborly relations in the region.

"The reopening of the pipeline and the highway is of direct benefit and in the interest of all citizens because it enables the flow of people and goods between the two countries. With today's actions, the area of the former Yugoslavia, after a five-year break, is again becoming an important transit region and the link between western and southeast Europe.

"The realization of this important step will also contribute to stabilizing the situation and strengthening the population's confidence in the possibility of coexistence in the Srem-Baranja region. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remains firmly committed to the consistent implementation of the Erdut agreement, which guarantees all inhabitants of the region full equality and the protection of civil and human rights.

"I expect that with joint efforts we will also be able to solve successfully any other unresolved questions, in the interest of rebuilding relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia on the basis of mutual interest, better understanding, and good-neighborly ties. There is no doubt that all of this is of great significance for the strengthening of the peace process, stability, and confidence, not only in the area of former Yugoslavia, but in a wider context as well."

FRY: Belgrade Defaults on Debt to IMF, World Bank

AU0405174296 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 4 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] An independent Belgrade television station reported today that the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Government would not repay to the IMF and the World Bank $20 million worth of debts that became due in the past month. The government in Belgrade thus rejected the proposal of FRY National Bank Governor Avramovic to repay the obligations due.

FRY: Bank Governor Suspends Work Permits of Five Banks

LD0305154496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1407 GMT 3 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 May (TANJUG)—The Council of the Yugoslav National Bank confirmed the decision by the governor of the Yugoslav National Bank to suspend work permits to the following state banks: Pribojska Bank from Priboj, Kombanka from Belgrade, Crvenka Bank from Crvenka, Medifarm Bank from Belgrade, and the private General Office Bank from Belgrade, the governor's office announced today.

The statement says that work permits were suspended because the banks in question failed to observe the decision of the Yugoslav National Bank on maintaining their solvency daily. The decision determines that a bank that is insolvent for more than three consecutive days or seven working days in a month will have its work permit suspended.

The suspension will apply in the future to all banks that fail to observe the above decision, the statement ends.

FRY: Arms Production, Achievements, Difficulties Viewed

AU0305091596 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 30 Apr-2 May 96 p 4

[Article by Milan Bozokin: "Military Industry Is Waiting for Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the dissolution of the former SFRY, its long-established, unique system of military industry disintegrated as well. Nevertheless, on the territory of the FRY there still remain about 48 percent of the capacity and 46 percent of the total number of employees of the former SFRY's military industry. Almost all of the personnel and facilities for scientific research have remained in the FRY, which has enabled the military industry of Yugoslavia to start production of some new weapons and military equipment.

On the other hand, the FRY has remained without production facilities for some important weapons and systems of armament and military equipment, such as: artillery and ammunition, rocket systems of fire support, armored combat vehicles (including tanks), much of the production of combat aircraft, vessels, much of the production of radio communication devices and guidance and command systems, as well as much of raw materials, component parts, and subsystems, without which it is not possible for us to organize much of our own production of arms and military equipment.

Adoption of New Production Lines

The FRY's military industry today includes 15 factories, along with about 30,000 employees. The greatest manufacturers of military equipment and armaments in Yugoslavia are the plants of Krusik in Valjevo, Zastava in Kragujevac, Sloboda in Cacak, Prvi Partizan in Uzice, Milan Blagojevic in Lucani, Prva Iskra in Baric, Cetvrti Novembar in Mojkovac, and Prvi Decembar in Pljevlje. A number of other organizations and several hundred associated firms are involved in the manufacturing of armament and military equipment as well.

The military industry of the FRY is capable of manufacturing pretty large quantities of rifles and ammunition, mortar shells, antitank mines, 60- and 82-millimeter mortars, hand grenades, antiaircraft weapons, airborne missiles, several kinds of protective means against nuclear-chemical-biological [NHB] warfare, training and combat aircraft, radar detectors, reconnaissance radars, a wide assortment of electronic or radio connection devices and equipment used in the rear. The central place in the production of military technical equipment that used to be manufactured in the secessionist republics, in the modernization of the existing combat technical equipment, as well as in the development of new combat systems to be used by the ground forces, the Air Force, and the Navy belongs to the Military-Technical Institute in Belgrade.

The Military-Technical Institute has integrated in itself the former Military-Technical Institutes of Ground Forces and Air Force and the Naval Institute in Zagreb, from which a number of our naval experts came. Thus, the Military-Technical Institute now satisfies the needs of all three services of the Yugoslav armed forces.

In the new situation, experts of the Military-Technical Institute first had to work on the adoption of new technologies and military production lines, which did not exist in Serbia and Montenegro before the transfer of gunpowder and all sorts of rocket fuel, the production of black gunpowder [crni barut] and fuses, mortars and ammunition for artillery weapons of 120-millimeter caliber, ammunition for infantry firearms, airborne bombs of 100, 200 and 500 kilograms, and Zolja and Osa shoulder-held rocket launchers.

How To Employ Capacities

In the past four years, the Valjevo-based Krusik plant achieved the best results in the adoption of new weapons production. This corporation, which counts more than 8,500 employees, of which one-half works in the special-purpose production section, is manufacturing weapons and ammunition for all three services of our armed forces. There is a long list of new products on which Krusik's experts have started production in new Yugoslavia. For ground forces, this plant manufactures mortars and mines, detonating fuses for artillery shells, and antitank guided missiles of the Maljutka type. For the Air Force, Krusik's experts have devised Strela 2M and Strela 10M missiles of 120-millimeter caliber, which are used by aircraft and helicopters at an altitude of up to 3,500 meters and a distance of up to 5,000 meters, as well as the rocket-programmed target [raketno-programirana meta], guided ballistic air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and airborne bombs of 100 and 500 kilograms. Finally, for the Navy, Krusik is manufacturing mines for anticommando operations and mine-sweeping instruments.

In the former Yugoslavia, about 1,000 plants took part in the production of tanks, while the final stage was carried out at Djuro Djakovic plant in Slavonski Brod. In the FRY, the 14 November plant in Krusevac is where the tanks are completed. Four years ago in Krusevac, five tow tanks were constructed, but after that the production line was suspended for lack of money for any major investment in this very expensive area of production. The aircraft industry is having similar problems, particularly the Utva plant in Pancevo, which has recently merged with the Belgrade-based Lola company, in order to overcome the crisis.

No sooner had the new Yugoslavia emerged from the ruins of the former state, than sanctions were imposed on it. Such a regime imposed on us by the international community banned us from all institutions and markets. Sanctions also affected the military industry, which lost its market. Many factories manufactured exclusively for the Army or were exporting arms through the Federal Directorate for trade in special-purpose production products. The budget was limited, while means allocated for the special-purpose production were too scarce to meet real needs. Nevertheless, production went on somehow, thanks to reserves, but these were dwindling as well. After the suspension of the UN-imposed sanctions and arms embargo, the special-purpose production companies are hoping for better days.

In providing our armed forces with the necessary equipment, Yugoslavia will be further relying on the capacities of its own military industry. Those capacities are now greater than the FRY's needs because they were designed and built to suit the needs of the former SFRY and its armed forces. Therefore, the surplus of capacities will be transformed and adjusted to civilian production. Some companies have already completed this process, while others are about to be restructured.

[Box, p 4]

Currently, the most important task of the FRY military industry is to use its capacities. The former state belonged to the exclusive club of the 10 biggest manufacturers and exporters of modern armament and military equipment. In the late 1980's, the average foreign currency gain from arms exports amounted to approximately $2.5 billion a year, which was twice as much as the annual gain from tourism. Yugoslav arms were highly thought of, selling throughout the world—in more than 80 countries.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Discusses Bosnia Plan With Kornblum

LD0705152796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1348 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 May (Tanjug)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received John Kornblum, U.S. assistant secretary of state, who arrived in Belgrade accompanied by his aides, the president's office has said in a statement.

Issues concerning the process of stabilization in the Balkan Region comprised the main topic for the talks. Special emphasis was placed on the need to implement the Bosnian Peace Plan and to normalize relations in the region.

Special attention was devoted to the implementation of the civilian section of the Dayton Agreement and current preparations for the coming elections. The two sides positively assessed cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the international players involved in the process of consolidating peace.

Emphasis was placed on the need to speed up economic recovery in the areas afflicted by the war as a precondition for restoring confidence and creating conditions for the return of refugees.

The talks also covered the issues of further advancing bilateral relations and cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States, which would be beneficial for both sides, and for the efforts to enhance stability in the region as a whole.

The talks were also attended by Milan Milutinovic, federal minister of foreign affairs.

Serbia: Milosevic Holds Talks With OSCE Mission Head

LD0705154696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 May (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Bosnia, President Milosevic's office has announced.

The talks related to preparations for the elections in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation, which is a primary political task upon which the normalization of the overall situation and the establishment of lasting stability in areas of earlier hostilities depends.

It is vital to ensure the conditions for the holding of democratic elections at which the real political will of citizens in both entities will be able to be expressed and thus allow legally elected institutions to come into being that will responsibly carry out the mandate entrusted to them. Hence the need to prevent any form of discrimination and pave the way for citizens in the elections to express their will freely, it was said in the talks.

Also taking part in the talks was Milan Milutinovic, Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs.

Serbia: President Milosevic Receives Carl Bildt

LD0705175896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1722 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 May (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community for Bosnia, President Milosevic's office has announced.

Their talks focused on the implementation of the civilian part of the peace agreement. The view was that the provision of essential economic assistance in areas where the civil war took place should be accelerated and the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation should be treated completely equally in terms of material assistance.

It was emphasized that the regeneration of the economy should not be a means of exerting any kind of political pressure but should stimulate the process of the normalization of relations and the strengthening of peace.

Also taking part in the talks was Milan Milutinovic, Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs.

Serbia: Djindjic Predicts Poverty, Division Under Milosevic

AU0705134996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Apr 96 p 4

[Report on a panel discussion with Zoran Djindjic, leader of the Democratic Party, by B. Lazukic "in Curug and Zablje"; date not given: "We Have Gambled Away Our Children's Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Sad—"Do you know what sort of charge and accusation it is and what sort of curse it is if we allow ourselves to be a generation that has gambled away its children's future?" Zoran Djindjic asked at an extremely well attended panel discussion of the Democratic Party [DS] in Curug and Zablje, proposing that now, as quickly as possible, changes should be made in society that should have been made five years ago and that mean the complete reform of both the political and economic system in this country.

"What has happened to us in the past five years," he noticed, "has not been a natural catastrophe or rain. Because, if it were that way, Mirko Marjanovic, Dragan Tomic, and Marko Milosevic [Serbian prime minister, Serbian Assembly chairman, and Milosevic's son, respectively, all allegedly involved in corruption cases] would also have gotten wet. They have not shared the destiny of this nation. Only we were left out to get wet, whereas they took shelter in their castles in good time."

"If at the elections in this and in the next years nothing happens in our country," Djindjic stressed, "then we may not need the next elections in four years at all because there will be nothing left to decide on in a country in which the national income per capita will be like the last African tribe. A country that will be completely uninteresting for any sort of capital, which will only export raw materials, like wood and ore?

"The money from such exports will go to the small oligarchy, which will live in Dedinje [exclusive part of Belgrade, where Milosevic lives] and will be guarded by 10,000 or 100,000 policemen."

Analyzing the structure of the present regime, Djindjic noticed that the people who get tied to it are those who obtain material privileges through it or who simply enjoy its power. And there is "someone" tied to the regime with a wedding ring:

"All that a nation should be ashamed of has in our country been raised to the level of state values. Thus we have someone who, on the basis of her wedding ring and only because she is the wife of the president of the Republic represents the greatest power in the country. She has so much power that she can appear on television whenever she wants to, appoint the government she likes, and change ministers when she likes!

"This means that, without any elections, without any support among the people, she has the greatest power that one can have in a country. A nation that has a tradition, pride, and dignity cannot endure such things," Djindjic said, prompting thunderous applause.

"Today we are led by a man whose main quality is that he divides us," Djindjic said. "He has torn apart everything that was possible to be torn apart. Only Montenegro is left, and he will chase Montenegro away, too! Then Vojvodina will be left, and he will chase Vojvodina away! Then he will chase away Sumadija, eastern Serbia, western Serbia, he will chase away everything. In the end he will chase his wife away, too! Perhaps he should have done that at the beginning, in order to keep everything else. He prefers to be the captain of a ship that sinks rather than being the third or fourth officer of a ship that sails proudly.

"That is why he brought in the worst scum and put them in the most responsible positions: the director of the customs service, the directors of various public enterprises, the chief of police. Their only goal is to protect his rule, and his only goal is to keep that rule. He wants to rule for the sake of it, not in order to do something in Serbia or for Serbia," DS President Zoran Djindjic said.

[Box, p 4]

"Makeup" for Zebic!

Asked about the future of Governor [of the FRY National Bank] Avramovic, Djindjic said that only his international credibility still kept him in his post:

"The moment the regime realizes that through the governor they will not get any credits, that there are conditions in the world for getting them, he will be removed. They have already started preparing and 'putting makeup' on Zebic [Serbian finance minister, tipped to replace Avramovic], and, as you have seen, they have already dyed his hair to prepare him to be the new governor."

Serbia: Comment on 'Real Power' of JUL, Alliance With SPS

AU0705145996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 96 p 7

[Commentary by N. Todorovic: "Reserve Party for Authorities' Needs"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A series of prominent people participated at the recent seminar of the Yugoslav Left [JUL] in the Cukarica commune, one which most certainly did not belong in the class of top promotions: These were Dragoljub Kocevic, sports director of the Karate Union of Yugoslavia; Dusan Janicijevic and Nenad Stekic, sports and general directors of the Crvena Zvezda club, respectively; Slobodan Brankovic, former European champion in the 400-meter race in 1992; and so on.

Such a disproportionate number of very-well-known people at a sideshow speaks of the real power of the JUL. Generally speaking, this power can be illustrated in the following way: It is a well-known that the JUL is an extraparliamentary organization but, on the other hand, it has an incredible impact on the mechanisms used to control public opinion (Radio Television of Serbia sometimes broadcasts as many as four reports in the main state newscast on the JUL promotion rallies).

"We are interesting to the public at large," JUL spokesman Aleksandar Vulin innocently said once, and he recently remarked with satisfaction that the movement he represents is obviously "expanding."

The high profile on the air has been followed by a heavy presence on the ground since the JUL has been spreading its network throughout Serbia. It has organized a network of committees in more than 80 percent of the municipalities in Serbia, and now it is set to penetrate "the pores"—that is, constitute committees in communes. The official line is that about 100,000 people have joined the movement.

"Pact" on Nonaggression

The JUL offensive clearly could not have begun without the blessing of the authorities. Some most important personnel changes in the Socialist Party have been interpreted as the removal of anti-JUL elements. Following the last Socialists' congress, Vulin noted for NASA BORBA that the new leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] did not begin its session with an attack on the JUL, which, on the other hand, "does not have any reason to feel embarrassed about the things that have happened in the SPS."

In this entire affair, it appears that the fewest mistakes will be made if two things are acknowledged: First, this movement is trying to absorb everything on the left that is not already with the Socialists (so it is made up of over 20 organizations, as they themselves say, from the Communist Alliance-Movement for Yugoslavia to Social Democratic organizations), and second, as Vulin said: "The JUL has not stained itself with nationalism so the organization has support in multiethnic communities." The official line is that the participation of ethnic minorities in this movement is greater than in other political parties, and the spokesman claims that in ethnically mixed communities people are joining them in much greater numbers than the SPS, among other things also because they have not cooperated with Seselj.

The public thinking is that the Socialists will try and make up for a possible lack of supporters—due to political shifts—at the next elections through the votes gathered by the JUL. This assumption is brought under a question mark by one (internal) research poll in the ruling party, according to which the JUL has no chance, at least not for the moment, of winning a single assembly deputy seat.

Despite this, the state forcing of the JUL is continuing through persistent insistence, as the leading party dogma, on the cooperation of leftist forces and the creation of their "bloc." This symbiosis implies the presence of Socialist representatives at the JUL promotion rallies, which is emphasized in the abundant state media reports. Considering the "hippie" slogans of the JUL, such media pressure can be seen as "memory washing"—that is, as attempts to erase the public memories of earlier greater Serbiandom of the state leadership. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Montenegro: PM Criticizes Yugoslav Government Over Economy

LD0705204996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1510 GMT 7 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 7 May (TANJUG)—Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic has again insisted on the need to speed up the privatization process, which he said is "an imperative and essential prerequisite for the achievement of a market economy and a developed society." He was speaking at a meeting of top representatives of the Montenegrin economy in Podgorica today. [passage omitted]

Djukanovic said that, to a large extent, the reasons for the embattled economy and slow recovery lies in the impractical policy decisions and behavior of the federal government which, in his view, is simply hampering or preventing the creation of conditions for a market economy and the international reintegration of the country.

"So far, Montenegro has endeavored to encourage the speeding up of the desired changes in federal regulations or has itself provided substitutes for certain federal functions. If the hesitation and reserved position of the federal government continues, we will have to be even more radical in our positions in this area," Djukanovic stressed.

He also expressed his dissatisfaction with what he described as the "nonfunctioning of the federal state" in relations between the national bank and the federal government, stressing that "Montenegro supports governor Avramovic in his efforts to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the international community."

Montenegro: Students Boycott Address by JUL Chief Markovic

AU0405204396 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 4 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Mira Markovic Boycotted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Montenegrin students abandoned the ceremony in Lepenski Vir when participants in a gathering of students from the natural sciences and mathematical faculties were addressed by Mira Markovic, president of the Yugoslav Left directorate. As MONTENA FAX reports, all 97 students from the Montenegrin faculty left the hall when Mira Markovic started to speak and only returned after the end of her speech.

Montenegro: Black Market DM Rate Jumps

AU0305125796 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 3 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "German Mark Again 3.5 Dinars"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The value of the German mark [DM] on the black market in Podgorica has jumped and since yesterday amounts to 3.5 dinars, MONTENA-FAKS reports.

After a lengthy period of stillness and a subsequent fall, when the black market rate became equal to the official exchange rate of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the value of one DM with street dealers in Podgorica has jumped from 3.30 to 3.50 dinars.

The agency claims that there are realistic grounds for an assumption that the money printing house at Topcider has been issuing extra money, saying that shortly before May Day all employees in state-run institutions received salaries in unused bank notes with new serial numbers, which confirms that the bank notes were brand new.

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